

H-3



STATE OF NEW JERSEY

In the Matter of Michael Hansen,  
Hudson County, Department of  
Corrections

CSC DKT. NO. 2016-3703  
OAL DKT. NO. CSV 06714-16

FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION  
OF THE  
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

ISSUED: JANUARY 18, 2017 BW

The appeal of Michael Hansen, County Correction Officer, Hudson County, Department of Corrections, 60 working day suspension, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Joann LaSala Candido, who rendered her initial decision on December 1, 2016. No exceptions were filed.

Having considered the record and the Administrative Law Judge's initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, the Civil Service Commission, at its meeting on January 18, 2017, accepted and adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusion as contained in the attached Administrative Law Judge's initial decision to modify the 60 working day suspension to a 20 working day suspension.

Since the penalty has been modified, the appellant is entitled to back pay, benefits, and seniority, pursuant to *N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10*, following the 20 working day suspension. However, the appellant is not entitled to counsel fees. Pursuant to *N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12(a)*, the award of counsel fees is appropriate only where an employee has prevailed on all or substantially all of the primary issues in an appeal of a major disciplinary action. The primary issue in any disciplinary appeal is the merits of the charges, not whether the penalty imposed was appropriate. See *Johnny Walcott v. City of Plainfield*, 282 N.J. Super. 121, 128 (App. Div. 1995); *James L. Smith v. Department of Personnel*, Docket No. A-1489-02T2 (App. Div. March 18, 2004); *In the Matter of Robert Dean* (MSB, decided January 12, 1993); *In the Matter of Ralph Cozzino* (MSB, decided September 21, 1989). In the case at hand, although the penalty was modified by the Commission, charges were

sustained. Thus, the appellant has not prevailed on all or substantially all of the primary issues of the appeal. Consequently, as the appellant has failed to meet the standard set forth at *N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12(a)*, counsel fees must be denied.

### ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in disciplining the appellant was justified. The Commission therefore modifies the 60 working day suspension to a 20 working day suspension. The Commission further orders that appellant be granted 40 days of back pay, benefits, and seniority. The amount of back pay awarded is to be reduced and mitigated as set forth in *N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10*. An affidavit of mitigation shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision.

Counsel fees are denied pursuant to *N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12*.

This is the final administrative determination in this matter. Any further review should be pursued in a judicial forum.

DECISION RENDERED BY THE  
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ON  
JANUARY 18, 2017



Robert M. Czech  
Chairperson  
Civil Service Commission

Inquiries  
and  
Correspondence

Nicholas F. Angiulo  
Assistant Director  
Division of Appeals and Regulatory Affairs  
Civil Service Commission  
P. O. Box 312  
Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0312

attachment



**State of New Jersey**  
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

**INITIAL DECISION**

OAL DKT. NO. CSV 06714-16

AGENCY DKT. NO. 2016-3703

**IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL HANSEN,  
HUDSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT  
OF CORRECTIONS.**

---

**Colin M. Lynch, Esq.**, for appellant Michael Hansen (Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak,  
Kleinbaum & Friedman, P.C., attorneys)

**Daniel Sexton**, Assistant County Counsel, for respondent Hudson County  
(Donato Battista, County Counsel, attorney)

Record Closed: November 3, 2016

Decided: December 1, 2016

**BEFORE JOANN LASALA CANDIDO, ALAJ:**

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

Appellant, Michael Hansen, appeals the determination of respondent, the Hudson County Department of Corrections (County/respondent), to impose a sixty-day suspension based upon his unapproved absences on September 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16, 2015, and his failure to notify respondent of a change in his address, in violation of custody staff rules and regulations that mandate that the employee must report a change of address within forty-eight hours. By Preliminary Notices of

Disciplinary Action dated December 8, 2015, respondent advised appellant of the charges and specifications, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3, as follows: (1) insubordination; (2) conduct unbecoming a public employee; (3) neglect of duty; (4) chronic or excessive absenteeism; and (5) other sufficient cause. Following a departmental hearing on March 17, 2016, a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action was issued on April 5, 2016, imposing the suspension.

### **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

Appellant appealed the suspension and the matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for determination as a contested case pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13. The hearing was held on September 12, and 20, 2016. Post-hearing submissions were received from both parties, the last on November 3, 2016, on which date the record closed.

### **ISSUES**

The issues in this case are whether respondent has proven the charges by a preponderance of the credible evidence and whether a sixty-day suspension is warranted.

### **FINDINGS OF FACT**

Appellant has been employed by the Hudson County Correctional Facility as a correction officer since November 7, 2008. He obtained a Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave of absence from his employment at the Hudson County Department of Corrections from March 5, 2015, to September 5, 2015, for sudden episodic flare-ups of cluster migraine headaches. After his leave had expired on September 5, appellant failed to report for duty, and he did not provide the proper medical documentation to obtain an extension of his leave.

On September 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16, 2015, appellant called Operations requesting an intermittent medical-leave day, and advised Operations officers that he was awaiting paperwork from his doctor. At this point he had exhausted all allotted sick days for the 2015 calendar year. As of September 15, 2015, the Hudson County Division of Personnel, which processes all medical-leave requests, confirmed that Officer Hansen had not contacted them via telephone requesting an extension of the expired leave. As a result, he was issued eight consecutive "absences with no pay." His leave was ultimately extended effective October 25, 2015.

On September 25, 2015, the Hudson County Division of Personnel informed the Hudson County Department of Corrections, via email, that Officer Michael Hansen failed to notify the Department that he had changed his home address, in violation of Custody Staff Rules and Regulations. This was discovered when the County attempted to serve Preliminary Notices of Disciplinary Action on appellant and was advised that he no longer resided at the address listed with the County. Appellant temporarily moved out of the marital home in 2013 and did not advise Personnel within forty-eight hours pursuant to County policy and procedures.

A departmental hearing conducted on March 17, 2016, resulted in a consolidated Final Notice of Disciplinary Action. (J-1; J-2; J-3; J-4.) Respondent advised appellant of the charges and specifications, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3, as follows: (1) insubordination; (2) conduct unbecoming a public employee; (3) neglect of duty; (4) chronic or excessive absenteeism; and (5) other sufficient cause. Due to Officer Hansen's failure to notify the department of his change in address and to his "chronic absenteeism," a sixty-day suspension from his position was imposed.

### **Parties' Arguments**

#### **Appellant**

Appellant argues that the breadth of the charges proffered against him should be reduced to reflect the facts on the record. Specifically, he asserts that the charges of

insubordination and conduct unbecoming a public employee should be dismissed since they are not applicable to his case. He relies on James v. City of Asbury Park, CSV 6099-05, Initial Decision (March 22, 2006), adopted, MSB (April 27, 2006), <<http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>>, in which the court defined insubordination as not submissive to authority. He also refers to Matza v. Warren County Correctional Center, CSV 1967-01, Initial Decision (June 7, 2005), adopted, MSB (December 13, 2005), <<http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>>, which defines unbecoming conduct as “[a]n occurrence reflecting upon an individual’s character and honesty.”

Appellant asserts that his conduct does not fit either standard. He did not willfully disobey an order for purposes of insubordination. Even assuming that he lacked available sick time to cover the absences, he fulfilled his duty by reporting the absences. Additionally, he asserts that an illness or medical condition that renders him unable to work does not reflect poorly on either his character or the Department of Corrections’ morale.

Appellant further avers that but for a technical procedural error, all of the dates of the absences without pay would have been covered by family medical leave. He had prior approved leave for his chronic migraines which expired on September 5, 2015. The absences without pay in question all concerned the same medical condition. Although he did not report to Patricia Joyce directly, which is the proper protocol, he did request an extension of leave to Captain Chris Yurecko, Unit 3 manager. Additionally, his physician was out of the country, and he was unable to obtain the proper medical documentation. Appellant claims that the prior granting of FMLA leave for his condition, his communication with Captain Yurecko, and his failed efforts to obtain paperwork all demonstrate that the County had notice of the need for an extension. These efforts also indicate that he was willing to comply with the existing policies.

Appellant also notes that he should have had sick days available to cover some, if not all, of the absences. He states that pursuant to the arbitration awards regarding sick-leave allotment (A-1; A-2; A-3), the County should have been allocating him a minimum of fifteen sick days as of January 1 of each contract year. However, at the

time the charges were issued, appellant was shorted approximately eight sick days. It is undisputed that if he had available sick time, the September absences with no pay instead would have been days of sick leave not subject to disciplinary action.

Finally, appellant argues that the doctrine of progressive discipline warrants a penalty less than the sixty-day suspension imposed by the County. He asserts that while the County claims that there is a major seventy-day disciplinary suspension on record from 2013, this incident did not involve any wrongdoing. Rather, the County “indefinitely” put appellant out of duty for a medical issue until he was fit to return. The finding of his being “unfit” was due to a medical condition that he could not prevent or control. Accordingly, the prior seventy-day suspension should not have weight in determining the appropriate penalty for the present matter.

#### Respondent

Respondent argues that the imposed suspension is appropriate because appellant was absent without approved leave on numerous days in September 2015, as set forth in two Preliminary Notices of Disciplinary Action. He also failed to advise the appointing authority of his current address, as charged in the third Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action. The County argues that the fact that appellant was applying to renew his intermittent leave does not constitute a defense. The County also asserts that since he “showed absolutely no appreciation for the gravity of his offenses,” the suspension period should be doubled.

The County contends that it is clear that appellant was apprised of the requirements for obtaining a leave of absence and the possible consequences of noncompliance. (A-10.) It asserts that the evidence is also clear that he failed to provide an accurate address for a significant period of time.

## LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Civil Service Act and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto govern the rights and duties of a civil service employee. N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1 to 11A:12-6; N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.1 et seq. A civil service employee who commits a wrongful act related to his or her duties, or gives other just cause, may be subject to major discipline. N.J.S.A. 11:2-6; N.J.S.A. 11A:2-20; N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.2; N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3. Grounds for discipline include, among other things, insubordination, chronic or excessive absenteeism or lateness, conduct unbecoming a public employee, and neglect of duty. See N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(2), (4), (6), and (7). An employee may also be subject to termination for resignation not in good standing. If an employee is absent from duty for five or more consecutive business days, or has not returned to work for five or more business days following an approved leave of absence, without the approval of his superior, he shall be considered to have abandoned his position and shall be recorded as a resignation not in good standing. N.J.A.C. 4A:2-6.2(b), (c).

Appellant was charged with chronic or excessive absenteeism or lateness because he was absent without authorization for more than five days after he exhausted his sick leave.

An employee may be subject to discipline for chronic or excessive absenteeism, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(4). While there is no precise number that constitutes "chronic," it is generally understood that chronic conduct is conduct that continues over a long time or recurs frequently. Good v. N. State Prison, 97 N.J.A.R.2d (CSV) 529, 531. Courts have consistently held that excessive absenteeism need not be accommodated, and that attendance is an essential function of most jobs. See, e.g., Muller v. Exxon Research and Eng'g Co., 345 N.J. Super. 595, 605–06 (App. Div. 2001) (under the Law Against Discrimination, excess absenteeism need not be accommodated even if it is caused by a disability otherwise protected by the Act); Svarnas v. AT&T Commc'ns, 326 N.J. Super. 59, 78 (App. Div. 1999) ("[a]n employee who does not come to work cannot perform any of her job functions, essential or otherwise").



Appellant was charged with insubordination, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(2), because he failed to come to work after exhausting his sick time. Black's Law Dictionary 870 (9th ed. 2009) defines insubordination as a "willful disregard of an employer's instructions" or an "act of disobedience to proper authority." Such dictionary definitions have been utilized by courts to define the term where it is not specifically defined in contract or regulation.

"Insubordination" is not defined in the agreement. Consequently, assuming for purposes of argument that its presence is implicit, we are obliged to accept its ordinary definition since it is not a technical term or word of art and there are no circumstances indicating that a different meaning was intended.

[Ricci v. Corporate Express of the East, Inc., 344 N.J. Super. 39, 45 (App. Div. 2001) (citation omitted).]

Importantly, this definition incorporates acts of noncompliance and noncooperation, as well as affirmative acts of disobedience. Appellant credibly testified that he attempted to submit the proper medical form for an extension of sick leave but his physician was out of the country by its due date. He was in contact with Operations to advise of the dates he would not be in. Furthermore, respondent admits that appellant would have been granted the extended medical leave without penalty had he provided the proper documentation. In fact, he was ultimately granted the extended family leave, effective October 25, 2015. I therefore **CONCLUDE** that appellant's failure to submit the documentation timely, through no fault of his own, was not insubordinate.

Appellant was charged with conduct unbecoming an employee, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6), and neglect of duty, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7), because he failed to abide by policy and procedure when he failed to obtain approved authorization to be absent from work as of September 15, 2015. "Conduct unbecoming a public employee" is an elastic phrase, which encompasses conduct that adversely affects the morale or efficiency of a governmental unit or that has a tendency to destroy public respect in the delivery of governmental services. Karins v. City of Atl. City, 152 N.J. 532, 554 (1998); see also In re Emmons, 63 N.J. Super. 136, 140 (App. Div. 1960). It is sufficient that the

complained-of conduct and its attending circumstances “be such as to offend publicly accepted standards of decency.” Karins, supra, 152 N.J. at 555 (quoting In re Zeber, 156 A.2d 821, 825 (1959)). Such misconduct need not necessarily “be predicated upon the violation of any particular rule or regulation, but may be based merely upon the violation of the implicit standard of good behavior which devolves upon one who stands in the public eye as an upholder of that which is morally and legally correct.” Hartmann v. Police Dep’t of Ridgewood, 258 N.J. Super. 32, 40 (App. Div. 1992) (quoting Asbury Park v. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 17 N.J. 419, 429 (1955)). “Neglect” connotes a deviation from normal standards of conduct. In re Kerlin, 151 N.J. Super. 179, 186 (App. Div. 1977). The term “duty” means conformance to “the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk.” Wytupeck v. Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 461 (1957). Thus, the charge has been interpreted to cover an employee who has neglected to perform an act required by his or her job title, or was negligent in its discharge. State v. Dunphy, 19 N.J. 531, 534 (1955) (police chief violated his sworn duty by failing to enforce criminal laws); Avanti v. Dep’t of Military & Veterans Affairs, 97 N.J.A.R.2d (CSV) 564; Ruggiero v. Jackson Twp. Dep’t of Law and Pub. Safety, 92 N.J.A.R.2d (CSV) 214.

Courts have found that when an employee makes an error in providing proper documentation for his or her absence, it does not necessarily constitute “conduct unbecoming an employee.” In In re Adams, No. A-6195-88T2 (App. Div. August 22, 1990), a communications operator was dismissed for alleged chronic and excessive absenteeism, failure to report for five consecutive days without proper notice to her employer, and inability to perform duties outlined in her job description. After exhausting all of her sick days for the year, the employee saw a specialist for an ear infection (later diagnosed as temporomandibular joint disease), and the doctor advised her not to return to work for twenty days. On the fifth day of her failure to report for duty, the employee sent a note to her supervisor saying that she would not be able to return until after the twenty-day period recommended by the doctor, pending tests. Her supervisor said the note was insufficient, and she was given a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action seeking her removal. The Merit System Board found that the employee’s only failure was in not furnishing proper documentation in support of her

request for leave, and ruled that the penalty should be a ten-day suspension without pay. The Appellate Division affirmed the Merit System Board.

In this matter, respondent alleges that appellant was chronically or excessively absent or late, which caused him to neglect his duty. Appellant stated that he could not submit the medical documentation to obtain an extension of leave because of his doctor's absence, but he did contact Operations (and not Personnel). I **CONCLUDE** that appellant attempted to avail himself of the proper avenues for obtaining that leave and did not intentionally violate policy and procedures applicable to sick leave. I therefore **CONCLUDE** that respondent has not proven the charge of conduct unbecoming an employee.

However, like in Adams, appellant violated policy and procedure. Although he did not intentionally violate policy applicable to sick leave to constitute insubordination, he was made aware numerous times of the proper protocol for requesting a leave of absence and the possible consequences of noncompliance. I must therefore **CONCLUDE** that respondent has proven the charge of neglect of duty.

There is no definition in the New Jersey Administrative Code for "other sufficient cause." "Other sufficient cause" is generally defined in the charges against an appellant. The charge of other sufficient cause has been dismissed when the "respondent has not given any substance to the allegation." Simmons v. City of Newark, CSV 9122-99, Initial Decision (February 22, 2006), adopted, Comm'r (April 27, 2006), <<http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>>.

In the present case, appellant's only failure was in not furnishing the proper documentation in support of his request for leave. The County was aware of his previous approved leave for the same condition. He ultimately obtained the proper paperwork from his physician and was subsequently approved for this leave. Therefore, I **CONCLUDE** that respondent has not satisfied its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, other sufficient cause as to excessive absenteeism.

Appellant was also charged with the above-mentioned charges for failure to report a change of address in violation of department rules and regulations within forty-eight hours of the change. He candidly testified that his wife kicked him out of the marital home for a short while. He did not report of a change of address, because he had hoped he would be able to return home in a short period of time. During the waiting period, he stayed with family and friends. I **CONCLUDE** that not reporting a change of address within forty-eight hours was a violation of policy and procedure, and the respondent has proven by a preponderance of the credible evidence the charges sustained.

### **PENALTY**

Principles of progressive discipline should be considered in the removal actions of civil service employees. West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962). The determination of whether a specific act supports removal requires an evaluation of the conduct in terms of its relationship to the nature of the position itself and an evaluation of the actual or potential impairment of the public interest that may be expected to result from the conduct in question. Golaine v. Cardinale, 142 N.J. Super. 385, 397 (Law Div. 1976). The frequency, number, and continuity of the employer's warnings indicate the progression of the discipline. Ibid. On appeals from disciplinary action, the Civil Service Commission may redetermine guilt or modify a penalty originally imposed. N.J.S.A. 11A:2-19; Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980). The Commission is empowered to substitute its own judgment on the appropriate penalty, even if the local appointing authority has not clearly abused its discretion. Id. at 579. The Commission must consider an employee's past record, including both mitigating factors and prior discipline, when determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed. Bock, supra, 38 N.J. at 523.

In 2013, appellant was placed on an indefinite suspension while a fitness-for-duty evaluation was performed. He was permitted to return to work in August 2013, after seventy days. A review of the matter indicates that it did not involve discipline or

wrongdoing at all. The County indefinitely put appellant out of work for a medical issue and deemed him, for a period of seventy days, to be “unfit for duty.” Nonetheless, public employers are “often reluctant” to characterize suspensions such as these as “disciplinary.” In re Recine, CSV 834-97, Final Decision, Merit System Board (March 10, 1998), <<http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>>. This is because the circumstances are often out of the employee’s control. In similar circumstances, employers suggest that “discipline is not appropriate to address questions of fitness,” and often suspend the employee with pay, pending completion of appropriate expert evaluations. Ibid. Since the record does not show that the suspension in 2013 involved any wrongdoing on appellant’s part, I **CONCLUDE** that the 2013 suspension should not be a factor in determining his penalty for purposes of progressive discipline.

Accordingly, appellant’s failure to report his change in address and failure to follow the proper protocol for requesting a continued medical leave are his only disciplinary infractions during his eight-year career. A sixty-day suspension without pay is too severe under the circumstances. I recognize that he had no control over the operations of his doctor’s office, and submitted the proper leave paperwork as soon as he was able. He thereafter was approved for this leave. However, courts sympathize with the sentiment that discipline in the workplace for public servants is critical: “Corrections officers are understandably held to a higher standard than other employees. We are also fully cognizant of the potential security ramifications of these types of mistakes.” In re Warren, No. A-5092-09 (App. Div. August 3, 2012), <<http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/courts/>>. Appellant’s errors involved oversights in codified procedure. These errors did not, however, constitute conduct severe enough to bypass the progressive-discipline scheme. For the reasons stated above, I cannot conclude that his conduct warrants a sixty-day suspension. I **CONCLUDE** that a twenty-day suspension is appropriate.

### **ORDER**

Based upon the foregoing, it is **ORDERED** that appellant be and is hereby suspended for a total of twenty days on the sustained charge of neglect of duty for not

obtaining approval for a medical leave pursuant to policy, which warrants a ten-day suspension, and for not reporting a change of address within forty-eight hours, which warrants a ten-day suspension. And it is further **ORDERED** that the charges of insubordination, conduct unbecoming, and other sufficient cause be and are hereby **DISMISSED**.

Upon serving the suspension, appellant shall be reinstated to the same position with back pay, benefits, and seniority, if applicable. The amount of back pay shall be mitigated in accordance with the guidelines set forth in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10(d)(3).

I hereby **FILE** my initial decision with the **CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION** for consideration.

This recommended decision may be adopted, modified or rejected by the **CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION**, which by law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. If the Civil Service Commission does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the **DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF APPEALS AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, UNIT H, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 44 South Clinton Avenue, PO Box 312, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0312**, marked "Attention: Exceptions." A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.

December 1, 2016  
DATE

Joann Lasala Candido  
JOANN LASALA CANDIDO, ALAJ

Date Received at Agency:

Dec. 1, 2016  
Joann Lasala Candido  
DIRECTOR AND  
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

Date Mailed to Parties:  
ljb

DEC 5 2016

**APPENDIX**

**WITNESS LIST**

**For Appellant:**

Michael Hansen

**For Respondent:**

Chris Yurecko

Patricia Joyce

**EXHIBIT LIST**

**Joint:**

- J-1 Final Notice of Disciplinary Action dated April 5, 2016
- J-2 Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action dated December 8, 2015
- J-3 Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action dated December 8, 2015
- J-4 Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action dated December 8, 2015

**For Appellant:**

- A-1 Perez Arbitration Award dated October 28, 2016
- A-2 PBA 109 Arbitration Award dated April 11, 2016
- A-3 PBA 109 Collective Negotiations Agreement
- A-4 Memo to Hansen from Lt. Yurecko dated February 27, 2015
- A-5 Attendance Memo to Hansen from Lt. Yurecko dated February 27, 2015
- A-6 Leaves, Separations and Transfers Form dated May 6, 2015
- A-7 Email to Lt. Yurecko from Kalimah Ahmed dated September 8, 2015
- A-8 Memo to Hansen from Elinor Gibney, leave-of-absence requirements
- A-9 Email to Lt. Yurecko and Jason Dembowski from Kalimah Ahmed
- A-10 Memo to Hansen from Elinor Gibney, leave-of-absence requirements



A-11 omitted

A-12 omitted

A-13 Leaves, Separations and Transfers Form dated September 25, 2015

A-14 Letter from Antwan Ahad, M.D., dated February 10, 2016

For respondent:

R-1 Custody Staff Rules and Regulations December 2009

R-2 Activity report dated September 7, 2015

R-3 Hansen schedule—February, March, May, July, September, October,  
December 2015

R-4 Custody Staff Rules and Regulations July 2013

R-5 Same as A-7

R-6 Hansen Emergency Contact Card

R-7 Hansen employee status

R-8 omitted

R-9 omitted