0001 1 PUBLIC HEARING OF THE NEW JERSEY RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 2 * * * 3 Wednesday, July 14th, 2010 Salem, New Jersey 4 * * * 5 6 PANEL PRESENT: JERRY HUMPHREYS, Hearing officer 7 THOMAS SCARDINO, Sergeant First Class JON CHRISTIANSEN, New Jersey Division of 8 State Police PAT MULLIGAN, Manager of the DEP's 9 Bureau of Nuclear Engineering JAMES LANGENBACH, New Jersey Department 10 of Health and Senior Services 11 HELD AT: SALEM COUNT COURTHOUSE 12 SALEM, NEW JERSEY 13 14 REPORTED BY: Krista Morici, Shorthand Reporter 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 CLASS ACT REPORTING AGENCY REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 23 1420 Walnut Street 133H Gaither Drive Suite 1200 Mt. Laurel, NJ 08054 24 Philadelphia, PA 19103 (856) 235-5108 (215) 928-9760 25 0002 1 - - - 2 (Whereupon, the hearing commenced at 3 approximately 7:00 p.m.) 4 - - - 5 MR. HUMPHREYS: Already it's 7:00, let's 6 get started. Good evening. My name is Jeffrey 7 Humphreys. I'm a Nuclear Engineer in the Nuclear 8 Engineering Section in the Bureau of Nuclear 9 Engineering within the State of New Jersey Department 10 of Environmental Protection. I'll be the hearing 11 officer this evening. 12 The purpose of this hearing is to receive 13 testimony, comments, and questions regarding the 14 adequacy and effectiveness of the New Jersey 15 Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power 16 Plants. In order that this hearing may be properly 17 documented, these proceedings are being recorded by a 18 shorthand reporter. 19 Everyone attending this meeting is asked to 20 sign the attendance sheet before leaving. The 21 attendance sheets for these hearings are used to 22 update the Bureau of Nuclear Engineering's public 23 hearing mailing list. 24 Public notice of this hearing was published 25 in the New Jersey Register on June 7th and June 21st, 0003 1 2010. In addition, public notice was published in the 2 Today's Sunbeam from July 7th through July 13th, 2010. 3 Copies of the public notice for the three hearings 4 were mailed in June to all persons who attended last 5 year's hearings. 6 This hearing will proceed as follows: I 7 will provide a brief background on why we're 8 conducting this hearing. Then I'll introduce the 9 panel members and ask them to briefly describe the 10 role of their organization in nuclear emergency 11 preparedness and response. Finally, I will open the 12 hearing for comments and questions from the public. 13 The New Jersey Radiation Accident Response 14 Act requires that the Department of Environmental 15 Protection, in cooperation with the New Jersey 16 Division of State Police, conduct public hearings to 17 take comment on, and to address questions relevant to, 18 the adequacy and effectiveness of the New Jersey 19 Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power 20 Plants. 21 These hearings are held annually in each of 22 the three counties affected by the plan; Ocean County 23 for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, and 24 Salem and Cumberland Counties for the Salem Unit 1, 25 Salem Unit 2, and Hope Creek Nuclear Generating 0004 1 Stations. We're here tonight to listen to your 2 questions and comments on New Jersey's nuclear 3 emergency response plan. Comments on more general 4 nuclear power issues or issues that relate to 5 licensing and regulatory matters at nuclear power 6 plants are not within the purview of this meeting and 7 hence are not appropriate, and will not be addressed. 8 The purpose of the plan is to coordinate 9 and implement an immediate and comprehensive response 10 at the state, county, and municipal levels to a 11 radiological emergency associated with any nuclear 12 power plant affecting the State County Emergency 13 Management Office in Mannington Township, the 14 Cumberland County Office of Emergency Management in 15 Bridgeton, the Ocean County Office of Emergency 16 Management in Berkeley Township, the New Jersey Office 17 of Emergency Management in West Trenton, and in public 18 libraries in Salem, Cumberland, and Ocean Counties. 19 Now, I'd like to introduce the members of 20 the panel. Sergeant First Class Thomas Scardino and 21 Mr. Jon Christiansen are representing the New Jersey 22 Division of State Police. Sergeant Scardino is the 23 Unit Head of the Radiological Emergency Response 24 Planning and Technical Unit, and Mr. Christiansen is 25 an Executive Assistant II in Radiological Emergency 0005 1 Response Planning and Technical Unit. Mr. Patrick 2 Mulligan is representing the New Jersey Department of 3 Environmental Protection. Mr. Mulligan is the Manager 4 of the DEP's Bureau of Nuclear Engineering. Mr. James 5 Langenbach is representing the New Jersey Department 6 of Health and Senior Services. Mr. Langenbach is an 7 Operations Program Manager in the Department's 8 Operations Program for emergency preparedness and 9 Response. If questions arise that involve the 10 responsibilities of DHSS, I will call on him for a 11 response. 12 Now I will ask Sergeant Scardino to briefly 13 describe the role of the State Police in the plan. 14 SERGEANT SCARDINO: Good evening, everyone. 15 It's good to see everyone survived the rain in getting 16 here this evening. For the record my name is Sergeant 17 First Class Thomas Scardino. I'm representing the New 18 Jersey Office of Emergency Management which is within 19 the New Jersey Division of State Police. Our office, 20 as you may know, has the responsibility for 21 administering and implementing the Radiological 22 Emergency Response Plan for incidents at nuclear power 23 plants in New Jersey. In addition to the preparation 24 of Radiological Emergency Response Plans the New 25 Jersey State Police is the lead agency in the follow 0006 1 functional areas: The notification and communication, 2 command and coordination, protective actions which 3 include evacuation, shelter and place, access control, 4 food, water and milk control. 5 The parallel actions also include traffic 6 control, decontamination, exposure control, mask care, 7 law enforcement, fire control, public health and 8 reentry return and recovery. I would also like to 9 introduce Mr. John Christiansen who is the Executive 10 Assistant II to the Emergency Management Sections. 11 Mr. Allan Smith is a senior planner representing Salem 12 and Hope Creek Stations. And Sergeant Brian Everham 13 is from our southern regional office and is a liaison 14 to Salem County for Emergency Management Functions. 15 Thank you. 16 MR. HUMPHREYS: Now, I will ask Mr. 17 Mulligan to briefly describe the role of the 18 Department of Environmental Protection Plan. 19 MR. MULLIGAN: Good evening, everybody, and 20 thank you for coming out this evening. My name is Pat 21 Mulligan. I'm the Manager of the Bureau of Nuclear 22 Engineering. I'll briefly discuss the Department of 23 Environmental Protection and role in the New Jersey 24 Radiological Emergency Response Plan. 25 The New Jersey Radiological Emergency 0007 1 Response Plan includes the plan, standard operating 2 procedures and annexes. The plan identifies all 3 responsible state agencies and outlines their specific 4 roles in the event of a nuclear emergency. It is 5 based on five primary functions that outline the 6 actions to be performed in the event of a radiological 7 emergency at one of the four nuclear power plants in 8 New Jersey or at a plant in a neighboring state. 9 These actions are notification and communication, 10 accident assessment, command and coordination, 11 protective actions and parallel actions. 12 Since agency roles and responsibilities 13 don't change often, the plan essentially does not 14 change. The Standard Operating Procedures are 15 specific instructions and guidelines used by each 16 agency when performing their specific duties. 17 Procedures are reviewed and tested annually, and 18 revised whenever necessary in order to enhance 19 emergency response. The Annexes, A and B, are the 20 Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the 21 Salem/Hope Creek and Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating 22 Sites. Respectively, each annex describes the 23 planning basis and concept of operation for each of 24 the municipalities within the ten-mile Emergency 25 Planning Zones around each site. 0008 1 Under the New Jersey Radiation Accident 2 Response Act, the Department of Environmental 3 Protection has the lead role in accident assessment 4 and control of food, water and milk following an 5 incident. Accident assessment involves two separate 6 analyses, an engineering analysis of the event at the 7 plant as it unfolds, and an analysis of the amount of 8 radiation to which the public may be exposed in the 9 event of a release. 10 Depending upon the severity of the event, 11 the Department provides protective action 12 recommendations to the Governor, who will make a final 13 decision on actions to be implemented to protect 14 public health and safety. Protective action 15 recommendations for the public may include the 16 administration of potassium iodide, evacuation, 17 sheltering, and access control within the affected, or 18 potentially affected, area. The Act also specifies 19 the Department develop and implement a comprehensive 20 monitoring strategy that includes the daily monitoring 21 of levels of radioactivity in the environment. The 22 Department also provides public health, safety, and 23 technical guidance with respect to the preparation and 24 implementation of the plan. The Department's final 25 responsibility under the Act is to conduct, in 0009 1 cooperation with the State Police, public hearings 2 annually in each designated county to determine the 3 adequacy and effectiveness of the plan. 4 Members of my staff who are here and in 5 attendance tonight are Mr. Allen Rosenfield who is 6 representing our engineering section, Karen Discello 7 supervisor of our environmental section, Mr. Paul 8 Schwartz, a Nuclear Engineer in the environmental 9 section and Carol Shepard a radiation physicist in the 10 emergency preparedness. Thank you. 11 MR. HUMPHRIES: We will now proceed with 12 the public's questions and comments. Those 13 individuals who wish to speak should fill out a 14 registration card and hand it to one of the staff. I 15 will call the speaker's name in the same order as I 16 receive the registration cards. Please be certain to 17 clearly print your name and address on the 18 registration card so that we can contact you if we 19 need to respond to your comments and questions more 20 fully in writing. 21 When I call your name, come forward to the 22 microphone, face the panel, and make yourself 23 comfortable. Before you begin your comments, please 24 state and spell your name for the reporter. Speakers 25 will be limited to five minutes each. If time still 0010 1 remains after everyone has had a chance to speak, I 2 will invite additional comments from those individuals 3 who already spoken. In fairness to the speaker and in 4 order that we all can make the best use of this time, 5 I ask cooperation of the audience in refraining from 6 calling out. Comments from the audience will only 7 delay the proceedings and will disrupt our ability to 8 hear and accurately record the speaker's statements. 9 Again I would like to emphasize that we are 10 here tonight to listen to your questions and comments 11 on New Jersey's nuclear emergency response plan. 12 Comments on more general nuclear power issue or issues 13 that relate to licensing and regulatory matters at 14 nuclear power plants are not within the purview of 15 this meeting and hence are not appropriate, and will 16 not be addressed. Thank you. We will now proceed 17 with our first commenter. Please accept my apologize 18 in advance if I mispronounce your name. 19 For the record the gentleman who has 20 retired, who used to be the supervisor of Emergency 21 Planning for the BNE, his name is Mr. Nick DePiero. 22 I've mispronounced his name the last time I did this 23 more than once and want to go on the record having 24 done if correctly. I'm sorry he's not here to hear 25 it. 0011 1 The first speaker that I have is Frieda 2 Barryhill. 3 MS. BARRYHILL: My name is Frieda 4 Barryhill. I'm from Wilmington, Delaware. I would 5 like to address my statement to that letter that was 6 signed by Dr. Jill Lipoti, from the Department asking 7 for answers to certain questions. I brought a copy of 8 it me but I notice you have extra copies on the table, 9 so I was going to have this for you. 10 It asks for a public hearing response 11 document. Now, the responder is not identified, but 12 from the answers I conclude that the answers came from 13 PSE&G and I would like you to verify that for me. 14 The first question, the assumption that 15 Salem is drilled into bedrock, I wouldn't mind if that 16 discrepancy was cleared up. Answer, for the 17 transformation provides an excellent foundation 18 support for Salem. This transformation is located 70 19 feet below grade, as I always said the cement pilings 20 go down 70 feet. 21 Answer -- question, because artificial 22 island, is built on dredge spoils, and because the 23 pilings do not reach bedrock has there been any 24 studies done on liquefaction due to earthquakes? 25 Answer, this transformation is completely -- is 0012 1 completely adequate to the support the load. The 2 information consists of medium to coarse grain -- 3 formation for this operation medium to course grain 4 sand. This transformation is sand, it is not bedrock. 5 Now then, here is the response as it 6 compares to the Salem Plans through the soil and the 7 condition soil of the Niigata, Japan which had an 8 earthquake. And Dr. -- hard to pronounce Dr. Cashi 9 Cabobi (phin) that plant apparently he did not agree 10 with the conclusion. He was the professor at the 11 Research Center for Urban Safety and Security and he 12 stated, I was a member of the expert panel that 13 developed the new guideline but I resigned during the 14 final stage of the work to protest the panel, its 15 stance on the issue. 16 Now, the soil is not a good case of 17 reference here when the expert resigned, evidently, I 18 expect no resignation here, on July, 16th, 2007 and of 19 course nearly destroyed the whole complex and spilling 20 radioactive material through its broken pipes all over 21 the place, so much for this panel's conclusion here. 22 The last sentence from this respondent is 23 extraordinary. It was concluded that the power block 24 and intake structure was safe from sliding, even if 25 the surrounding soil is completely liquefied. 0013 1 Extraordinary, gentlemen, this statement in view of 2 the facts that Salem's pools are filled. Pools 3 holding five to ten times more radioactivity than the 4 reactive building. In spite of the fact one crack in 5 the pool could be devastating. We're going into dry 6 cast storage, are they holding up? Let's make no 7 mistake here dry cast storage does not eliminate the 8 spill pools, garage still must be in the pools for 9 several years before they can put the dry cast 10 storage. We have the addition there of radioactivity. 11 You have held these hearings for years and 12 I attended every one of them. I know you understand 13 the problem and I'm convinced you have a clear 14 understanding of what is at stake here. You know that 15 the last NCR's report estimated that injuries can be 16 in the billions of dollars. Why is it then, that you 17 cannot answer questions posted by people who come here 18 looking for answers? 19 Now, example please, I read the transcript 20 in Cumberland County. Question, because artificial 21 islands is an artificial island, built with dredge 22 spoils, and because the foundation of the pilings for 23 Salem/Hope Creek do reach bedrock, have there been any 24 studies done on liquefaction due to earthquakes? And 25 I believe we're going to have to get back to you on 0014 1 that. That was his answer. That was the answer he 2 gave. Okay. Mr. Mulligan, yeah, we're going to have 3 to look at the study. We'll take a look at it. 4 Alright. Mr. Mulligan, liquefaction is a phenomenon 5 of sand -- I'm going back to the transcript, to take a 6 look at dredge spills, I don't know that it's quite 7 the same but we'll take a look at it, at the 8 engineering. And I'm sure they are out there. 9 Gentlemen, they are out there, they have been for 40 10 years. I've been in the files, the maps all there 11 with the soil conditions, and documents are there, the 12 hearing transcripts are here. He said, yes, I'm sure 13 we'll see, we're sure they're out there. 35 foot mud 14 and sand, 35 foot gravel and sand, 35 foot Vincentown 15 Formation, a 100 feet reach no rock bottom. 16 And again, the hearings in Salem County. 17 Example, and I'm reading from the transcript again, my 18 name is Nancy Willy, I'm just a little concerned with 19 the discrepancy, Mr. Mulligan, is that his name, we 20 had spoken earlier and he's under the assumption that 21 Salem is drilled into rock bottom but we have Frieda 22 who says she investigated at length and then we have 23 chain verifying it, it's not bedrock so maybe you 24 won't mind if that discrepancy was cleared up 25 especially if you're taking -- adding a fourth reactor 0015 1 at Salem. Now, this is interesting -- 2 MR. HUMPHREYS: Ms. Barryhill -- 3 MS. BARRYHILL: -- Ms. Barryhill, we'll get 4 back to you on that. 5 MR. HUMPHREYS: May I interrupt? We've 6 given you ten minutes, could you -- 7 MS. BARRYHILL: I have a few more minutes. 8 MR. HUMPHREYS: I'm not going to stop you 9 but if you can move along so we can have some of the 10 speakers. 11 MS. BARRYHILL: We'll get back to you, says 12 Mr. Mulligan. Why shouldn't you be able by this time, 13 after all these years, to answer this on record? Of 14 course the answers come -- it's my understanding that 15 Mr. Mulligan did answer some sentences later in the 16 letter stating that in effect I was right, 17 off-the-record. 18 Now changing the subject, please, I have 19 one more problem. As if we didn't have enough to 20 worry being PSE&G is proposing to produce Cobalt-60 at 21 Hope Creek, the only nuclear power plant to do so, but 22 Cobalt 50 rods are inserted with the regular fuel rods 23 to produce the Cobalt-60. Now, the dangers clearly 24 described in the letter to the NRC, my personal 25 concern is, however, the fact that granting this 0016 1 request makes PSE&G a profit making enterprise which 2 protects the company from disclosing proprietary 3 information. I again got an e-mail from the NRC by 4 PSE&G again requesting secrecy as to the production of 5 Cobalt-60. 6 Now, the NRC requests all the information, 7 but there's a problem, where will PSE&G hold the line 8 as to what should be public knowledge and what 9 shouldn't. And this is a real problem because there 10 is an enormous profit motive here, do we know what 11 that can do. God willing I'll see you next year. 12 MR. HUMPHREYS: Thank you. Next I have 13 Nancy Willing. 14 MS. WILLING: Since there wasn't any 15 feedback to Frieda I guess the procedure is done in 16 writing in answer to her questions? 17 MR. HUMPHREYS: Those questions will be 18 looked at, yes. We'll go over the transcript and look 19 at the questions. The questions that pertain to the 20 deal with the Emergency Plan will be addressed. 21 MS. WILLING: My name is Nancy Willing, 22 W-I-L-L-I-N-G. Frieda hit a lot of the points I was 23 interested in and I think it's fair to say that the 24 problems that we had last year aren't still adequately 25 addressed, I think she covered that adequately. 0017 1 I think the concern is -- the pending 2 concern is the Cobalt-60, there seems to be secrecy 3 and I think the responsibility to the public is what 4 bearing would this process have on potential accidents 5 and then basically through the emergency evacuation 6 plan would there be specific information, and 7 adjustments, and amendments made relative to a new 8 commercial enterprise and process within these power 9 plants? 10 This is a brand new thing, it's very 11 disturbing that this level of secrecy evidently is 12 surrounding it. 13 So the question would be, what since 14 there's something new, it's not old hat, it's 15 something new and I think we'd like to see whatever 16 you come up with that would address these changes. 17 Thank you very much. 18 MR. HUMPHREYS: Thank you. Jane Nogaki. 19 MS. NOGAKI: My name is Jane Nogaki, 20 N-O-G-A-K-I. I represent the New Jersey Environmental 21 Federation, which is New Jersey's largest 22 environmental group, we have 100,000 members in the 23 State of New Jersey and we're a chapter of the 24 National Clean Water action. 25 Now, so to also give some comments tonight, 0018 1 Delaware River network asked me to, you know, deliver 2 some remarks on their behalf as well. Norm Collin 3 couldn't be here tonight, he usually is, so I'm 4 providing some comments on their behalf as well. 5 And one is that pick up on the theme that 6 Frieda and Nancy have brought up, the Cobalt-60, the 7 potential for the using of this material, the 8 inserting rods into the existing whatever it is to 9 make this product raises the level of concern in 10 security around the plant because it's an additional 11 source of nuclear material that isn't currently there. 12 It's going to be transported in and transported out. 13 And so while it may not affect the evacuation plan 14 directly it certainly adds to the list of security 15 concerns and safety concerns around the plant because 16 there's going to be movement of this on and off site. 17 Certainly we oppose the application for a 18 new nuclear plant there for the same reasons that it 19 increases the risk to the public. More nuclear 20 material on site, more waste to be developed on site, 21 and the fact that the construction alone of a fourth 22 reactor on this site as Frieda talks about is built on 23 a sand formation, the Vincentown Formation, in a sand 24 formation it does not seem appropriate or safe. 25 As I recall at last year's meeting the very 0019 1 date of that meeting there was an earthquake. It was 2 considered, you know, too low to be a level of concern 3 but, nevertheless, it brought home the fact somebody 4 mentioned that had they felt that at Mannington 5 Meadow, right, they could feel the ground shake, this 6 is of concern. 7 I think that last year I also brought up 8 the fact that how is coordination with the State of 9 Delaware in case of an emergency. Many Delaware 10 residents live actually closer to the plan than people 11 in Salem County. And I'm wondering what the 12 coordination is, you know, we're having an evacuation 13 plan hearing here tonight and there is places to go 14 for the residents in Salem and Cumberland. But what 15 about the residents that live across the water in 16 Delaware, do they have their on evacuation plan 17 meetings? Do they have a similar response document 18 that they have annual hearings on? You know, is there 19 communication between the State Police, the emergency 20 management and New Jersey and Delaware City for 21 instance? 22 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes. 23 MS. NOGAKI: I have another question and 24 that is, in this booklet it's, you know, pretty 25 straightforward and written pretty simply describing 0020 1 where people live, where they should go, that they 2 should listen to the radio to see, you know, what 3 center they go to, whether it's County College or -- 4 in Bridgeton, or the high school, my concern is 5 that -- I assume, that you will make this 6 determination based on some kind of plume map 7 analysis. 8 MR. HUMPHREYS: Yes, ma'am. 9 MS. NOGAKI: And then they'll be, you know, 10 based on which way the wind is blowing the attempt 11 will be to take people in another direction right away 12 from where the plume is going. So on these bus routes 13 how do people know, you know, what direction their 14 ultimately heading, do they listen to the radio, and 15 the radio tells them go, you know, Bridgeton, or go to 16 Pennsville or go to Salem Votech? 17 MR. HUMPHREYS: If you continue on we'll -- 18 I might ask Sergeant Scardino to discuss exactly how 19 the plan works and how traffic is controlled, et 20 cetera and he will give you a better feel for that and 21 also coordination between New Jersey and Delaware and 22 what is done over there. 23 MS. NOGAKI: And then related to that, you 24 know, people know what which direction to go, in this 25 booklet it says the people should listen to the radio, 0021 1 but what happens if there's a power failure and people 2 can't listen to their radio, how are they going to 3 know where to go? 4 In the coordination of the bus response, 5 the buses are going to come from somewhere to these, 6 right, locations to do the routes and pick up. What 7 happens if the buses are in the area where the plume 8 is leading towards, are they going to drive through 9 the plume to get to their route? In other words, you 10 know, is there, you know, are there like three 11 different locations where buses might come from so 12 that they're traversing through the plume or not 13 located within the plume? So I have a concern about 14 that. 15 Also in looking at your schedule of 16 emergency response training, I see a lot of trainings 17 that were done in '09 and I see the announcement of 18 some kinds of plume map exercised that schedule for a 19 plume and ingestion passageway exit site plan for 20 2010, has that occurred yet? 21 MR. HUMPHREYS: That's been completed. 22 MS. NOGAKI: But it's not reported in this 23 fax sheet? 24 MR. HUMPHREYS: It was completed May 18, 19 25 and 20. 0022 1 MS. NOGAKI: Okay. These fact sheets make 2 it look like the only thing that happened was 2009, so 3 I have assumed and you're corroborating that some kind 4 of exercise takes place on a earlier basis at least? 5 MR. HUMPHREYS: That exercise is every six 6 years and we have quarterly exercises at different 7 sites around the plant. And whenever we do the 8 exercises -- the drills here, Delaware is also 9 included in that annual exercise. 10 MS. NOGAKI: And my last question is about 11 there is a tritium fact sheet here because there was a 12 tritium at 50 times the drinking water standards in 13 April of 2010. And there's a report here that it's 14 felt by the monitoring of -- that DEP did and PSE&G 15 did everything was contained in the catch basins and 16 so forth. But my question is because what -- tritium 17 leaks have been a continued problem, not only at this 18 nuclear plant but at Oyster Creek. There were over 24 19 tritium leaks at Oyster Creek that we just found out, 20 since the 1984 era only four were actually reported to 21 the NRC, there were over 24 tritium leaks there. I'm 22 wondering what is being done to address this problem 23 to prevent it from it happening again because if these 24 tritium leaks keep occurring eventually you keep 25 building, you know, things to contain these things it 0023 1 could be breached. And we're wondering what is the 2 source, why did this leak even happen in the first 3 place? You know, this is not perhaps something that 4 would require an evacuation but certainly contributes 5 to the overall risk of the plan and released to the 6 environment. Whether it's to the groundwater, to the 7 surface water, to the Delaware River, so I'm 8 wondering, you know, what the plant is doing and what 9 the emergency response folks are asking of PSE&G to 10 prevent this from happening again because, you know, 11 it leaks, it's, you know, lack of redundancy that can 12 lead to catastrophe. You've witnessed the oil spill 13 out in the Gulf and no redundant safety feature there 14 that the cap that didn't work. What about these 15 tritium leaks, where is the redundancy, you know, to 16 prevent them happening again? 17 So in conclusion, you know, I'll look for 18 your responses, but I again address these concerns to 19 the emergency management folks who really bear the 20 brunt of response and picking up the pieces when 21 something happens. The burden shouldn't be entirely 22 on you to do this, it should be the responsibility of 23 the nuclear power plant itself to do its best to keep 24 operating safely and to prevent risk, and to reduce 25 risk. And we see that actually going in the wrong 0024 1 direction both by even considering processing 2 Cobalt-60 at the plant and by building a fourth 3 reactor in a place where we don't think even 1, 2, or 4 3 should have been built. That includes my remarks. 5 MR. HUMPHREYS: I'm going to ask Sergeant 6 Scardino to address your questions directly with 7 regards to the plan which would be interaction between 8 New Jersey and Delaware and how that works, what are 9 response is as you ask about buses, evacuation routes, 10 how does that happen, that's all part of the response 11 plan, program something that is practiced and -- 12 SERGEANT SCARDINO: Good evening. I think 13 I'm going repeat what I thought your questions to the 14 plan may be, the first comment regarding Cobalt-60 15 manufacturing and the shipment of radioactive 16 materials to and from the site and although that is 17 not part of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan 18 for nuclear power plants shipments are routinely 19 tracked if there are certain radioactivities and 20 quantities in cooperation -- the NJ DEP locate will 21 regulate those shipments, local law enforcement is 22 notified of those shipments and so forth so that would 23 be a common practice as a security feature for 24 shipment of any radioactive material in the state it 25 meets a certain quantity. 0025 1 MS. NOGAKI: Do you practice response of 2 those kinds of accidents too because if like a truck 3 rolled over and there was a breach of the container 4 that spilled out on the road? 5 SERGEANT SCARDINO: Absolutely, throughout 6 the state routinely, you know, New Jersey has a lot of 7 hazardous materials in it. So our first response 8 organizations throughout the state routinely practice 9 drills involving hazardous materials not only 10 radiation but chemical and other sources as well. So 11 I hope that addresses that question for you. 12 The second one that you talked about is the 13 coordination with the State of Delaware. And in any 14 event involving the release of radiation of the plant 15 or even during drills routinely have a direct connect 16 phone line to Delaware and our state directors from 17 each state will communicate and coordinate protective 18 action, decision making and implementation. 19 If we're going to clear the river, for 20 example, we'll call Delaware and coordinate that 21 function with them when we're going to clear the 22 river, maritime traffic. And also we routinely meet 23 with Delaware on a quarterly basis through our 24 committees that we have. And during your drills as 25 Jerry mentioned we conduct quarterly drills and also 0026 1 communication drills on a routine basis as well, so 2 we're always in constant contact with our partners in 3 Delaware. 4 MS. NOGAKI: What about this redundancy if, 5 you know, there is a power failure -- 6 SERGEANT SCARDINO: Right. 7 MS. NOGAKI: I assume, you know, power -- 8 nuclear power, these three power plants provide about 9 a third of the power of New Jersey. If this plant is 10 not operating and there is, you know, a lack of 11 electricity. Suppose there is multiple things 12 happening, there's an accident at the plant and at the 13 same time there's a power outage due to a storm, then 14 how do people get the word of I need to go to 15 Bridgeton, or I need to go to Pennsville, or I need to 16 go to the Votech? 17 SERGEANT SCARDINO: I'm going to let John 18 Christiansen answer that but, you know, the good thing 19 is that PSE&G has battery back up to their siren 20 systems so the sirens would activate. And I'll let 21 John talk about our routing procedures in the event 22 there is a power failure. 23 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Well, the first one, I'd 24 like to make is that the Salem plants do not 25 necessarily provide the electricity for in this room. 0027 1 This is a different franchise area, it is Atlantic 2 City Electric they still call it now. So the Salem 3 Plants being offline may or may not cause a disruption 4 here, more significant power disruption would be with 5 Atlantic City. 6 If we did lose power, as all emergency 7 management around the country we rely on the emergency 8 alert system and the sirens still function. As 9 Sergeant Scardino mentioned there is a battery backup 10 capable for over 24 hours actually to have a full 11 siren blast. Our emergency responders all have 12 emergency operations centers that are provided with 24 13 hours emergency power capabilities so we have the 14 capability to bring in the emergency responders. And 15 we have what we call RAD alert plans that provide 16 notification to the public and they can provide 17 instructions. Now, their primary purpose would be if 18 say the sirens were not available at all, say a car 19 hit the siren poll and it was obliterated but the 20 route alert teams could, if necessary, provide 21 emergency instructions to the public. 22 MS. NOGAKI: And how would they do that? 23 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: They would go on 24 designated streets using TA systems, this is evaluated 25 annually. They are required to get their routes 0028 1 completed within 45 minutes of the siren failing and 2 this is evaluated by the State of New Jersey during 3 the off year exercise and by FEMA, during the FEMA 4 evaluated exercises. We could use that system to 5 provide emergency instructions. 6 But the emergency instruction that would be 7 most important would be to go to your car and turn 8 your radio on because the car radio is still going to 9 work. And this is similar to the way states that are 10 affected more significantly by hurricanes. The car 11 radio, unless the battery is dead it should function. 12 But they can provide the emergency instructions and 13 advise residents where to go to a reception center if 14 all else were to fail. And that system is tested and 15 it's tested very vigorously. 16 MS. NOGAKI: And are all these routes going 17 to be covered -- 18 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Those are the bus routes 19 for persons who do not have access to an automobile. 20 MS. NOGAKI: But these are the areas that 21 will be evacuated? 22 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: These are the routes 23 that the buses would traverse, yes. 24 MS. NOGAKI: These are all areas that would 25 need to be covered if -- 0029 1 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: They are all within the 2 EPZ, yes, ma'am. 3 MS. NOGAKI: And these emergency 4 responders, are they primarily volunteers servicing 5 these areas? 6 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: In Salem and Cumberland 7 County, yes, they are primarily volunteers. I believe 8 the police department is available in Salem City as a 9 backup, although they do have a number of volunteer 10 firefighters and the firefighters would be the primary 11 resource in Elison Borough and Mannington, and 12 Pennsville would either be the police department -- it 13 can be the police department or fire department. 14 Usually it's the police department in Pennsville. And 15 the police departments routinely test those and we 16 evaluate them and we use the same standards that FEMA 17 uses to make sure that everything is done within the 18 required time limits. 19 MS. NOGAKI: What was the response on the 20 exercise that you did a completed exercise -- this 21 plant where there was a criticism that there was a 22 period of time making decisions and getting faxes out, 23 has that problem been fixed? 24 SERGEANT SCARDINO: We're going to 25 re-demonstrate that tomorrow July 15th for the Federal 0030 1 Emergency Management Agency, yes. 2 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: If I could clarify that 3 it was not so much the decision process, but it was -- 4 MS. NOGAKI: The communication of it? 5 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: It was developing the 6 message itself, there was a precand message and that 7 message was being wordsmith and they weren't being 8 mindful of the time. Normally those messages are 9 completed within 35 minutes from the -- and they are 10 on the air 35 minutes from the time that we 11 acknowledge that a general emergency is declared. 12 This time it went about 23 minutes or so longer 13 because of, you know, just trying to change the 14 working a little bit. I think what that whole issue 15 there just validates is the exercise process. 16 Normally we do this in about 35 minutes. 17 FEMA came in, they identified that we didn't and they 18 made the state aware of this and the state embraced 19 it, recognized that the process had too many people 20 involved in the handing of the message. It was a 21 route cause review and it was determined that the 22 number of steps between the time that we find out 23 about the general emergency and make a protective fact 24 and decision and construct an EAS message, the number 25 of people handing that needed to be reduced 0031 1 significantly. There has been a couple of test runs 2 that have been conducted. And tomorrow we'll have an 3 opportunity to verify that streamline process with 4 FEMA. 5 But our view on the exercise is that, you 6 know, we welcome their observations if there is an 7 issue and we're not doing something that we should we 8 want to know about it so we can correct it. 9 MS. NOGAKI: What do you think the amount 10 of time is between when say a release that would be 11 significant enough to require an evacuation and the 12 time to get the messages out and the time to actually 13 do the evacuation, what do you think that time span 14 would be from the time something is first reported, 15 you know, to the realization that it's significant 16 enough to need an evacuation? 17 SERGEANT SCARDINO: It's all scenario 18 driven. 19 MS. NOGAKI: -- the format of, you know, 20 what the area is to be evacuated, what time do you 21 think it would take to actually evacuate it, like an 22 hour, a day? 23 SERGEANT SCARDINO: It's scenario driven, 24 if it's -- if we communicate with the emergency 25 director at the facility and they're communicating to 0032 1 us that the accident and the BNE is communicating to 2 us that the accident is severe or something, we may 3 initiate a protective action at a site area emergency 4 for example, or we may start moving certain 5 populations early on during the alert level 6 classification. So to answer your question it's kind 7 of hard to give a fixed number, it's scenario driven 8 dependant on the accident itself. As John mentioned 9 typically 35 minutes to 45 minute range to get the 10 public moving is when they're going to hear that 11 emergency alert system message. When it's broadcasted 12 over the radio, they're going to hear the sirens, the 13 radio -- turn to their radios and at that point 14 they'll start moving and getting in their vehicle. So 15 from the time we get a report of affective action 16 decision crafting EAS message and communicate that out 17 to the public that's the time we're talking about. 18 MS. NOGAKI: One more thing, I notice 19 there's a list of schools here and then their host 20 schools where they would go to, wouldn't that change 21 based on the plume map? 22 SERGEANT SCARDINO: It may. But, you know, 23 again we rely on the data from the DEP and the 24 facility, you know, we're dealing with a ten mile EPZ 25 and our host outside the ten mile EPZ. 0033 1 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I'd like to add a caveat 2 to that as well -- 3 MS. NOGAKI: What happens if, you know, 4 they are in the directions where the wind is blowing? 5 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: If I could. We're aware 6 that the reason we have those schools identified so 7 the parents know where the children will be. And the 8 objective of the state and the county is that if we 9 have an incident that is -- involves potential threat 10 to the public the schools, as Tom mentioned, would be 11 one of the groups that we would take precautionary 12 actions with. We would not wait for a general 13 emergency to move the schools, the schools would be 14 moved long before that. And the reason we put that in 15 there so that we don't have parents going to the 16 school if we know that the children have already been 17 relocated to a host school, we don't want to delay the 18 parents in their evacuation time. So that particular 19 population group is always first and foremost taking 20 precautionary actions. And I believe Delaware takes a 21 similar stance. 22 MS. NOGAKI: Thank you. 23 MR. HUMPHREYS: Our next commentator is 24 Bernard August. 25 MR. AUGUST: I would like to say that I 0034 1 want to thank you, the State of New Jersey, for having 2 passed legislation for public input on evacuation 3 plans of nuclear plants. 4 As we know being from Delaware we're here 5 to ask questions because we don't have these hearings 6 in Delaware. We're trying to get information about 7 evacuation planning and what's going to go on. It's 8 not communicated to the public very well. So I find 9 this really a privilege and an honor to come here and 10 to be able to sit here out of state and ask you some 11 really important questions that are very, very 12 consequential for us all with nuclear power plants. 13 So my name is Bernard August and I'm an 14 activist that's registered with the NRC and I get 15 involved intervening with the licensing, safety and 16 monitoring of nuclear plants. I've done it for like 17 30 years, I was one of the respondents in the Three 18 Mile and cases on that. 19 I've participated in numerous licenses and 20 safety hearings including two legal -- a two-year 21 legal battle of their restart of Three Mile Island, we 22 don't want a reactor. I've also participated in a 23 evacuation plan hearing that relates to nuclear 24 evacuation on a federal, state and county evacuations 25 for the last 30 years. 0035 1 And again, I want to thank, again, the 2 State of New Jersey, for having these hearings. 3 I'm going to submit an article to you that 4 was printed in last Sunday's News Journal Paper about 5 the nuclear plant risk. I don't know if you saw this 6 or not, it has a lot of pertinent information and 7 people expressing apparent risk of nuclear power 8 plants. It has a listing of all the reactors in the 9 area, as you can see it overlaps a large part of the 10 mid-Atlantic region, it talks about Limerick, Peach 11 Bottom, Oyster Creek, Calvert Cliffs, the population 12 densities. It talks about how many people live within 13 the evacuation zone. I think you guys may have read 14 this. I will give you, not this, but I will give you 15 the article printed off the internet for information. 16 I always have to say this, I think we have 17 an ugly job that we're doing. None of us, like, 18 really want to do this. This nuclear power and energy 19 has been thrust on us, it's a deadly technology. 20 Every nuclear power plant in the United States has 21 been built within the last 40 years out of specs. 22 They're unsafe, they have accidents, they break down, 23 and they emit radiation everyday. The consequences of 24 a nuclear accident are dire. And evacuation of an 25 area around the nuclear power plant especially in the 0036 1 mid-Atlantic region is completely unattainable, I've 2 testified to this several times. They do not have 3 adequate emergency procedures, they're all slip shots 4 because you have to rely on the information that you 5 got from the corporation running the plant. And from 6 TMI where I was involved for three years, and still 7 are as a matter of fact, it shows that there are too 8 many failures. You only have to look at what BP has 9 done the Gulf with this attitude. That's a corporate 10 attitude and it's a horrible one because life has put 11 down the minimum risk factor for someone's property. 12 So we're sitting here talking about human 13 lives, taking people out of school, disrupting farm 14 life, the whole agriculture base and the government of 15 this country for the sake of electricity. And so, you 16 know, I've been pushing, myself, other people were 17 hoping and we are getting to the point to where we're 18 probably going to get some replacement energy power 19 for these power plants. This is a political process, 20 that these plants can and will and should be 21 eventually shut down, they are running out of design 22 basis, there's miles and miles, and books and books, 23 and reports and reports, about getting adequacy of the 24 NRC, how they run the industry and their safety 25 procedures. FEMA inadequacies, we saw that with 0037 1 Katrina. And that, you know, I'm here just to say and 2 repeat what a lot of people and probably yourself feel 3 deep inside this is an exercise with unity, it's a 4 threat against the environment, our civil liberties 5 and our right to live in peace. Thank you. 6 MR. HUMPHREYS: Thank you. 7 Ms. Cheryl Reardon. 8 MS. REARDON: Cheryl Reardon, 9 R-E-A-R-D-O-N. I'm a project director with the 10 Association of New Jersey Environmental Commission. 11 I'm fairly new to the process, I attended the meeting 12 last year. But I'd like to say thank you for the 13 people from Delaware who have been attending many 14 years and offering comments, I really appreciate it. 15 Working for Anjack we're most -- our main 16 concern is the environmental issues especially the 17 water. With many residents in Salem County being on 18 private drinking wells the Delaware River is extremely 19 important to us. When I hear Tritium discharges at 50 20 times the federal standards it concerns me about our 21 drinking water. 22 And when I hear that other plants there 23 have been only four discharges reported out of 24 I 24 wonder what is the requirement for reporting these 25 discharges. This is one discharge how many have there 0038 1 been? What is the overall affect of numerous 2 discharges? Salem County has an extremely high cancer 3 rate, does Tritium cause cancer, is it in there as a 4 cancer causing act, I assume it probably is. 5 In the beginning one of the gentlemen 6 stated, I'm not sure which one, stated that the plan 7 does not change. Well, Salem County's population has 8 changed and I'm sure it was a consensus result the 9 relief that has shown that our population had 10 ages probably increase drastically, we're 11 predominately an older county. 12 I would think your plan would need to 13 change. How -- moving senior citizens with some 14 special needs health concerns is much harder and needs 15 more attention then moving people that are mobile and 16 younger. So it's really a great concern to me that 17 this plan hasn't changed. If one thing we've learned 18 from the oil spill, I hate to bring it up again, but 19 you need back up plan, after back up plan, after back 20 up plan, after back up plan and the affects of the 21 nuclear power would be far more devastating -- the oil 22 spill was bad and we're going deal with it for decades 23 and decades and decades, but this would be more 24 immediate. 25 Obviously, terrorism is a concern. If you 0039 1 took -- what are the plans if there were numerous 2 terrorist attacks on the evacuation plan, not just one 3 relief? 4 I can't even imagine -- when you get these 5 people to these schools and different locations, where 6 will they park? I mean, I understand you're going to 7 be running buses for some people but how are you going 8 to get these people to schools, usually they have 9 parking lots, but I don't know if they could hold that 10 many cars, it would be mass mayhem. 11 And the idea of building a fourth nuclear 12 power plant I'm not overall opposed to all the nuclear 13 power, but it has to be safe nuclear power. Why would 14 the fourth nuclear power plant -- will the plan change 15 them? Why would there be a fourth nuclear power 16 plant? Also does your plans address the accident that 17 will occur with aging plants, the existing plants are 18 getting old now. One concern I have is why isn't this 19 fourth nuclear plant replacing one of the outdated 20 nuclear power plants? Do you have studies that go -- 21 that look at what type of accidents could be expected 22 on aging nuclear power plants that weren't in the 23 first 40 years? 24 I was very concerned when I heard that a 25 statement was made that there was -- that it had been 0040 1 stated that the base is drilled into bedrock when it 2 appears it is drilled into sand. Well, how about the 3 climate change, the climate change will definitely 4 affect sand. We know that this part of the country is 5 going to be hit hard with climate change. Do you do 6 studies of the affects of the foundation of the plants 7 over the next 20 years? 8 And just in closing my main question I want 9 to know if all of the -- all of the releases at the 10 power plant in Salem and have been reported and in 11 which a procedure is for reporting. And while I 12 appreciate that New Jersey does have this type of 13 public of comment it just doesn't seem that one time a 14 year, giving people -- I'm sure these people had a lot 15 more to say, giving people 5 minutes is fair or 16 adequate. Thank you. 17 MR. HUMPHREYS: I'm going to ask Mr. 18 Mulligan to address changes in the plan and what he 19 meant -- and what was meant when he said that the plan 20 was not changed. Also of the effect of if there is a 21 fourth nuclear plant what affect does it have on the 22 plans. I'm going to ask him to speak to that. 23 I'm going to ask Sergeant Scardino to 24 address your terrorism question. 25 MR. MULLIGAN: When I made the statement 0041 1 earlier in my opening remarks that the plan doesn't 2 change I can kind of refine that a little. The plan 3 itself, which is right over here in that blue book is 4 a thin document, what the plans says is the DEP is 5 responsible for this, that doesn't change, okay? In 6 the plan it says that the state police are responsible 7 for this, that doesn't change, the health department 8 is responsible for this -- that, how we do that 9 changes constantly. What is I said the standard 10 operating procedures outlines what we do, how we do 11 it, who does it, what resources are available 12 constantly. So the plan itself doesn't change, the 13 standard operating procedures change constantly. 14 Every time we have an exercise -- we do post-exercises 15 assessment and see what needs to be approved on. We 16 receive feedback from evaluators of those exercises 17 and we've make changes to those standard operating 18 procedures. So that's what I meant when I talked 19 about the plan itself doesn't change. The plan merely 20 identifies who is responsible for what. The procedure 21 identifies how we do that plan. So it's not to say 22 that we don't make changes, we are constantly changing 23 the way we do business, the plan itself doesn't 24 change. 25 MS. REARDON: How will the plan change 0042 1 after the fourth nuclear power plant with your 2 operating procedure? 3 MR. MULLIGAN: Again, the operating 4 procedure it's really too early to speculate how that 5 will affect it. It depends what the design of the 6 plant is, it depends upon, you know, there are a lot 7 of things that are not in placement. And for me to 8 even start thinking how that would change our plan 9 that would be pure conjecture and I don't want to do 10 that at this point. I need to know what the plant is, 11 what the design of the plant is and other things need 12 to be in place, you know, we're early in the process, 13 the site has been committed but not approved yet by 14 NRC and then there's other steps that will be involved 15 in that constantly looking about, you know, how those 16 particular facts and designs and things like that 17 along the away affect the plans. 18 MS. REARDON: Does your plan have several 19 back up plans so if A fails or if there's multiple -- 20 in a case of terrorist attack that -- or is it just 21 one, is there different levels of operation procedure 22 and how you would evacuate, if the first one don't 23 work is there more? 24 SERGEANT SCARDINO: The plan is flexible, 25 any plan that we develop in emergency service is a 0043 1 flexible plan. As Pat said the assumptions and so 2 forth are standard in the thin booklet -- the plan is 3 flexible and is meant to be that way so that on scene 4 incident commanders can adjust and compensate for 5 varying events, as you're mentioning different types 6 of scenarios and so forth. It's a flexible type of 7 document and it allows the decision makers and the 8 commanders to make adjustments as needed. If that 9 kind of helps you out, I don't know. 10 MS. REARDON: It does and it doesn't. Does 11 the evacuation plan change in looking at the age of 12 these plants and other things like things that could 13 more frequently go wrong -- 14 SERGEANT SCARDINO: We have to be prepared 15 for release of radiation and to move the public out of 16 harm's way so that's what we focus on. It could be 17 caused by a terrorist incident, it could be caused by 18 an accident inside the plant, it could be caused by an 19 earthquake, the effect is going to be basically 20 radiation escaping from the plant and that's the 21 threat. 22 MS. REARDON: And I understand that you are 23 focusing on an evacuation plan, but why is it that 24 only four of the releases out of 24 were made public 25 and have there been other releases at the Salem and 0044 1 Hope Creek Plants that the public is not aware of? 2 MR. HUMPHREYS: I don't know that we can 3 speak for those numbers without having the data in 4 front of us. But releases are going to be based on 5 what the NRC guidelines are for releases the -- if 6 you're -- assuming that your numbers are correct the 7 ones that weren't reported probably weren't above the 8 guidelines and guidelines are based on protecting 9 public health and safety. So before they were made 10 they may have been over those -- I would assume over 11 those releases and they were made in conjunction with 12 the NRC requirements, if they were less than the NRC 13 requirements then they're not required to make that -- 14 make that as a reportable occurrence. 15 So you have to look at what's required and 16 did these meet the requirements. And in the NRC 17 they're in control of those releases -- in control of 18 those licensees I should say. If they met the 19 requirements and the NRC had found no problems then 20 they obviously met the law and they met the 21 regulation. 22 I'm saying that without having the data in 23 front of me which is probably not a smart thing to 24 have done, but you have to look at what drives those 25 "reports" and you have to look at the guidelines and 0045 1 the regs. 2 MS. REARDON: And, just in closing, I think 3 with the -- and I'm new to this, with the Cobalt-60, 4 I've driven in and out of these plants in New Jersey, 5 and New Jersey has some of the worse traffic, it just 6 doesn't even seem feasible that they should be 7 transported in and out of this area by trucks. It 8 just seems like we're waving a flag to terrorist to do 9 something. I mean, we travel these roads, the 10 turnpike, 295, you know what it's like, sometimes it's 11 just stopped. You're asking for problems. Thank you. 12 MR. HUMPHREYS: Next is Rodger Nogaki. 13 MR. NOGAKI: Rodger Nogaki, N-O-G-A-K-I. 14 I'm from Marlton, New Jersey. I find this talk 15 interesting because I've come here now for a couple 16 years with my wife. And 47 years ago when I served in 17 the military, I served in a chemical biological, 18 radiological warfare unit and it's interesting to hear 19 what you're talking about, evacuation and that. I sat 20 on the other side and we talked about how we could 21 incapacitate a community, a country, a whole area of 22 the world. 23 And I think that our government really has 24 to start taking a look at the way we are handing 25 things that could be a disaster for our nation. And 0046 1 these nuclear power plants that we have in this 2 country spell that particular problem. And I don't 3 think whatever good plans you guys have worked up, and 4 mean to work in, they're not going to work because you 5 have Murphy's Law to contend with and that's what's 6 going to happen. Worse things are going to happen at 7 the most inappropriate time and you're not going to be 8 able to react. 9 When I served in the military one of the 10 things that we planned was how many people could be 11 killed in the matter of minutes, and hours, and days. 12 Because we are talking about doing, you know, massive 13 attacks on populations. And there are other people 14 who are thinking the same thing of us today as 15 exemplified what happened in 2001, it's going to 16 happen again. We're just, you know, we survived that 17 thing in 2001 but don't forget back in 1993 they tried 18 it then and it didn't work, they found a better way to 19 do it and make it bigger. 20 Now what we're doing is we're making a 21 bigger plan, which is going to present a bigger target 22 and bigger problems. And when it comes at the wrong 23 time and under the wrong circumstances there is 24 nothing that you're going to do to plan that's going 25 to be able to protect the people or to evacuate 0047 1 people. 2 People are not going to respond to an 3 evacuation. Every time we have a hurricane on the 4 east coast here and you try to evacuate people off 5 these barrier islands and things, you just can't do 6 it. It happened down in New Orleans we couldn't do 7 it. People got clogged on highways. 8 If you had a nuclear disaster you wouldn't 9 have that kind of time to move people. And look what 10 it did, when we did have time to move people we 11 couldn't do it. 12 I think if we're going to look at our power 13 resource in this country we have to look at different 14 types of power and we're not going that. We're being 15 managed by money managers who do not care about the 16 masses that are going to be lost in this situation, 17 and that's what we're faced with in reality. So we 18 really have to look at alternative means of providing 19 energy, spread the risk. The Germans are doing it, 20 the Chinese are doing it, the Japanese are doing it, 21 they're doing it all over the world but in America. 22 And where did all that technique come from, it came 23 from the Americans. 24 We had wind energy plants that we were 25 generated -- building Pennsylvania, that plant moved 0048 1 to China. And now those products are being sent back 2 to this country from China. They put our workers out 3 of work, they take business away from our communities, 4 they affect all of us. 5 They put a reasonable burden on the state 6 police and other responding emergency groups -- 7 government groups and citizens who are asked to come 8 out and help in the event of an emergency. And I feel 9 badly for you people. And I'm talking about as being 10 a senior citizen, I'm not going to be around here 11 when -- maybe when the next big one comes up, but it's 12 going to come and you guys are going to be here to 13 answer for it. 14 And so -- thank God that you guys are 15 putting forth the effort to do something under the 16 scenario that you have to today. But in the overall 17 picture, unless we change our whole thought process as 18 to how we're going to distribute energy in this 19 country we're doomed. We're doomed because these few 20 greedy people are consuming all our resources today 21 and then lying do us. They're lying to you people, 22 they're lying to us and like sheep we're taking it. 23 Well, I'm just telling you I think that 24 we're running up the wrong street here and we should 25 be looking at alternatives other than nuclear power in 0049 1 this country because it's going to doom us. We're 2 going to make all these big power plants. I heard the 3 president say he wants to build all these nuclear 4 power plants, he wanted to blow and go in the drilling 5 of oil, the oil thing is doomed out there in the Gulf. 6 And this nuclear thing is going to be something that 7 none of us are going to be able to withstand. Thank 8 you. 9 MR. HUMPHREYS: Thank you. Mr. Mulligan 10 has been asked to speak about tritium although it's 11 not a direct subject as far as the Radiological 12 Emergency Response Plan. 13 MR. MULLIGAN: I just want to make folks 14 aware here, and I'm sure probably everybody is and 15 very recently and people should know that the 16 commissioner for the DEP has taken a very hard stance 17 and takes very seriously public drinking water 18 supplies and continually strive to make sure that that 19 water is safe to drink. And regardless of whether the 20 event was reported or not reported that's not 21 relevant. What is relevant is that the DEP monitors 22 the drinking water and the wells on site to ensure 23 that none of the tritium is in the drinking water 24 supplies. 25 And we'll continue to make sure that the -- 0050 1 any tritium that is released on site regardless of 2 whether it's 3, 10 or 20 remains on site and does not 3 reach the public drinking water. And that is if there 4 is any indication that that could happen and we will 5 make sure that steps are taken so it doesn't happen. 6 And there is nothing hiding we get all the 7 data, we collect all of the data, from both sites, and 8 we post them along the way for the public. So the 9 public has access to all the information that is out 10 there regarding tritium. 11 That this point there is no public health 12 and safety issue on any of the sites from the tritium. 13 I just want to make sure that we're real clear on 14 that. 15 MS. WILLING: I noticed and I was going to 16 remark on that early, that in your statement you're 17 saying that the amount detected is 50 times the 18 federal standards of drinking water. And then lower 19 you're talking about reporting thresholds that you 20 don't give the data that would indicate -- and I 21 obviously with a four reported and possibly 20 not 22 reported, your comment was, well, they must have been 23 below the reporting threshold. So is there a place 24 where the public can go and find out what is the data 25 and perimeter of the reporting threshold and that 0051 1 might clear up in everybody's head what's going on. 2 Do you know what the reporting threshold 3 is, 50 times above the standard for safe drinking 4 water and reporting threshold. So what would be 5 considered -- 6 MR. HUMPHREYS: Again, I can't tell you off 7 the top of my head but you can find it from contacting 8 the NRC or on the website and it should be there. 9 MR. WILLING: I have a couple of questions. 10 I is potassium iodine stock piled to distribute to 11 people now within a ten mile -- do they have it in 12 their house or do they have to wait until it's called 13 and they are evacuated before it's given to them? 14 MR. LANGENBACH: Actually both. We 15 distributed a pretty aggressive distribution program 16 to the counties and it's also a stock piled at the 17 reception center. For people who either misplaced it 18 and don't know where it is, when they get to the 19 reception center it's there for them. 20 MR. AUGUST: Boy, that's something we've 21 tried to get in Delaware for a long time. 22 MS. NOGAKI: Just a comment about the 23 tritium. The tritium leaks that I was just mentioning 24 that there were actually 24 not 4 was at the Oyster 25 Creek one, not at PSE&G. And thankfully the 0052 1 commissioner has taken an aggressive stance requiring 2 Exelon to do more monitoring at Oyster Creek and to do 3 it, you know, offsite. Because their claim was that 4 while they admitted that they had the leak in the 5 aquifer, which is the drinking water aquifer, it was 6 underneath their own site, so it wasn't affecting 7 anyone's drinking water. However, the large aquifer 8 it's not confined, you know, water moves under an 9 aquifer and so the concerns was that it could very 10 well have moved offsite towards somebody's private 11 well. 12 And while it hasn't at this point DEP, you 13 know, it's the DEP's action to make Exelon more 14 responsible, you know, for making sure that doesn't 15 happen by doing more monitoring around the site. And 16 that's a very good action. But frankly, it wouldn't 17 have happened if activists weren't complaining, 18 looking at, you know, watching Exelon and making the 19 Freedom Information Act request to find out that these 20 other leaks -- and maybe they were below reportable 21 threshold but these leaks happen constantly. 22 So that goes back to my question why are 23 these leaks happening, it isn't normal for the tritium 24 to be released into a pool, is it? Tritium is a 25 byproduct of the nuclear process, you know, where it's 0053 1 suppose to be, if it's not supposed to be, you know, 2 leaking out or if it's going to catch basins those 3 aren't supposes to leak out to the groundwater or to, 4 you know, other sources. You know, that's the point, 5 how do you prevent this from happening in the first 6 place, not waiting until it gets into the groundwater 7 and be caught in a monitoring well to address the 8 problem. 9 MR. HUMPHREYS: Thank you. 10 At this time I'm going to adjourn -- 11 MS. BARRYHILL: Mr. August brought in the 12 newspaper, which is generally very conservative, but 13 it did declare Wilmington one of the most dangerous 14 places in the nation. We have 40,000 people living in 15 the EPC, in Delaware. 40,000 people with no 16 evacuation there, it's impossible. 17 MR. HUMPHREYS: Thank you. At this point 18 I'm going to adjourn the hearing. Thank you for 19 coming. 20 - - - 21 (Whereupon, the hearing concluded at 22 approximately 8:24 p.m.) 23 - - - 24 25 0054 1 CERTIFICATE 2 3 I, Krista Morici, Professional Court Reporter, 4 certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate 5 transcript of the proceedings which were held at the 6 time, place and on the date hereinbefore set forth. 7 I further certify that I am neither attorney 8 nor counsel for, not related to or employed by, any of 9 the parties to the action in which these proceedings 10 were taken. Further, that I am not a relative or 11 employee of any attorney or counsel employed in this 12 case, nor am I financially interested in this action. 13 14 15 Krista Morici 16 Professional Shorthand Reporter 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25