



State of New Jersey  
GOVERNMENT RECORDS COUNCIL

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CHRIS CHRISTIE  
Governor

KIM GUADAGNO  
Lt. Governor

RICHARD E. CONSTABLE, III  
Acting Commissioner

FINAL DECISION

April 25, 2012 Government Records Council Meeting

Andrew Babiak, Esq.  
(on behalf of Gloria Grantham)  
Complainant

Complaint No. 2010-326

v.  
Pleasantville Board of Education (Atlantic)  
Custodian of Record

At the April 25, 2012 public meeting, the Government Records Council (“Council”) considered the April 18, 2012 Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director and all related documentation submitted by the parties. The Council voted unanimously to adopt the entirety of said findings and recommendations. The Council, therefore, finds that:

1. The Custodian’s failure to respond in writing to the Complainant’s OPRA request either granting access, denying access, seeking clarification or requesting an extension of time within the statutorily mandated seven (7) business days results in a “deemed” denial of the Complainant’s OPRA request pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.g., N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.i., and Kelley v. Township of Rockaway, GRC Complaint No. 2007-11 (Interim Order October 31, 2007).
2. Because the Complainant’s request Item No. 3 fails to identify a date the report was prepared, who authored the report, or to whom the report was disseminated and would require the Custodian to conduct research, such request is invalid under OPRA pursuant to MAG Entertainment, LLC v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534 (App. Div. 2005), Bent v. Stafford Police Department, 381 N.J. Super. 30, 37 (App. Div. 2005), New Jersey Builders Association v. New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing, 390 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div. 2007), and Schuler v. Borough of Bloomsbury, GRC Complaint No. 2007-151 (February 2009).
3. The Custodian violated N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.g. and N.J.S.A. 47:1A-i. by failing to timely respond to the Complainant’s OPRA request. However, the Custodian’s Counsel provided records responsive to the Complainant’s OPRA request Items No. 1 and No. 2 to the Complainant on December 17, 2010 and Complainant’s OPRA request Item No. 3 is invalid under OPRA because it fails to identify a date the report was prepared, who authored the report, or to whom the report was disseminated and would require the Custodian to conduct research to locate a responsive record. Additionally, the evidence of record does not indicate that the former Custodian’s violation of OPRA had a positive element of conscious wrongdoing or was intentional and deliberate. Therefore, it is concluded that the Custodian’s actions did



not rise to the level of a knowing and willful violation of OPRA and unreasonable denial of access under the totality of the circumstances.

4. Pursuant to Teeters v. DYFS, 387 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 2006), the Complainant has not achieved “the desired result because the complaint brought about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian’s conduct.” *Id.* at 432. Additionally, pursuant to Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (2008), no factual causal nexus exists between the Complainant’s filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief ultimately achieved. Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, Teeters, Mason, and Spectraserv v. Middlesex County Utilities Authority, 416 N.J. Super. 565 (App. Div. 2010).

This is the final administrative determination in this matter. Any further review should be pursued in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey within forty-five (45) days. Information about the appeals process can be obtained from the Appellate Division Clerk’s Office, Hughes Justice Complex, 25 W. Market St., PO Box 006, Trenton, NJ 08625-0006. Proper service of submissions pursuant to any appeal is to be made to the Council in care of the Executive Director at the State of New Jersey Government Records Council, 101 South Broad Street, PO Box 819, Trenton, NJ 08625-0819.

Final Decision Rendered by the  
Government Records Council  
On The 25<sup>th</sup> Day of April, 2012

Robin Berg Tabakin, Chair  
Government Records Council

I attest the foregoing is a true and accurate record of the Government Records Council.

Denise Parkinson Vetti, Secretary  
Government Records Council

**Decision Distribution Date: April 30, 2012**

**STATE OF NEW JERSEY  
GOVERNMENT RECORDS COUNCIL**

**Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director  
April 25, 2012 Council Meeting**

**Andrew Babiak, Esq.**  
**(on behalf of Gloria Grantham)<sup>1</sup>**  
**Complainant**

**GRC Complaint No. 2010-326**

v.

**Pleasantville Board of Education (Atlantic)<sup>2</sup>**  
**Custodian of Records**

**Records Relevant to Complaint:** Copies of the following:

1. All Pleasantville Board of Education (“Board”) meeting minutes from July 2009 through October 2010.
2. Video and audio recordings in CD or DVD format of all Board meetings from July 2009 through October 2010.
3. Any and all reports pertaining to the mold problem at the Leeds Avenue School.

**Request Made:** November 18, 2010

**Response Made:** December 17, 2010

**Custodian:** Dennis Mulvihill

**GRC Complaint Filed:** December 10, 2010<sup>3</sup>

**Background**

**November 18, 2010**

Complainant’s Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”) request. The Complainant requests the records relevant to this complaint listed above in a letter referencing OPRA.

**December 10, 2010**

Denial of Access Complaint filed with the Government Records Council (“GRC”) attaching the Complainant’s OPRA request dated November 18, 2010.

The Complainant states that he has had no contact with the Custodian. The Complainant also states that he has not received any telephone call, letter or any communication regarding his OPRA request.

The Complainant does not agree to mediate this complaint.

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<sup>1</sup> The Complainant is an attorney representing Dr. Gloria Grantham, former Superintendent of the Pleasantville Board of Education.

<sup>2</sup> Represented by Raymond L. Hamlin, Esq., of the Law Offices of Hunt, Hamlin & Ridley (Newark, NJ).

<sup>3</sup> The GRC received the Denial of Access Complaint on said date.

**December 14, 2010**

Request for the Statement of Information (“SOI”) sent to the Custodian.

**December 17, 2010**

Custodian Counsel’s response to the Complainant’s OPRA request. Counsel responds in writing via letter to the Complainant’s OPRA request on the sixteenth (16<sup>th</sup>) business day following receipt of such request.<sup>4</sup> Counsel provides the following records responsive: 1) Board meeting minutes from July 2009 through October 2010 and 2) video recordings of said meetings from July 2009 through October 2010. Counsel states that the report and all related records prepared by Hunt, Hamlin, & Ridley and/or Parker McKay (“Board’s attorneys”) responsive to request Item No. 3 are exempt from disclosure under OPRA because they contain attorney client privileged communications pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.

**January 4, 2011**

Letter from GRC to the Custodian. The GRC sends a letter to the Custodian indicating that the GRC provided the Custodian with a request for an SOI on December 14, 2010 and to date has not received a response. Further, the GRC states that if the SOI is not submitted within three (3) business days, the GRC will adjudicate this complaint based solely on the information provided by the Complainant.

**January 5, 2011**

E-mail from the Complainant to the GRC. The Complainant states that the Board has not provided a copy of the report responsive to request Item No. 3. The Complainant also states that the Custodian’s Counsel asserts that the records responsive to request Item 3 are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the attorney client privilege. The Complainant further states that Counsel can redact the portions of the record that contain legal opinions.

**January 26, 2011<sup>5</sup>**

Custodian’s SOI with the following attachments:

- Complainant’s OPRA request dated November 18, 2010
- Letter from Custodian’s Counsel to the Complainant dated December 17, 2010.

The Custodian certifies that he received the Complainant’s OPRA request on November 23, 2010. The Custodian also certifies that Counsel provided the Complainant with copies of the Board minutes responsive to request Item No. 1 on December 17, 2010. The Custodian further certifies that Counsel provided the Complainant with copies of the video recordings of the Board meeting responsive to request Item No. 2 on

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<sup>4</sup> The Custodian certifies in the SOI that he received the Complainant’s OPRA request on November 23, 2010.

<sup>5</sup> The Custodian did not certify to the search undertaken to locate the records responsive or whether any records responsive to the Complainant’s OPRA request were destroyed in accordance with the Records Destruction Schedule established and approved by New Jersey Department of State, Division of Archives and Records Management as is required pursuant to Paff v. NJ Department of Labor, 392 N.J. Super. 334 (App. Div. 2007).

December 17, 2010. The Custodian additionally certifies that the Board's attorneys prepared a report regarding the circumstances surrounding an investigation into mold that was discovered at the Leeds Avenue School. The Custodian argues that this report contains attorney client privileged communications, impressions and work product. The Custodian certifies that this report was prepared in anticipation of litigation in which the Complainant is currently involved with the Board. The Custodian also certifies that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 the report was not disclosed to the Complainant or to the Complainant's client.

### Analysis

#### **Whether the Custodian timely responded to the Complainant's OPRA request?**

OPRA provides that:

“[i]f the custodian is unable to comply with a request for access, the custodian shall indicate the specific basis therefor on the request form and promptly return it to the requestor. The custodian shall sign and date the form and provide the requestor with a copy thereof ...” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.g.

Further, OPRA provides that:

“[u]nless a shorter time period is otherwise provided by statute, regulation, or executive order, a custodian of a government record shall grant access ... or deny a request for access ... as soon as possible, but *not later than seven business days after receiving the request* ... In the event a custodian fails to respond within seven business days after receiving a request, *the failure to respond shall be deemed a denial of the request* ...” (Emphasis added.) N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.i.

OPRA mandates that a custodian must either grant or deny access to requested records within seven (7) business days from receipt of said request. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.i. As also prescribed under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.i., a custodian's failure to respond within the required seven (7) business days results in a “deemed” denial. Further, a custodian's response, either granting or denying access, must be in writing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.g.<sup>6</sup> Thus, a custodian's failure to respond in writing to a complainant's OPRA request either granting access, denying access, seeking clarification or requesting an extension of time within the statutorily mandated seven (7) business days results in a “deemed” denial of the complainant's OPRA request pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.g., N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.i., and Kelley v. Township of Rockaway, GRC Complaint No. 2007-11 (Interim Order October 31, 2007).

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<sup>6</sup> It is the GRC's position that a custodian's written response either granting access, denying access, seeking clarification or requesting an extension of time within the statutorily mandated seven (7) business days, even if said response is not on the agency's official OPRA request form, is a valid response pursuant to OPRA.

In the instant complaint, the Complainant filed his OPRA request on November 18, 2011. The Custodian certified in the SOI that he received the Complainant's OPRA request on November 23, 2011. The Custodian also certified in the SOI that Custodian's Counsel responded on his behalf to the Complainant's request on December 17, 2010, sixteen (16) business days after receipt of said request, granting access to records responsive to request Item No. 1 and No. 2 and denying access to a report responsive to request Item No. 3 on the grounds that said report contains attorney client privileged material pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.

Therefore, the Custodian's failure to respond in writing to the Complainant's OPRA request either granting access, denying access, seeking clarification or requesting an extension of time within the statutorily mandated seven (7) business days results in a "deemed" denial of the Complainant's OPRA request pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.g., N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.i., and Kelley, supra.

### **Whether the Complainant's request Item No. 3 is valid under OPRA?**

The Complainant's request Item No. 3 for "any and all reports pertaining to the mold problem at the Leeds Avenue School" is overly broad because it fails to specifically identify a date the report was prepared, who authored the report, or to whom the report was disseminated, and would require the Custodian to conduct research; this request Item is therefore invalid under OPRA.

The New Jersey Superior Court has held that "[w]hile OPRA provides an alternative means of access to government documents not otherwise exempted from its reach, *it is not intended as a research tool litigants may use to force government officials to identify and siphon useful information. Rather, OPRA simply operates to make identifiable government records 'readily accessible for inspection, copying, or examination.'* N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1." (Emphasis added.) MAG Entertainment, LLC v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534, 546 (App. Div. 2005). As the court noted in invalidating MAG's request under OPRA:

"Most significantly, the request failed to identify with any specificity or particularity the governmental records sought. MAG provided neither names nor any identifiers other than a broad generic description of a brand or type of case prosecuted by the agency in the past. Such an open-ended demand required the Division's records custodian to manually search through all of the agency's files, analyze, compile and collate the information contained therein, and identify for MAG the cases relative to its selective enforcement defense in the OAL litigation. Further, once the cases were identified, the records custodian would then be required to evaluate, sort out, and determine the documents to be produced and those otherwise exempted." *Id.* at 549.

The Court further held that "[u]nder OPRA, *agencies are required to disclose only 'identifiable' government records* not otherwise exempt ... In short, OPRA does not countenance open-ended searches of an agency's files." (Emphasis added.) *Id.*

In addition, in Bent v. Stafford Police Department, 381 N.J. Super. 30, 37 (App. Div. 2005),<sup>7</sup> the Superior Court references MAG in that the Court held that a requestor must specifically describe the document sought because OPRA operates to make identifiable government records “accessible.” “As such, a proper request under OPRA must identify with reasonable clarity those documents that are desired, and a party cannot satisfy this requirement by simply requesting all of an agency's documents.”<sup>8</sup>

Moreover, in New Jersey Builders Association v. New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing, 390 N.J. Super. 166, 180 (App. Div. 2007), the court enumerated the responsibilities of a custodian and a requestor as follows:

“OPRA identifies the responsibilities of the requestor and the agency relevant to the prompt access the law is designed to provide. The custodian, who is the person designated by the director of the agency, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, must adopt forms for requests, locate and redact documents, isolate exempt documents, assess fees and means of production, identify requests that require "extraordinary expenditure of time and effort" and warrant assessment of a "service charge," and, when unable to comply with a request, "indicate the specific basis." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(a)-(j). The requestor must pay the costs of reproduction and submit the request with information that is essential to permit the custodian to comply with its obligations. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(f), (g), (i). *Research is not among the custodian's responsibilities.*” (Emphasis added), NJ Builders, 390 N.J. Super. at 177.

Moreover, the court cited MAG by stating that “...when a request is ‘complex’ because it fails to specifically identify the documents sought, then that request is not ‘encompassed’ by OPRA...” The court also quoted N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.g in that “[i]f a request for access to a government record would substantially disrupt agency operations, the custodian may deny access to the record after attempting to reach a reasonable solution with the requestor that accommodates the interests of the requestor and the agency.” The court further stated that “...the Legislature would not expect or want courts to require more persuasive proof of the substantiality of a disruption to agency operations than the agency’s need to...generate new records...” Accordingly, the test under MAG then, is whether a requested record is a *specifically identifiable* government record.

Under such rationale, the GRC has repeatedly found that blanket requests are not valid OPRA requests. In the matter of Schuler v. Borough of Bloomsbury, GRC Complaint No. 2007-151 (February 2009), the relevant part of the Complainant’s request sought:

- Item No. 2: “From the Borough Engineer’s files: all engineering

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<sup>7</sup> Affirmed on appeal regarding Bent v. Stafford Police Department, GRC Case No. 2004-78 (October 2004).

<sup>8</sup> As stated in Bent, *supra*.

documents for all developments or modifications to Block 25, Lot 28; Block 25, Lot 18; Block 23, Lot 1; Block 23, Lot 1.02.

- Item No. 3: From the Borough Engineer's files: all engineering documents for all developments or modifications to North St., to the south and east of Wilson St.
- Item No. 4: From the Borough Attorney's files: all documents related to the development or modification to Block 25, Lot 28; Block 25, Lot 18; Block 23, Lot 1; Block 23, Lot 1.02.
- Item No. 5: From the Borough Attorney's files: all documents related to the development or modification to North Street, to the south and east of Wilson St."

In reviewing the complainant's request, the Council found that "[b]ecause the Complainant's OPRA requests # 2-5 are not requests for identifiable government records, the requests are invalid and the Custodian has not unlawfully denied access to the requested records pursuant to MAG Entertainment, LLC v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534 (App. Div. 2005) and Bent v. Stafford Police Department, 381 N.J. Super. 30 (App. Div. 2005)."

In the instant complaint, the Complainant requested "any and all reports pertaining to the mold problem at the Leeds Avenue School." The Complainant's request Item No. 3 fails to specifically identify a date the report was prepared, who authored the report, or to whom the report was disseminated. Thus, the Custodian would have to research all reports made, maintained or kept on file to identify reports responsive to the Complainant's request. OPRA does not require custodians to perform research to locate records responsive to the Complainant's request. See MAG, *supra*.

Therefore, because the Complainant's request Item No. 3 fails to identify a date the report was prepared, who authored the report, or to whom the report was disseminated and would require the Custodian to conduct research, such request is invalid under OPRA pursuant to MAG Entertainment, LLC v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534 (App. Div. 2005), Bent v. Stafford Police Department, 381 N.J. Super. 30, 37 (App. Div. 2005), New Jersey Builders Association v. New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing, 390 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div. 2007), and Schuler v. Borough of Bloomsbury, GRC Complaint No. 2007-151 (February 2009).

The Council recognizes Gannett v. County of Middlesex, 379 N.J. Super. 205 (App. Div. 2005), in which the Court held that although Gannett's request was improper and Middlesex County could have refused to produce any records responsive but instead Middlesex County provided Gannett with most of the records responsive to the request. Gannett brought action against County of Middlesex seeking disclosure of the remainder of the records responsive. The Court held, "[s]uch a voluntary disclosure of most of the documents sought by Gannett and refusal to release the remaining documents solely on confidentiality grounds constituted a waiver of whatever right the County may have had to deny Gannett's entire OPRA request on the ground that it was improper." *Id.* at 213.

The facts in the instant complaint are distinguishable from Gannett, *supra*. The Custodian's Counsel responded to the Complainant's OPRA request denying access to Andrew Babiak, Esq. (on behalf of Dr. Gloria Grantham) v. Pleasantville Board of Education (Atlantic), 2010-326 – Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director



reports and all related records prepared by the Board's attorneys responsive to request Item No. 3 because they contain attorney client privileged communications pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. Furthermore, in the SOI the Custodian certified that the Board's attorneys prepared a report regarding the circumstances surrounding an investigation into mold discovered at Leeds Avenue School. However, the Custodian also asserted that such report was exempt from disclosure pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 as attorney client privileged material and did not provide the Complainant access to the report responsive to request Item No. 3. Therefore, the Council declines to address whether said report is exempt from disclosure as attorney client privilege material because the Complainant's request Item No. 3 was improper and the Custodian did not disclose any records responsive to such request pursuant to Gannett v. County of Middlesex, 379 N.J. Super. 205 (App. Div. 2005).

**Whether the Custodian's actions rise to the level of a knowing and willful violation of OPRA and unreasonable denial of access under the totality of the circumstances?**

OPRA states that:

“[a] public official, officer, employee or custodian who knowingly or willfully violates [OPRA], and is found to have unreasonably denied access under the totality of the circumstances, shall be subject to a civil penalty ...” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11.a.

OPRA allows the Council to determine a knowing and willful violation of the law and unreasonable denial of access under the totality of the circumstances. Specifically OPRA states:

“... If the council determines, by a majority vote of its members, that a custodian has knowingly and willfully violated [OPRA], and is found to have unreasonably denied access under the totality of the circumstances, the council may impose the penalties provided for in [OPRA]...” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-7.e.

Certain legal standards must be considered when making the determination of whether the Custodian's actions rise to the level of a “knowing and willful” violation of OPRA. The following statements must be true for a determination that the Custodian “knowingly and willfully” violated OPRA: the Custodian's actions must have been much more than negligent conduct (Alston v. City of Camden, 168 N.J. 170, 185 (2001)); the Custodian must have had some knowledge that his actions were wrongful (Fielder v. Stonack, 141 N.J. 101, 124 (1995)); the Custodian's actions must have had a positive element of conscious wrongdoing (Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., 37 N.J. 396, 414 (1962)); the Custodian's actions must have been forbidden with actual, not imputed, knowledge that the actions were forbidden (Berg); the Custodian's actions must have been intentional and deliberate, with knowledge of their wrongfulness, and not merely negligent, heedless or unintentional (ECES v. Salmon, 295 N.J. Super. 86, 107 (App. Div. 1996).

The Custodian violated N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.g. and N.J.S.A. 47:1A-i. by failing to timely respond to the Complainant's OPRA request. However, the Custodian's Counsel provided records responsive to the Complainant's OPRA request Items No. 1 and No. 2 to the Complainant on December 17, 2010 and Complainant's OPRA request Item No. 3 is invalid under OPRA because it fails to identify a date the report was prepared, who authored the report, or to whom the report was disseminated and would require the Custodian to conduct research to locate a responsive record. Additionally, the evidence of record does not indicate that the former Custodian's violation of OPRA had a positive element of conscious wrongdoing or was intentional and deliberate. Therefore, it is concluded that the Custodian's actions did not rise to the level of a knowing and willful violation of OPRA and unreasonable denial of access under the totality of the circumstances.

**Whether the Complainant is a "prevailing party" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 and entitled to reasonable attorney's fees when the Complainant is an attorney?**

OPRA provides that:

"[a] person who is denied access to a government record by the custodian of the record, at the option of the requestor, may:  
institute a proceeding to challenge the custodian's decision by filing an action in Superior Court...; or  
in lieu of filing an action in Superior Court, file a complaint with the Government Records Council...

A requestor who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.

In Teeters v. DYFS, 387 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 2006), the court held that a complainant is a "prevailing party" if he/she achieves the desired result because the complaint brought about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian's conduct. Additionally, the court held that attorney's fees may be awarded when the requestor is successful (or partially successful) via a judicial decree, a quasi-judicial determination, or a settlement of the parties that indicates access was improperly denied and the requested records are disclosed. Id.

In Teeters, the complainant appealed from a final decision of the Government Records Council which denied an award for attorney's fees incurred in seeking access to certain public records via two complaints she filed under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 and N.J.S.A. 47:1A-7.f., against the Division of Youth and Family Services ("DYFS"). The records sought involved an adoption agency having falsely advertised that it was licensed in New Jersey. DYFS eventually determined that the adoption agency violated the licensing rules and reported the results of its investigation to the complainant. The complainant received the records she requested upon entering into a settlement with DYFS. The court found that the complainant engaged in reasonable efforts to pursue her access rights to the records in question and sought attorney assistance only after her self-filed complaints and personal efforts were unavailing. Id. at 432. With that assistance, she achieved a favorable result that reflected

an alteration of position and behavior on DYFS's part. *Id.* As a result, the complainant was a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney's fee. Accordingly, the Court remanded the determination of reasonable attorney's fees to the GRC for adjudication.

Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled on the issue of "prevailing party" attorney's fees. In Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (2008), the court discussed the catalyst theory, "which posits that a plaintiff is a 'prevailing party' if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct." Mason, *supra*, at 71, (quoting Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 131 S. Ct. 1835, 149 L. Ed. 2d 855 (2001)). In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court stated that the phrase "prevailing party" is a legal term of art that refers to a "party in whose favor a judgment is rendered." (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1145 (7<sup>th</sup> ed. 1999)). The Supreme Court rejected the catalyst theory as a basis for prevailing party attorney fees, in part because "[i]t allows an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties." *Id.* at 605, 121 S. Ct. at 1840, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 863, but also over concern that the catalyst theory would spawn extra litigation over attorney's fees. *Id.* at 609, 121 S. Ct. at 1843, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 866.

As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in Mason, Buckhannon is binding only when counsel fee provisions under federal statutes are at issue. 196 N.J. at 72, *citing Teeters*, *supra*, 387 N.J. Super. at 429; *see, e.g., Baer v. Klagholz*, 346 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 2001) (applying Buckhannon to the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), *certif. denied*, 174 N.J. 193 (2002). "But in interpreting New Jersey law, we look to state law precedent and the specific state statute before us. When appropriate, we depart from the reasoning of federal cases that interpret comparable federal statutes." 196 N.J. at 73 (citations omitted).

The Mason Court then examined the catalyst theory within the context of New Jersey law, stating that:

"New Jersey law has long recognized the catalyst theory. In 1984, this Court considered the term "prevailing party" within the meaning of the federal Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. Singer v. State, 95 N.J. 487, 495, *cert. denied*, New Jersey v. Singer, 469 U.S. 832, 105 S. Ct. 121, 83 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1984). The Court adopted a two-part test espousing the catalyst theory, consistent with federal law at the time: (1) there must be "a factual causal nexus between plaintiff's litigation and the relief ultimately achieved;" in other words, plaintiff's efforts must be a "necessary and important factor in obtaining the relief," *Id.* at 494-95, 472 A.2d 138 (internal quotations and citations omitted); and (2) "it must be shown that the relief ultimately secured by plaintiffs had a basis in law," *Id.* at 495. *See also North Bergen Rex Transport v. TLC*, 158 N.J. 561, 570-71 (1999)(applying Singer fee-shifting test to commercial contract).

Also prior to Buckhannon, the Appellate Division applied the catalyst doctrine in the context of the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213. Warrington v. Vill. Supermarket, Inc., 328 N.J. Super. 410 (App. Div. 2000). The Appellate Division explained that "[a] plaintiff is considered a prevailing party 'when actual relief on the merits of [the] claim materially alters the relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.'" *Id.* at 420 (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12, 113 S. Ct. 566, 573, 121 L. Ed. 2d 494, 503 (1992)); see also Szczepanski v. Newcomb Med. Ctr., 141 N.J. 346, 355 (1995) (noting that Hensley v. Eckerhart "generously" defines "a prevailing party [a]s one who succeeds 'on any significant issue in litigation [that] achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit'" (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1938, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40, 50 (1983))). The panel noted that the "form of the judgment is not entitled to conclusive weight"; rather, courts must look to whether a plaintiff's lawsuit acted as a catalyst that prompted defendant to take action and correct an unlawful practice. Warrington, *supra*, 328 N.J. Super. at 421. A settlement that confers the relief sought may still entitle plaintiff to attorney's fees in fee-shifting matters. *Id.* at 422.

This Court affirmed the catalyst theory again in 2001 when it applied the test to an attorney misconduct matter. Packard-Bamberger, *supra*, 167 N.J. at 444. In an OPRA matter several years later, New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, 185 N.J. 137, 143-44 (2005)(NJDPM), this Court directed the Department of Corrections to disclose records beyond those it had produced voluntarily. In ordering attorney's fees, the Court acknowledged the rationale underlying various fee-shifting statutes: to insure that plaintiffs are able to find lawyers to represent them; to attract competent counsel to seek redress of statutory rights; and to "even the fight" when citizens challenge a public entity. *Id.* at 153.

After Buckhannon, and after the trial court's decision in this case, the Appellate Division decided Teeters. The plaintiff in Teeters requested records from the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), which DYFS declined to release. 387 N.J. Super. at 424. After the GRC preliminarily found in plaintiff's favor, the parties reached a settlement agreement leaving open whether plaintiff was a "prevailing party" under OPRA. *Id.* at 426-27.

The Appellate Division declined to follow Buckhannon and held that plaintiff was a "prevailing party" entitled to reasonable attorney's fees; in line with the catalyst theory, plaintiff's complaint brought about an alteration in DYFS's position, and she received a favorable result through the settlement reached. *Id.* at 431-34. In rejecting Buckhannon, the panel noted that "New Jersey statutes have a different tone and flavor" than federal fee-shifting laws. *Id.* at 430. "Both the language of our statutes and the terms of court decisions in this State dealing with the issue of counsel

fee entitlements support a more indulgent view of petitioner's claim for an attorney's fee award than was allowed by the majority in Buckhannon . . . .” *Id.* at 431, 904 A.2d 747. As support for this proposition, the panel surveyed OPRA, Packard-Bamberger, Warrington, and other cases.

OPRA itself contains broader language on attorney's fees than the former RTKL did. OPRA provides that “[a] requestor who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. Under the prior RTKL, “[a] plaintiff in whose favor such an order [requiring access to public records] issues . . . may be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee not to exceed \$ 500.00.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-4 (repealed 2002). The Legislature's revisions therefore: (1) mandate, rather than permit, an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party; and (2) eliminate the \$ 500 cap on fees and permit a reasonable, and quite likely higher, fee award.<sup>9</sup> Those changes expand counsel fee awards under OPRA.” Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 73-76 (2008).

The court in Mason, *supra*, at 76, held that “requestors are entitled to attorney’s fees under OPRA, absent a judgment or an enforceable consent decree, when they can demonstrate (1) ‘a factual causal nexus between plaintiff’s litigation and the relief ultimately achieved’; and (2) ‘that the relief ultimately secured by plaintiffs had a basis in law.’ Singer v. State, 95 N.J. 487, 495, cert denied (1984).”

In Mason, the plaintiff submitted an OPRA request on February 9, 2004. Hoboken responded on February 20, eight business days later, or one day beyond the statutory limit. *Id.* at 79. As a result, the Court shifted the burden to Hoboken to prove that the plaintiff's lawsuit, filed on March 4, was not the catalyst behind the City's voluntary disclosure. *Id.* Because Hoboken's February 20 response included a copy of a memo dated February 19 -- the seventh business day -- which advised that one of the requested records should be available on February 27 and the other one week later, the Court determined that the plaintiff's lawsuit was not the catalyst for the release of the records and found that she was not entitled to an award of prevailing party attorney fees. *Id.* at 80.

However, in Spectraserv v. Middlesex County Utilities Authority, 416 N.J. Super. 565 (App. Div. 2010), the Appellate Division determined that prevailing party attorney fees are not appropriate where a request is invalid under OPRA because it is overly broad and fails to identify specific government records sought, even if the Custodian released records after the filing of the Denial of Access Complaint. *Id.* at 578-79.

In the matter before the Council, the Complainant's request for request Item No. 3 is invalid under OPRA because it is overly broad and unclear. Although Custodian's Counsel identified a report responsive to request Item No. 3 subsequent to the filing of

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<sup>9</sup> The significance of awarding fees to “requestors” and not “plaintiffs” is less clear because OPRA’s fee-shifting provision refers both to individuals filing suit in Superior Court and those choosing the GRC’s more information mediation route; the phrase “requestors” may simply have been used to encompass both groups. Likewise, one cannot obtain an “order” from the GRC, so the absence of that language in OPRA is not necessarily revealing.

the instant Denial of Access Complaint, Custodian's Counsel had no lawful duty to produce any records responsive to this request Item because such request Item is overly broad and is therefore invalid under OPRA.

Therefore, pursuant to Teeters, *supra*, the Complainant has not achieved "the desired result because the complaint brought about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian's conduct." *Id.* at 432. Additionally, pursuant to Mason, *supra*, no factual causal nexus exists between the Complainant's filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief ultimately achieved. Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney's fee pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, Teeters, *supra*, Mason, *supra*, and Spectraserv, *supra*.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

The Executive Director respectfully recommends the Council find that:

1. The Custodian's failure to respond in writing to the Complainant's OPRA request either granting access, denying access, seeking clarification or requesting an extension of time within the statutorily mandated seven (7) business days results in a "deemed" denial of the Complainant's OPRA request pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.g., N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.i., and Kelley v. Township of Rockaway, GRC Complaint No. 2007-11 (Interim Order October 31, 2007).
2. Because the Complainant's request Item No. 3 fails to identify a date the report was prepared, who authored the report, or to whom the report was disseminated and would require the Custodian to conduct research, such request is invalid under OPRA pursuant to MAG Entertainment, LLC v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534 (App. Div. 2005), Bent v. Stafford Police Department, 381 N.J. Super. 30, 37 (App. Div. 2005), New Jersey Builders Association v. New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing, 390 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div. 2007), and Schuler v. Borough of Bloomsbury, GRC Complaint No. 2007-151 (February 2009).
3. The Custodian violated N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.g. and N.J.S.A. 47:1A-i. by failing to timely respond to the Complainant's OPRA request. However, the Custodian's Counsel provided records responsive to the Complainant's OPRA request Items No. 1 and No. 2 to the Complainant on December 17, 2010 and Complainant's OPRA request Item No. 3 is invalid under OPRA because it fails to identify a date the report was prepared, who authored the report, or to whom the report was disseminated and would require the Custodian to conduct research to locate a responsive record. Additionally, the evidence of record does not indicate that the former Custodian's violation of OPRA had a positive element of conscious wrongdoing or was intentional and deliberate. Therefore, it is concluded that the Custodian's actions did not rise to the level of a knowing and willful violation of OPRA and unreasonable denial of access under the totality of the circumstances.

4. Pursuant to Teeters v. DYFS, 387 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 2006), the Complainant has not achieved “the desired result because the complaint brought about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian’s conduct.” *Id.* at 432. Additionally, pursuant to Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (2008), no factual causal nexus exists between the Complainant’s filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief ultimately achieved. Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, Teeters, Mason, and Spectraserv v. Middlesex County Utilities Authority, 416 N.J. Super. 565 (App. Div. 2010).

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