

138-26
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 18264-25
Agency Dkt. No. 289-9/25

New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision

Brian Nelson,

Petitioner,

v.

Board of Education of the Township of Stafford,
Ocean County,

Respondent.

The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), the exceptions filed by petitioner Brian Nelson pursuant to *N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4*, and the reply filed by the Stafford Board of Education (Board), have been reviewed and considered.

In this matter, petitioner challenges the Board Superintendent's written directives issued June 16 and August 5, 2025, that he submit to a "Fit to Return examination in accordance with Policy 3161" (the Policy). The Board filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary decision, which petitioner opposed. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted the Board's motion for summary decision upon concluding that no genuine issues of material fact existed and that the Board acted properly in compelling petitioner to either undergo a psychiatric examination or produce a letter from his own medical provider confirming his fitness to return to duty.

In his exceptions, petitioner argues that the ALJ misapplied the summary decision standard because some of the material facts were indeed disputed in his certification opposing

the Board's motion. He further argues that even if the facts were true as alleged by the Board, they do not justify a psychiatric examination. The Board maintains that the ALJ's decision is correct and that it is entitled to summary judgment because petitioner has not shown that its directive was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

Upon review, the Commissioner rejects the Initial Decision because this matter is not ripe for review. Pursuant to *N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2*, boards of education "may require individual psychiatric or physical examinations of any employee, whenever, in the judgment of the board, an employee shows evidence of deviation from normal, physical or mental health." *N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.2(b)* requires boards of education to adopt written policies and procedures that "shall provide for notification to school employees regarding the requirements for physical or psychiatric examinations."

Citing *N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2* and *N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3*, the Policy reiterates that the Board may require a psychiatric examination of a teaching staff member "whenever, in the judgment of the Board, a teaching staff member shows evidence of deviation from normal physical or mental health," to determine their fitness. In addition, the Policy states that the Board must provide the teaching staff member with a written statement of the reasons for the required examination, as well as a hearing before the Board if requested. *See N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3(b)(1)* and *(2)* (requiring a written statement of reasons and a board hearing, if requested). The Policy also states that notice of the teaching staff member's right to a hearing shall be provided with the statement of reasons for the required examination. Moreover, the Policy provides that the teaching staff member must request the Board hearing in writing within five working days of receipt of the written statement of reasons.

Regarding the nature of the Board hearing, the Policy explains that it “shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of *N.J.S.A.* 18A:25-7 and will offer the teaching staff member the opportunity to appear before the Board to refute the reason(s) for the required examination(s).” The Policy directs that “if the teaching staff member failed to persuade the Board at the hearing that [they] should not be required to submit to the appropriate examination(s),” then they “shall be ordered to submit to the appropriate examination(s) by the physician or institution designated by the Board.” Finally, quoting the applicable regulation, the Policy instructs that “[t]he determination of such a hearing shall be appealable to the Commissioner.” See *N.J.A.C.* 6A:32-6.3(b)(2)(i) (“The determination of such a hearing shall be appealable to the Commissioner . . .”).

Here, the Board Superintendent provided letters to petitioner dated June 16 and August 5, 2025, requesting that he submit to a Fit to Return examination. The August 5, 2025, letter specifically cited the Policy and provided a more detailed statement of the reasons for the request. However, the letters did not advise petitioner of his right to request a Board hearing within five working days of receipt of the written statement of reasons. Thus, the Policy was not adhered to by the Board and petitioner was not “afforded the opportunity to be heard after the specific reasons were furnished to him.” *Gish v. Bd. of Educ. of Paramus*, 145 *N.J. Super.* 96, 107 (App. Div. 1976), *certif. denied*, 74 *N.J.* 251 (1977), *cert. denied*, 434 *U.S.* 879 (1977).

Upon review of the record, the Commissioner became aware for the first time that on August 21, 2025, the parties executed a document titled “Stipulation As To Commencement of the Proceedings Directly Before the Commissioner Of Education” stating they agreed that petitioner may challenge the Board’s directive via the filing of a Petition of Appeal before the

Commissioner “without requesting nor appearing for any predicate hearing before the Board.” However, the Commissioner finds that the parties are not permitted to circumvent the Policy or regulations via stipulation. Because the statement of reasons did not advise petitioner of his right to request a Board hearing to refute the stated reasons for the examination, and no Board hearing occurred, this matter is not ripe for review before the Commissioner.

For these reasons, the matter is remanded to the Board. *See Gish, 145 N.J. Super.* at 104 (“School boards are entrusted by our Legislature with the duty of determining the general issue of fitness of teachers” and are “sufficiently equipped to conduct a fair and impartial inquiry whenever such issue legitimately comes into question.”). Should petitioner desire the opportunity to refute the stated reasons for the required examination, he shall request a Board hearing in writing within five working days of receipt of this decision. If he fails to persuade the Board at the hearing that he should not be required to submit to the examination, then the Board shall order him to submit to the examination by the designated physician. The determination of that hearing shall be appealable to the Commissioner.

Accordingly, the Initial Decision is rejected and the petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.¹



COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION

Date of Decision: April 21, 2026
Date of Mailing: April 22, 2026

¹ This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to *N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1*. Under *N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b)*, a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date of mailing of this decision.



State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

INITIAL DECISION

SUMMARY DECISION

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 18264-25

AGENCY DKT. NO. 289-9/25

BRIAN NELSON,

Petitioner,

v.

**BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
TOWNSHIP OF STAFFORD, OCEAN
COUNTY**

Respondent.

Edward A. Cridge, for petitioner (Mellk Cridge LLC, attorneys)

Giulia L. Lima, and **Jacob K. Mintun**, Esqs., for respondent (Comegno Law Group, P.C., attorneys)

Record Closed: December 23, 2025

Decided: February 9, 2026

BEFORE **MARY ANN BOGAN**, ALJ:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Brian Nelson (Nelson), a tenured teaching staff member employed by the Stafford Township Board of Education (the Board or District) appeals the Board's

directive to undergo a fitness to return examination or psychiatric examination (examination) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2 and N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3(b). The Board maintains that the petition of appeal fails to state a claim of relief to challenge the Board's decision that the petitioner's behavior showed evidence of a harmful, significant deviation from normal physical or mental health affecting his ability to teach, discipline, or associate with children when he called and sent text messages to other employees and colleagues that were described as irrational and caused fear. In the alternative, the Board maintains that even if petitioner sufficiently provides a cause of action, there is no longer a disputed issue as to any material facts challenging the Board's request. For the reasons set forth below, there is sufficient evidence to compel petitioner to undergo an examination in order to return to duty.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 14, 2025, the Department of Education, Office of Controversies and Disputes transmitted this matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) as a contested case. In lieu of filing an answer, the District filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition of Appeal and alternatively filed a Motion for Summary Decision, under N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5. Under that rule, "[a] party may move for summary decision upon all or any of the substantive issues in a contested case." N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(a). Such motion "shall be served with briefs and with or without supporting affidavits" and "[t]he decision sought may be rendered if the papers and discovery which have been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). When the motion "is made and supported, an adverse party in order to prevail must by responding affidavit set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue which can only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding." Ibid. No further papers were filed, and the motion for summary decision is now ripe for review.¹

¹ Although petitioner requested oral argument, this matter would be decided on the papers. See N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.2(d).

FACTUAL DISCUSSION

Based on the papers filed in this matter, including the certifications of counsel and petitioner, I **FIND** that the following **FACTS** are undisputed:

On June 16, 2025, the Superintendent George Chidiac issued a directive ordering Mr. Nelson to undergo an examination). The Board in lieu of the examination proposed to Mr. Nelson that he may provide correspondence from his healthcare provider confirming his fitness to return to duty. The directive was issued based upon reports from staff members who reported Mr. Nelson missed a scheduled student conference, spent extended time in the gym teacher's office, arrived late to school or left early, failed to observe a student leaving school grounds, and inconsistent attendance. Beginning on June 11, 2025, Mr. Nelson "sent text messages to teachers outside of the workday and about his employment and [made baseless], yet concerning, threats related to the Superintendent of Schools." After Mr. Nelson "demanded" a meeting with Superintendent Chidiac he rescinded his meeting request. Exhibit K. The meeting took place with staff members who reported and signed statements concerning Mr. Nelson's "irrational text messages". It was also reported that Mr. Nelson was "defensive and anxious" when approached about his conduct. See Exhibit L; Certification of George Chidiac (Chidiac Cert.); see also Exhibit F; H, I, J.

Mr. Nelson has a disciplinary history of unbecoming conduct, which began in 2015 when he was placed on administrative leave with pay after being arrested four times for driving while under the influence. Mr. Nelson was observed at work walking wobbly, and beer cans were found in his office. His conduct violated District Policy 3159 when he failed to report three of the arrests. Exhibits L; A; and B. He attended an inpatient treatment center. In November 2019², the Board contends he was denied workers' compensation when video surveillance did not show him injuring his ankle as he reported. Two years later, it was reported that Mr. Nelson was observed walking erratically at work. Mr. Nelson was again placed on administrative leave pending an investigation of him being under the influence of alcohol while working. As part of that disciplinary action, Mr.

² Mr. Nelson was again denied workers' compensation for a second time beginning in early 2023 when documents and footage did not reveal the claims he had made about an injury in the school.

Nelson and the District entered into a Last Chance Agreement, which included terms such as waiving his right to grieve, contest, or challenge any transfer to another position or work location, and an agreement to submit to random drug/alcohol testing. See Chidiac Cert. at 11; Exhibit E. The agreement was in effect until June 30, 2023.

On August 5, 2025, Superintendent Chidiac issued a letter to Mr. Nelson summarizing his behavior that caused him to issue the directive to be examined. Exhibit R. In response, Mr. Nelson requested an order declaring that the Board does not have the legal authority to compel him to undergo the examination; specifically, he claims that the Board “did not demonstrate evidence of conduct of a harmful, significant deviation from normal physical or mental health affecting his ability to teach, discipline, or associate with children of the age of the children subject to the teacher’s control in the school district”. Instead, Mr. Nelson contends that “he does not suffer from or manifest any evidence of a harmful, significant deviation from normal physical or mental health affecting his ability to teach, discipline, or associate with the children subject to his control in the District”.

POSITION OF THE PARTIES

According to the Board, dismissal of the petition, or in the alternative, summary decision in its favor, is appropriate, and there is no need for a hearing because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding Mr. Nelson’s prior discipline, his dispute with colleagues, and his misconduct that gave rise to the current directive to undergo an examination in order to return to work.

The Board argues that the petition “fails to state a legal basis for relief” as petitioner’s submission is conclusionary, merely setting forth his own self-assessment as to whether he should be tested or not, without providing any factual support to demonstrate that the Board’s directive “lacked a reasonable basis.”

Thereafter, Mr. Nelson filed a brief in opposition to the District’s motion for summary decision. A certification signed by Mr. Nelson was included in the filed opposition. Exhibit B. In his certification opposing the District’s motion, Mr. Nelson denied

prior disciplinary history for acting “erratically or wobbly” and having empty beer bottles in his office, and admitted he entered into a Last Chance Agreement after the incident in which he was found to have alcohol on school grounds. Mr. Nelson also responded to current complaints of conduct in a general manner admitting that he contacted staff who reported his behavior and that he does not “suffer from, nor manifest any evidence of a harmful, significant deviation from normal physical or mental health affecting his ability to teach, discipline or associate with the children subject to his control in the School District.” See Petitioner’s Verified Petition ¶ 5.

To the extent that Mr. Nelson addresses the District’s examples of his specific acts of conduct that resulted in discipline, he generally denies certain conduct and explains that his conduct did not rise to the level of warranting an examination. Mr. Nelson also disputes the District’s contention that he misled the District when he filed for workers’ compensation without demonstrating a valid injury.

Based on these arguments, Mr. Nelson also asserts that the District’s motion for summary decision should be denied because the District represents in its pleadings a “fundamental misunderstanding as to the procedure attendant to demands for psychiatric evaluation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2.”

In response to Mr. Nelson’s opposition, the District argues that Mr. Nelson failed to dispute the facts and evidentiary support provided for each relevant fact and statement. Furthermore, the District argues that the petitioner’s opposition mischaracterized the statutory framework governing psychiatric examination under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2. In particular, Mr. Nelson “overstates his procedural rights, and misrepresents the evidentiary requirements necessary to challenge the Board’s determination.”

The Board restates its position that no genuine issues of material fact have been set forth through a responding affidavit; therefore, it is entitled to summary decision directing Mr. Nelson to undergo an examination.

LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Under the procedural rules governing petitions of appeal filed with the Commissioner of Education, a respondent can move to dismiss in lieu of an answer for various reasons, including “on the grounds that the petitioner has advanced no cause of action even if the petitioner’s factual allegations are accepted as true” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.10; N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5(g). Such a motion is assessed under the same standards as a motion to dismiss for a complainant’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under New Jersey Court Rule 4:6-2(e), which like N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5(g) and N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.10 allows for the motions for judgment on the pleading.

Under those standards, “the test for determining the adequacy of [the] pleading [is] whether a cause of action is ‘suggested’ by the facts,” such that the “inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint.” Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (citing R. 4:6-2(e); Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988); Rieder v. Dep’t of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987)).

While the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules governing motions, N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.1 to -12.7, do not specifically limit the types of motions that may be made in administrative hearings or otherwise preclude a “motion to dismiss,” the more common method for resolving a case on the papers without a plenary hearing is by a motion for summary decision pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5.

Under N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5, “[a] party may move for summary decision upon all or any of the substantive issues in a contested case.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(a). Such motion “shall be served with briefs and with or without supporting affidavits,” and “[t]he decision sought may be rendered if the papers and discovery which have been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). However, a motion for summary decision shall be denied if, by responding affidavit, an adverse party “set[s] forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue which can only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding.” Ibid.

Summary decision is analyzed in accordance with the principles established by the Supreme Court in Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995):

[A] determination whether there exists a “genuine issue” of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. The “judge’s function is not . . . to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”

[Citation omitted.]

See also Nat’l Transfer, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 347 N.J. Super. 401, 408–09 (App. Div. 2002).

A summary decision “may be rendered if the papers and discovery which have been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). That rule is substantially similar to the summary judgment rule embodied in the New Jersey Court Rules. See R. 4:46-2; Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954).

Having considered the parties’ submissions, I **CONCLUDE** that the evidence at this juncture is sufficient to properly dispose of this matter by way of summary decision because there are no genuine issues of material fact.

Petitioner challenges the Board’s decision to direct him to undergo an examination confirming his fitness to return to duty.

Under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2, the Board of Education has discretion to request an evaluation of its employees:

Every board of education may require its employees and shall require any candidate for employment who has received a conditional offer of employment to undergo a physical examination. The board may require individual psychiatric or physical examinations of any employee, whenever, in the judgment of the board, an employee shows evidence of deviation from normal, physical or mental health.

[N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2(a).]

Under N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3(b):

When a district board of education requires an employee to undergo a physical or psychiatric examination:

1. The district board of education shall provide the employee with a written statement of the reason(s) for the required examination.
2. The district board of education shall provide the employee with a hearing, if requested.
 - i. The determination of such a hearing shall be appealable to the Commissioner pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9

[ibid.]

On appeal, the question is whether “the board's determination was a fair and reasonable one—a determination which . . . is ‘one which could logically be made by reasonable and fair-minded men who have evaluated petitioner’s behavior and who are concerned with petitioner’s fitness to be a teacher in intimate contact with numbers of impressionable, adolescent pupils.’” Gish v. Bd. of Educ. of Bor. of Paramus, 145 N.J. Super. 96, 105 (App. Div. 1976). Thus, “[t]he issue to be determined is whether petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the credible evidence that it was unreasonable for the Board to conclude, based upon the facts before it . . . that there was ‘evidence of deviation from normal, physical or mental health.’” Mahan v. Bd. of Educ. of Bor. of Haddon Heights, 1984 S.L.D. 642, 664.

In evaluating the merits of the motion, “[a]ll inferences of doubt are drawn against the movant and in favor of the opponent of the motion.” Judson, 17 N.J. at 75. “When a motion for summary decision is made and supported, an adverse party in order to prevail *must by responding affidavit* set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue which can only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b) (emphases added). “If the opposing party offers no affidavits or matter in opposition, or only facts which are immaterial or of an insubstantial nature, a mere scintilla, ‘fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious,’ [they] will not be heard to complain if the court grants summary [decision.]” Judson, 17 N.J. at 75 (citation omitted, emphasis added).

Petitioner’s responding affidavit merely offers a denial of the facts. It fails to respond specifically to each of respondent’s facts and statements that were found to be credible and buttressed by signed and dated statements written on the same day staff members reported Mr. Nelson’s behavior to the Superintendent, and the submissions of text messages.

In light of petitioner’s arguments about the need for a hearing in this matter, some discussion of the laws governing contested case hearings is necessary. As the Supreme Court has explained, the Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15, the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.1 to -21.6, and the statute establishing and governing the OAL, N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -23, set forth “basic ground rules for the conduct of administrative hearings in contested matters within an agency’s area of responsibility.” Dep’t of Children & Families v. E.D.-O., 223 N.J. 166, 190 (2015).

A “contested case” is defined as “an adversary proceeding . . . in which the legal rights, duties, obligations, privileges, benefits or other legal relations of specific parties are required by constitutional right or by statute to be determined by an agency by decisions, determinations, or orders, addressed to them or disposing of their interests, after opportunity for an agency hearing.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-2.1; N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2. If “an agency renders a decision and a person seeks review of the decision,” and the agency head determines that “the request for review constitutes a contested case,” then the agency will transmit the matter to the OAL for a contested case hearing. E.D.-O., 223

N.J. at 190–91; N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) (providing that “[a]ll hearings of a State agency required to be conducted as a contested case . . . shall be conducted by an administrative law judge assigned by the Director and Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Office of Administrative Law”); but see N.J.S.A. 52:14F-8 (stating that, “[u]nless a specific request is made by the agency, no administrative law judge shall be assigned by the director to hear contested cases with respect to . . . [t]he State Board of Parole; the Public Employment Relations Commission; the Division of Workers’ Compensation; [or] the Division of Tax Appeals . . .”).

However, and importantly, not all contested cases transmitted to the OAL require a hearing. A “hearing” is “a proceeding conducted by a judge for the purpose of determining disputed issues of fact, law or disposition.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-2.1. After an agency sends a contested case to the OAL, it could turn out that there are no “disputed issues of fact, law or disposition,” and thus a contested case may be resolved without the need for a hearing. “It is well-established that where no disputed issues of material fact exist, an administrative agency need not hold an evidential hearing in a contested case.” Frank v. Ivy Club, 120 N.J. 73, 98 (1990).

Like summary judgment, summary decision “is designed to provide a prompt, businesslike and inexpensive method of disposing of any cause which a discriminating search of the merits in the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits submitted on the motion clearly shows not to present any genuine issue of material fact requiring disposition at a [hearing].” Judson, 17 N.J. at 74.

Here, the Commissioner sent petitioner’s appeal to the OAL for a contested case hearing. However, petitioner failed to meet the requirements of N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5 by not raising any genuine issues of material fact by responding affidavit in opposition to respondent’s motion for summary decision. Accordingly, there is no need for a hearing.

For the foregoing reasons, I **CONCLUDE** that the respondent Board proved by a preponderance of the competent, credible evidence that petitioner’s behavior was found to be harmful, significant deviation from mental health affecting the teacher’s ability to teach, discipline, or associate with children of the age of the children subject to the

teacher's control in the school district, as reported by fair minded teaching staff and administrators and I further **CONCLUDE** that respondent acted properly in compelling petitioner to undergo a psychiatric examination or submit a letter from his medical provider confirming his fitness to return to duty, in order to keep his tenured teaching job for the District.

ORDER

It is hereby **ORDERED** that the Board of Education of the Township of Stafford's motion for summary decision is **GRANTED**. Accordingly, it is hereby **ORDERED** that the action taken by the Board of Education of the Township of Stafford in directing Nelson to undergo a Fitness for Duty Examination or submit a letter from his medical provider confirming his fitness to return to duty is **GRANTED**, and the appeal is hereby **DISMISSED**.


I hereby **FILE** this initial decision with the **COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION** for consideration.

This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the **COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION**, who by law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. If the Commissioner of the Department of Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the **COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION**. Exceptions may be filed by email to ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to **Office of Controversies and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0500**. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.

February 9, 2026 _____

DATE



MARY ANN BOGAN, ALJ

Date Received at Agency:

Date Mailed to Parties:

MAB/sa