

A-9



STATE OF NEW JERSEY

In the Matter of Angel Reillo  
Camden County  
Police Department

FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION  
OF THE  
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CSC DKT. NO. 2014-1477  
OAL DKT. NO. CSR 17327-13

ISSUED: October 1, 2014 PM

The appeal of Angel Reillo, a Police Officer with the Camden County Police Department, removal effective November 13, 2013, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Joseph Lavery, who rendered his initial decision on June 26, 2014. Exceptions and cross exceptions were filed on behalf of the parties.

Having considered the record and the Administrative Law Judge's initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, the Civil Service Commission, at its meeting on October 1, 2014, accepted and adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusion as contained in the attached Administrative Law Judge's initial decision.


ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in removing the appellant was justified. The Commission therefore affirms that action and dismisses the appeal of Angel Reillo.

Re: Angel Reillo

This is the final administrative determination in this matter. Any further review should be pursued in a judicial forum.

DECISION RENDERED BY THE  
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ON  
OCTOBER 1, 2014

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Robert M. Czech", is written over a horizontal line.

Robert M. Czech  
Chairperson  
Civil Service Commission

Inquiries  
and  
Correspondence

Henry Maurer  
Director  
Division of Appeals  
and Regulatory Affairs  
Civil Service Commission  
Unit H  
P. O. Box 312  
Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0312

attachment



**State of New Jersey**  
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

**INITIAL DECISION**

OAL DKT. NO. CSR 17327-13

2014-1477

**IN THE MATTER OF ANGEL REILLO,  
CAMDEN COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT.**

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**Jeffrey S. Ziegelheim, Esq.**, for appellant Angel Reillo (Alterman & Associates,  
attorneys)

**Antonieta Paiva Rinaldi**, Assistant County Counsel, for respondent Camden  
County Police Department (Sherri L. Schweitzer, County Counsel)

Record Closed: March 28, 2014

Decided: June 26, 2014

**BEFORE JOSEPH LAVERY, ALJ t/a:**

This is an appeal by **Angel Reillo, appellant**, from his termination as a police officer with the Camden County Police Department. With respect to an incident in the course of duty, appellant is charged with (1) giving false information to his immediate supervisor as well as to his peers, and (2) being untruthful during an internal investigation.

**Respondent County of Camden Police Department (the County; appointing authority; department)** contests the appeal, petitioning to have the charges upheld.

**Today's Initial Decision affirms the decision of the Camden County Police Department to terminate appellant for cause.**

### **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

This is an appeal filed in the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) on December 31, 2013, pursuant to L. 2009, c. 16, supplementing Title 40A of the New Jersey Statutes (N.J.S. 40A:14-200 through -212) and amending N.J.S. 40A:14-150 and N.J.S. 40A:14-22.

This case was direct-filed in the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) on November 27, 2013. On December 11, 2013, the Director and Chief Administrative Law Judge assigned the case for hearing, and a prehearing order issued from the undersigned on December 20, 2013. Hearing convened on February 25, 2014, but the record remained open, awaiting transcripts of Internal Affairs interviews, received in the OAL on March 4, 2014. Through calculation error, initial decision did not issue timely. On discovery of the error, post-hearing, extension was granted through nunc pro tunc orders of June 25, 2014. In addition, due to a medical emergency, an order of extension issued on May 12, 2014. This decision now issues within the prescribed time.

### **STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

#### **Background:**

The following facts are not in contention:

The charges of giving false information to peers and to a supervisor, and being untruthful during a formal internal investigation arise from an incident occurring on July 17, 2013, at about 10:21 p.m., while appellant and his partner, Officer M. Baney, were on patrol in a police vehicle, unit 112. The location of the event was in a park at 29<sup>th</sup> and Pierce in the City of Camden.

On that date, and at that time, appellant and Officer Baney came upon a parked silver Mercedes automobile occupied by a man and woman. Darkness had fallen. The time for the park to be clear of visitors had passed. Seeing this, in the space of approximately a minute, the two officers stopped and went to the car, with appellant approaching the driver's side, as Officer Baney moved directly to the passenger side. Within approximately one minute's time the occupants were advised that they were required to leave, because regulations prohibited their presence in the park during the nighttime hours. The couple complied, and the officers left the scene. No incident report was filed.

In the meantime, shortly after the officers returned to the Police Administration building, during the shift turnover, appellant, though not having documented the stop through written report, did recount his experience to his supervisor, Sergeant W. Frett. Other officers were nearby. Some minutes later, appellant also had conversations touching on the event with Detective Randy Smith, overheard by Officer Melvin Fuentes, who submitted an informational report. Officer Fuentes also spoke with appellant at a later time. Sergeant Frett eventually passed on this information to his superior, Captain J. Saponare.

The matter did not end there. Rumors and Facebook posts as well as subsequent comments which the County maintains were made by appellant, gave continued life to this police stop. By July 28, two separate posts on Facebook had become known, one by a local pastor intending to run for office, alleging that a councilman, Frank Moran, had been discovered in a state of sexual compromise with a young female, not his wife, during a police stop. Two days earlier, Councilman Moran himself had written to the County police chief, denying these accusations and demanding an investigation. At the time of the stop made by the two officers, Councilman Moran asserted, he had been outside the City of Camden at a family function held at the home of his wife's relatives, with his wife present. It was found later by the police that the Councilman did not own a Mercedes automobile. After

subsequent police inquiries, the department ultimately concluded that the Councilman's assertions were true.

In any event, the result of the stop and of appellant's interactions with other officers was a series of Internal Affairs (IA) interviews with appellant and his colleagues. The accuracy and truthfulness, or not, of appellant's comments to others were now at the crux of this matter. The investigative process was initiated by Police Chief Scott Thompson and undertaken by then Captain Joseph Wysocki and Sergeant Martinez.<sup>1</sup> The outcome of these cumulative conversations convinced the appointing authority that appellant had not been truthful in his comments to others, and in his answers during three of the four investigative interviews. Preliminary and final notices of disciplinary action issued, and appellant was terminated.

The present appeal followed.

**Arguments of the parties:**

The County's case:

The County first submitted its case at hearing through testimony and an investigative report (Exh. C-1) by **Captain Joseph Wysocki**. The captain testified in addition to his report that all officers are aware of the importance of truthfulness. They are told repeatedly that removals and convictions can follow from lying. The Attorney General's Guidelines, in which officers are trained, highlight the need for truth. Otherwise, when testifying as an officer in criminal matters, the officer's credibility is subject to challenge, jeopardizing the case. The mission given the captain by the chief was to determine the truth concerning the incident, the captain said.

In multiple interviews, Captain Wysocki stated further, appellant had said that he did not know the male in the Mercedes, that he had not observed what occurred in the

car, that he had not declared to other officers that he was able to recognize the man, and that he could not and did not identify the male occupant of the Mercedes to anyone as Councilman Moran. However, the captain noted, in the last five minutes of appellant's third investigative interview, this time under focus as a principal, appellant confessed that he had done just that. Appellant finally acknowledged that he had disclosed his knowledge of the event to Sergeant Frett and to Officer Randy Smith.

Because of this changed response, Chief Thompson, who alone had the authority, imposed a penalty of removal for lack of truthfulness, Captain Wysocki related. The captain stressed that the offense causing his termination did not arise from the manner in which appellant conducted the police stop in the park, but in the lying which followed. Had he been truthful, appellant would not be in his present predicament.

Highlighting the necessity for truthfulness in police officers, **Deputy First Assistant Prosecutor Mark Chase** testified that veracity in police officers is crucial to cases brought by the prosecutor, particularly as it pertains to plea bargaining. Any lack of candor in an officer must be made known by the prosecutor to defense counsel. Moreover, any record of lying by an officer permanently renders him or her unusable in court in all judicial proceedings thereafter. As a result, the history of honesty in an officer in such matters is the linchpin to the prosecution's trial of a case. Pertinent sections of the Attorney General's Guidelines, which all police departments must follow, leave no doubt concerning officers' obligations, he added.

According to Mr. Chase, his office prosecutes officers or accepts their resignations when there is sufficient evidence of untruth, as in a false report, or in lies made to his office. When there is lying by an officer to the police department itself, the process is administrative, but the Prosecutor's office reviews for possible criminal

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<sup>1</sup> Now Deputy Chief Wysocki. To avoid confusion, references to his rank will be to his former title of Captain, held during the time in issue.

charges. In Mr. Chase's experience, the Camden County Police Department consistently terminates any officers who are found to have lied in the course of duty.

Called for IA interview (Exhs. C-9, C-9a) as an officer who had been told of the stop by appellant, **Police Detective Randy Smith** reiterated verbatim his "special" report (Exh. C-4) submitted in writing on August 15, 2013. In it, Detective Smith maintained that walking from the building after the shift change at the end of the 12:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. shift on July 17, 2013, appellant had approached him and had spoken of the police stop in the park he had been involved in that evening. Detective Smith quoted appellant as saying, "I caught Moran in a vehicle with a pretty young girl which I don't think was his wife." Detective Smith, not entirely sure of whom appellant was identifying, asked: "Councilman Moran?" to which appellant responded: "Yeah, and this girl he was with had a nice set of tits," motioning descriptively with his hands.

Detective Smith added that appellant had told him he feared for his job, regretting that he hadn't known what to do after approaching the vehicle. Detective Smith stated in his report that when he asked appellant if he had then notified his sergeant, appellant said he hadn't, adding: "No, and I'm glad I didn't, he would have made me write a ticket or something." In his report, the detective wrote that he had then concluded appellant had done nothing wrong. Nevertheless, he advised appellant to notify his sergeant, which, he later learned, appellant did.

Testifying in the present hearing, Detective Smith said he felt compelled subsequently to write the "special" report when he heard from another officer that appellant, during questioning, had fallen short of accuracy when describing what occurred, to the collateral detriment of Sergeant Frett, who was being disciplined. Detective Smith said that he knew from his conversations with appellant that Sergeant Frett was not at fault.



Detective Smith acknowledged that closed circuit filming had depicted the conversation with appellant after the shift change on July 17, and that, though he could not recall his presence, Officer Melvin Fuentes was with them.

**Police Officer Melvin Fuentes** testified that he, too, had been called for an IA interview as a witness. In that recorded interview (Exh. C-6, C-6a, C-7 and C-7a), he had heard the rumors after July 17 that an officer had encountered a councilman having sex with a girl in the park. He had also overheard appellant describing in joking fashion, in the company of several other officers, how he himself had come upon them, and that he had seen the girl "with her legs spread open." The councilman who appellant identified was "Moran," the officer stated.

At some point, Officer Fuentes said in the IA interview, he had taken appellant aside and cautioned him about making light of, or "exploring" such a serious situation. In response, appellant conceded he was wrong to do so.

In the present hearing, Officer Fuentes reiterated the statements of his interview, recalling specifically that he overheard appellant's laughing remarks in front of other officers in the hallway at roll call, during which time appellant named Councilman Moran. Officer Fuentes testified further that he had also heard appellant specify Councilman Moran when appellant spoke to Detective Smith.

**Appellant's argument:**

**Appellant, Angel Reillo**, testified on his own behalf. He did not call witnesses or introduce exhibits.

Describing his part in the events beginning on July 17, 2013, appellant said he entered the park with his partner, Officer Baney, to familiarize her with this part of the City of Camden, and to clear the park of anyone staying past its closing time. Officer Baney was new to the Patrol Division. Once there, they came upon a silver Mercedes

with a male and female inside. During a brief contact, the male driver of the vehicle gave his name as Milan or Moran, appellant wasn't sure which. After Officer Baney said the female occupant was alright, appellant recalled, they left, after directing the others to leave the park.

Appellant stated that when they returned to the Police Administration Building from patrol, he went immediately to Sergeant Frett. Appellant had some thought that the sergeant might want him to write a report on the incident, given the possible importance of the male occupant who had claimed some connection with the City with City Council. Present when he got there were several other officers. Appellant recalled that he himself never mentioned the name "Moran." Instead, when told of the incident, Sergeant Frett orally ran through a list of names, trying to identify the councilman, and Moran was one of the names the sergeant, not appellant, brought up.

Twenty minutes or so afterward, appellant said, he had a conversation with Detective Smith, concerned that he might be in trouble. Detective Smith did not see a problem, and nothing happened immediately. When confronted with the quote from Detective Smith's report (Exh. C-4), appellant insisted that the detective's quotations of what he, appellant, had said were lies, possibly to protect Sergeant Frett. Also false was Captain Wysocki's report that he had made admissions to IA.

Recalling his conversations with Officer Fuentes, appellant declared that the latter had lied about its content. Officer Fuentes' brother is a councilman, and Officer Fuentes had alleged to appellant that his brother was interested in what had occurred. Appellant himself had never discussed with Officer Fuentes anything of what happened on July 17 in the park, nor had he mentioned Councilman Moran.

Appellant stated that he had been a police officer for some seventeen years without being disciplined, had not lied to anyone in the past, and had worked professionally with the prosecutor's office. He added that he had undergone four interviews with IA.

**Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law**

**Findings:**

To resolve disputes of material fact, I make the following **FINDINGS**:

1. On July 17, 2013, returning from his police stop in the park at 29<sup>th</sup> and Pierce in the City of Camden, appellant told Sergeant Frett during shift relief that he had discovered a councilman there with a woman inside a Mercedes. He identified the Councilman as Frank Moran.
2. In the hallway shortly after speaking with Sergeant Frett, appellant gave a description of the stop to officers gathered in the area, again naming Councilman Moran. Appellant engaged in a ribald monologue, intended as a humorous account of sexual wrongdoing in the vehicle by the councilman.
3. This monologue was overheard by Officer Manuel Fuentes. His testimonial description at hearing and in his IA interviews accurately represents what appellant at that time specifically ascribed to Councilman Moran.
4. Appellant afterward discussed the event in the park with Detective Randy Smith, again naming Councilman Moran. The details of that discussion are factually as recalled by Detective Smith in his testimony, in his interview with IA, and in his special report (Exh. C-4).
5. When Officer Melvin Fuentes cautioned appellant against public recounting of the stop in the park during which appellant had identified Councilman Moran, appellant agreed that he had made a mistake.

**Conclusions:**

Burden of proof:

The burden of persuasion falls on the agency in enforcement proceedings, such as those in which it is sought to prove an employee has engaged in violations susceptible to removal as a penalty, under controlling regulations, Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Moffett, 218 N.J. Super. 331, 341 (App. Div. 1987). The agency must prove its case by a preponderance of the credible evidence, which is the standard in administrative proceedings, Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143 (1962). Precisely what is needed to satisfy the standard must be decided on a case-by-case basis. The evidence must be such as to lead a reasonably cautious mind to a given conclusion, Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 26 N.J. 263 (1958). Preponderance may also be described as the greater weight of credible evidence in the case, not necessarily dependent on the number of witnesses, but having the greater convincing power, State v. Lewis, 67 N.J. 47 (1975).

The charges:

The offenses charged by the County are those described in the final notice of disciplinary action (FNDA) removing appellant from his position. They are:

On July 17<sup>th</sup> 2013, Officer A. Reillo was involved in an incident surrounding a parked car at 29<sup>th</sup> and Pierce Avenue. Officer A. Reillo knowingly represented false information as fact to his immediate supervisor and peers. Officer A. Reillo was subsequently untruthful in an internal investigation surrounding the aforementioned incident.

[Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (31-B) dated 11/12/2013; Exh. C-15]

The regulations cited by the County as being violated are: Camden County Police Department Rules and Regulations 3:8.4 and 3:5.7 (Truthfulness); 1:4.24 (Neglect of Duty); 3:1.27 (Withholding Information). Ibid.

There are two aspects to the foregoing charges, and they will be treated in their sequence, as follows:

1. "On July 17<sup>th</sup> 2013, Officer A. Reillo was involved in an incident surrounding a parked car at 29<sup>th</sup> and Pierce Avenue. Officer A. Reillo knowingly represented false information as fact to his immediate supervisor and peers":

If it was the intention of the County to prove that appellant lied about who he observed in the Mercedes, its evidence does not preponderate on this point. The police department investigated whether the male occupant was Councilman Moran, but neither the councilman nor any witnesses were summoned to testify before this tribunal. Only Captain Wysocki testified as to his personal interviews with the Councilman, his wife and a sister-in-law, the latter reached by telephone. All affirmed that he was present at a family function in Pennsauken. These representations were adjudged by the department to be true. It is undeniable that the department had complete authority to draw that conclusion, and it must be presumed it acted in good faith. The department's opinion therefore remains the last public record on that score.

However, the County is now litigating an appeal before an administrative tribunal. If it anticipates that mere reference to a police department assessment disposes of the issue of false information given out by appellant as to who was present in the Mercedes, the County's confidence is misplaced. The County did not try this question. It proffered only hearsay from Captain Wysocki (Exh. C-1, C-12). Unsupported by competent evidence, this does not satisfy due process requirements before an administrative tribunal. N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5. Neither the councilman nor appellant's partner at the scene nor family members interviewed were called to testify. Thus, there is no preponderance of evidence identifying who the male occupant of the car was, or who he was not, and no conclusion can, or should, be reached by this tribunal concerning the Councilman's whereabouts on July 17, 2013. Consequently, for the purpose of establishing whether

appellant lied when he specifically identified Councilman Moran as the Mercedes' driver to his peers, his superiors, and the IA interviewers, the County's case fails.

2. "Officer A. Reillo was subsequently untruthful in an internal investigation surrounding the aforementioned incident":

Whether, as charged, appellant lied during the subsequent IA investigation is a distinctly different matter. The Findings above confirm that the County has shown by a preponderance of evidence that appellant was not truthful during the interviews with the IA investigators. As Captain Wysocki pointed out in his testimony, appellant, for most of the first two interviews, denied that he recognized the male occupant of the Mercedes or that he had named Councilman Moran when he spoke with Sergeant Frett, Detective Smith and Officer Fuentes. Yet, in the final portion of interview three on August 15 (Exhs. C-11, C-11a), appellant conceded he had named the driver as Councilman Moran to both Sergeant Frett and Detective Smith. Further, appellant acknowledged that he had agreed when Officer Fuentes pointed out to him the inappropriateness of public "exploration" of the incident. (Exh. C-11a, at pp. 30-31). These three interviews, captured in transcript and CD form (Exhs. C-2, C-2a, C-3, C-3a, C-11, C-11a), are consistent with the captain's testimony.<sup>2</sup>

Beyond appellant's admissions against interest, testimony at hearing and the recorded answers elicited during witness interviews from Detective Smith and Officer Fuentes are fully credible. Detective Smith, a union representative, did not work on a shift with appellant, nor did he share a close relationship. Officer Fuentes, who apparently sought to warn appellant of the risk which attended his joking public behavior about so serious an event, has not been shown to harbor any personal bias. The composite of their testimony therefore supports the Findings, supra.

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<sup>2</sup> A fourth interview, conducted on August 22, 2013, is available only in recorded form in the CD format. This CD contains all the other recorded interview exhibits mentioned herein. It was at this final, short interview that Captain Wysocki informed appellant that the department had found that Councilman Moran was absent from the City of Camden on July 17, 2013.

In sum, it is believable that appellant, fresh from patrol, orally reported to Sergeant Frett that the male occupant of the Mercedes was Councilman Moran. That done, in the company of other officers in an adjoining hallway, he sought to regale those present with a tale of sexual peccadillo. Again, in the telling, he particularly declared that the Councilman involved was Frank Moran. At hearing, appellant's rejoinder to this persuasive testimony was that all the witnesses lied. Appellant's defense is not credible.

Setting aside appellant's lack of professional propriety in broadcasting lascivious details attributed to his stop in the park, it remains essential not to lose sight of the pertinent and significant portion of the charged rule violations here in issue. There was no focus by the County on poor behavior. Instead, in the second portion of the FNDA charge, the County singled out appellant's lack of truthfulness in answering IA questions, his withholding of information, and, necessarily as a result, his neglect of duty. The underlying factual justification for these charges has been demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence, and appellant's offenses fall within the ambit of the police rules cited in the PNDA. For this, a penalty is inevitable.

#### **Penalty:**

When imposing penalty, appellant's history of discipline is first examined. The County has not submitted any. Therefore, it will be assumed there is none. This fact and the concept of progressive discipline must be taken into account. West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500, 524-525 (1962). On the other hand, the need for consideration of these factors and their relative influence may be overridden when the offense is such that the circumstances of but one incident may warrant punishment. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 197 (2011). Given appellant's status as a sworn police officer, appellant's circumstances fall within this category. Apposite judicial decisions exist in support which are compelling for the following reasons:

Dishonesty is objectionable when undertaken by a government employee in any class title, but it must be assessed through a special filter when untruthfulness in sworn officers is in play. They are responsible for public safety. The public depends on their honest enforcement of the law. Consequently, law enforcement personnel are set apart. Our appellate division has stated:

A police officer is a special kind of public employee. His primary duty is to enforce and uphold the law . . . He represents law and order to the citizenry and must present an image of personal integrity and dependability in order to have respect of the public. [Twp. of Moorestown v. Armstrong, 898 N.J. Super. 560, 566, 215 A.2d 775 (App. Div. 1965), certif. denied, 47 N.J. 80, 219 A.2d 417 (1966)]

Removal in circumstances comparable in seriousness to the instant matter is not without precedent. In the case of In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 485-486 (2007), involving a police officer who slept while on duty, the Court held:

In matters involving discipline of police and corrections officers, public safety concerns may also bear upon the propriety of the dismissal sanction. See, e.g., Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 580, 410 A.2d 686 (1980) (affirming appellate reversal of Board decision to reduce penalty from dismissal to suspension for prison guard who falsified report because of Board's failure to consider seriousness of charge); In re Hall, 335 N.J. Super. 45, 51, 760 A.2d 1148 (App. Div. 200) (reversing Board's decision to reduce penalty imposed on police officer for attempted theft from dismissal to suspension), certif. denied, 167 N.J. 629, 772 A.2d 931 (2001); Bowden v. Bayside State Prison, 268 N.J. Super. 301, 305-06, 633 A.2d 577 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable to reduce penalty from removal to six months suspension for prison guard who gambled with inmates for cigarettes), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 469, 640 A.2d 850 (1994).

In light of the foregoing case law, termination of appellant here is justifiable. In addition, however, it is highly significant that a finding of dishonesty renders appellant unusable as a witness in any criminal proceedings stemming from arrests which he may make. This disability is permanent. Most persuasive as to penalty is the fact that testimony in court is a fundamental and frequent police duty. Prosecutor Chase, relating



at hearing his own trial experience, also referred to the Attorney General's Guidelines followed by all police departments. The import of its provisions, as well, made clear the preeminent need for honesty in police officers (See, Exh. C-16, pp. 45-50). Mr. Chase's testimony was fully credible.

For the foregoing reasons expressed in numbered sections 1. and 2. above, I **CONCLUDE** that appellant, as charged, was "untruthful in an internal investigation surrounding the aforementioned incident." I **CONCLUDE FURTHER** that the County has not shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that appellant "knowingly represented false information as fact to his immediate supervisor and peers."

### **ORDER**

I **ORDER**, therefore, after de novo consideration of the hearing record and the appropriateness of penalty, that removal of **appellant, Angel Reillo**, from his position of police officer in the Camden County Police Department, should be, and hereby is, **AFFIRMED**.


I hereby **FILE** my initial decision with the **CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION** for consideration.

This recommended decision may be adopted, modified or rejected by the **CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION**, which by law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. If the Civil Service Commission does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 40A:14-204.

Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the **DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF APPEALS AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, UNIT H, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 44 South Clinton Avenue, PO Box 312, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0312**, marked "Attention: Exceptions." A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.

June 26, 2014

DATE

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
JOSEPH LAVERY, ALJ

Date Received at Agency:

6/26/14

Date Mailed to Parties:

6/26/14

mph

**LIST OF WITNESSES:**

**For appellant:**

Angel Reillo, appellant

**For respondent:**

Joseph Wysocki

Randy Smith

Melvin Fuentes

Mark Chase

**LIST OF EXHIBITS:**

**For appellant:**

None

**For respondent:**

- C-1 Investigative report, August 12, 2015
- C-2 Audio recording of appellant, July 30, 2013 [on disk]
- C-2a Transcript of C-2
- C-3 Audio recording of appellant, August 5, 2013
- C-3a Transcript of C-3
- C-4 Special report of Detective Randy Smith, August 15, 2013
- C-5 Witness form, Officer Melvin Fuentes, August 15, 2013
- C-6 Audio recording #1 of Officer Melvin Fuentes, August 15, 2013
- C-6a Transcript of C-6
- C-7 Audio recording #2 of Officer Melvin Fuentes, August 15, 2013
- C-7a Transcript of C-7
- C-8 Witness form, Detective Randy Smith, August 15, 2013

- C-9 Audio recording of Detective Randy Smith, August 15, 2013
- C-9a Transcript of C-9
- C-10 Administrative advisement form, appellant, August 15, 2013
- C-11 Audio recording of appellant, August 15, 2013
- C-11a Transcript of C-11
- C-12 Audio recording of appellant, August 22, 2103
- C-13 Camden County Police Department Rules and Regulations
- C-14 PNDA, August 22, 2103
- C-15 FNDA, November 12, 2013
- C-16 Portion of Attorney General Guidelines referenced at hearing