



State of New Jersey  
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS  
101 SOUTH BROAD STREET  
PO Box 819  
TRENTON, NJ 08625-0819

PHILIP D. MURPHY  
Governor

LT. GOVERNOR SHEILA Y. OLIVER  
Commissioner

**FINAL DECISION**

**June 27, 2023 Government Records Council Meeting**

Rotimi Owoh, Esq. (o/b/o African American  
Data & Research Institute)  
Complainant

Complaint No. 2021-266

v.

Audubon Police Department (Camden)  
Custodian of Record

At the June 27, 2023 public meeting, the Government Records Council (“Council”) considered the June 20, 2023 Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director and all related documentation submitted by the parties. The Council voted unanimously to adopt the entirety of said findings and recommendations. The Council, therefore, finds that:

1. The Custodian did not unlawfully deny access to the Complainant’s September 22, 2021 OPRA request. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. Specifically, the Custodian certified, and the record reflects, that the Borough of Audubon provided all responsive records containing the requested information. See Danis v. Garfield Bd. of Educ. (Bergen), GRC Complaint No. 2009-156, *et seq.* (Interim Order dated April 28, 2010).
2. The Complainant has not achieved the desired result because the complaint did not bring about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian’s conduct. Teeters v. DYFS, 387 N.J. Super. 423, 432 (App. Div. 2006). Additionally, no factual causal nexus exists between the Complainant’s filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief ultimately achieved. Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 76 (2008). Specifically, the Custodian certified that no additional records exist which contained the requested information. Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. at 432, and Mason, 196 N.J. at 76.

This is the final administrative determination in this matter. Any further review should be pursued in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey within forty-five (45) days. Information about the appeals process can be obtained from the Appellate Division Clerk’s Office, Hughes Justice Complex, 25 W. Market St., PO Box 006, Trenton, NJ 08625-0006. Proper service of submissions pursuant to any appeal is to be made to the Council in care of the Executive Director at the State of New Jersey Government Records Council, 101 South Broad Street, PO Box 819, Trenton, NJ 08625-0819.

Final Decision Rendered by the  
Government Records Council  
On The 27<sup>th</sup> Day of June 2023

Robin Berg Tabakin, Esq., Chair  
Government Records Council

I attest the foregoing is a true and accurate record of the Government Records Council.

Steven Ritardi, Esq., Secretary  
Government Records Council

**Decision Distribution Date: June 29, 2023**

**STATE OF NEW JERSEY  
GOVERNMENT RECORDS COUNCIL**

**Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director  
June 27, 2023 Council Meeting**

**Rotimi Owoh, Esq. (on behalf of African American  
Data & Research Institute)<sup>1</sup>  
Complainant**

**GRC Complaint No. 2021-266**

**v.**

**Audubon Police Department (Camden)<sup>2</sup>  
Custodial Agency**

**Records Relevant to Complaint:** Electronic copies via e-mail of: Names, date of hire, date of separation and reason for separation, salary at the time of separation who either resigned or retired or terminated or otherwise separated from 2008 to the present. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10. This request includes any agreement entered with each one of the separated police officer(s).

- a. When stating the reason for separation, please note that some police officers separate due to plea deal, criminal convictions, criminal charges, sentences, and or other court agreement or court proceedings that require officers to be separated from your police department and or law enforcement jobs.
- b. Some police officers separate due to internal affairs investigations within the police departments.<sup>3</sup>

**Custodian of Record:** Thomas J. Tassi

**Request Received by Custodian:** September 22, 2021

**Response Made by Custodian:** October 28, 2021

**GRC Complaint Received:** November 3, 2021

**Background<sup>4</sup>**

**Request and Response:**

On September 22, 2021, the Complainant submitted an Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”) request to the Custodian seeking the above-mentioned records. On October 28, 2021, the Custodian responded in writing providing a spreadsheet containing the requested information, noting the reasons for separation as “special retirement”, “ordinary disability”, or “suicide/survivor benefits.”

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<sup>1</sup> The Complainant represents the African American Data & Research Institute.

<sup>2</sup> Represented by Salvatore J. Siciliano, Esq., of Siciliano & Associates, LLC (Haddonfield, NJ).

<sup>3</sup> The Complainant sought additional records that are not at issue in this complaint.

<sup>4</sup> The parties may have submitted additional correspondence or made additional statements/assertions in the submissions identified herein. However, the Council includes in the Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director the submissions necessary and relevant for the adjudication of this complaint.

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### Denial of Access Complaint:

On November 3, 2021, the Complainant filed a Denial of Access Complaint with the Government Records Council (“GRC”). The Complainant asserted that the provided records did not provide the reasons for separation. The Complainant contended that simply stating “terminated”, “resigned”, or “retired,” was insufficient under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10.

The Complainant requested that the GRC compel the Custodian to comply fully with the OPRA request and award counsel fees.

### Statement of Information:

On November 12, 2021, the Custodian filed a Statement of Information (“SOI”). The Custodian certified that he received the Complainant’s OPRA request on September 22, 2021. The Custodian certified that his search included retrieving information from online databases as well as paper archives. The Custodian certified he responded in writing on October 28, 2021, providing a spreadsheet containing the requested information.

The Custodian certified that the Borough of Audubon (“Borough”) possessed no additional responsive records. The Custodian contended that the Borough had not entered into separation agreements that would outline the “reason for separation” beyond the provided spreadsheet. Further, the Custodian asserted that there have been no criminal charges or internal affairs investigations with Borough officers that may induce separation agreements between the officers and the Borough. The Custodian contended that if any such investigations occurred, they were conducted outside the Borough’s control.

The Custodian also asserted that earlier in the year the Complainant submitted an OPRA request seeking the same records as those in the instant matter and noted that no additional information has changed. The Custodian thus maintained there were no additional responsive records to provide.

### Additional Submissions:

On November 14, 2021, the Complainant submitted a brief in response to the Complainant’s SOI. The Complainant asserted that the Custodian failed to provide the “real reasons” for separation in response to his OPRA request.

The Complainant initially argued that the terms “terminated”, “retired”, or “resigned,” did not sufficiently provide the “reason for separation” because they were merely types of employment separations and did not adequately describe the underlying basis thereof. The Complainant argued that the “reason” for separation was likely located within a separate document constituting a government record, and the Custodian was obligated to retrieve that record, rather than create a spreadsheet or list containing the words “terminated”, “retired”, or “resigned.”

The Complainant next asserted that in many instances where a police officer is charged for crimes, they may enter a plea agreement which may require them to leave the police department

or be removed from employment because of a conviction. The Complainant argued that it was insufficient for the Custodian to merely state the terms “retired”, “resigned”, or “terminated” as the reason for separation if the “real reason” was that the officer was compelled to separate as part of a plea agreement or sentence. The Complainant thus argued that the Custodian violated OPRA by not providing the “real reasons” for any of the separations listed.

The Complainant asserted that a guilty plea agreement between an officer and prosecutor is akin to a settlement agreement normally entered into in civil proceedings. Libertarians, 465 N.J. Super. 11. The Complainant argued that civil settlement agreements are subject to OPRA, and therefore guilty plea agreements should also be subject to OPRA in accordance with Libertarians.

The Complainant contended the Borough did not want to provide the “real reasons” for separation due to the pervasive culture and predisposition to protect officers convicted of misconduct. The Complainant argued that providing single word descriptions was only partially truthful and did not promote OPRA’s goal of transparency.

The Complainant asserted that as an example of police departments’ culture, he noted that in response to a similar OPRA request, Millville Police Department stated that two (2) officers “resigned” from the department. The Complainant asserted that in fact the officers pleaded guilty to criminal charges and as part of the agreement and sentencing they were required to be separated from the department.

The Complainant requested that the GRC compel the Custodian comply fully and truthfully with the OPRA request. The Complainant also requested the GRC declare the Complainant a prevailing party and award counsel fees.<sup>5</sup>

### Analysis

#### Unlawful Denial of Access

OPRA provides that government records made, maintained, kept on file, or received by a public agency in the course of its official business are subject to public access unless otherwise exempt. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. A custodian must release all records responsive to an OPRA request “with certain exceptions.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. Additionally, OPRA places the burden on a custodian to prove that a denial of access to records is lawful pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.

In Danis v. Garfield Bd. of Educ. (Bergen), GRC Complaint No. 2009-156, *et seq.* (Interim Order dated April 28, 2010), the Council found that the custodian did not unlawfully deny access to the requested records based on the custodian’s certification that all such records were provided to the complainant. The Council held that the custodian’s certification, in addition to the lack of refuting evidence from the complainant, was sufficient to meet the custodian’s burden of proof.

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<sup>5</sup> The Complainant further noted that access to the records should have been granted under the “common law ‘right to access public records’.” However, the GRC does not have the authority to address a requestor’s common law right to access records. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-7(b); Rowan, Jr. v. Warren Hills Reg’l Sch. Dist. (Warren), GRC Complaint No. 2011-347 (January 2013); Kelly v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., GRC Complaint No. 2010-215 (November 2011). Thus, the GRC cannot address any common law right of access to the requested records.

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See also Burns v. Borough of Collingswood, GRC Complaint No. 2005-68 (September 2005); Holland v. Rowan Univ., GRC Complaint No. 2014-63, *et seq.* (March 2015).

Here, the Complainant's OPRA request sought the "[n]ames, date of hire, date of separation and reason for separation, salary at the time of separation who either resigned or retired or terminated or otherwise separated from 2008 to the present." The Complainant also requested any "agreement" between the Borough and any separated officer that would provide the "reason for separation," and included examples of such agreements within subparts (a) and (b) of the request.

The Custodian responded to the Complainant on October 28, 2021, providing the requested information, which included the stated "reason for separation" as "special retirement", "ordinary disability", or "suicide/ survivor benefits" for all identified officers. In the SOI, the Custodian certified that no additional responsive records exist, inclusive of any of the types of "agreements" listed by the Complainant. Although the Complainant identified instances where other municipalities possessed such agreements elaborating on the "reason for separation," he failed to present any evidence that the Borough possessed same at the time of the request.

Accordingly, the Custodian did not unlawfully deny access to the Complainant's September 22, 2021 OPRA request. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. Specifically, the Custodian certified, and the record reflects, that the Borough provided all responsive records containing the requested information. See Danis, GRC 2009-156, *et seq.*

### **Prevailing Party Attorney's Fees**

OPRA provides that:

A person who is denied access to a government record by the custodian of the record, at the option of the requestor, may: institute a proceeding to challenge the custodian's decision by filing an action in Superior Court . . .; or in lieu of filing an action in Superior Court, file a complaint with the Government Records Council . . . . A requestor who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee.

[N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.]

In Teeters v. DYFS, 387 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 2006), the Appellate Division held that a complainant is a "prevailing party" if he achieves the desired result because the complaint brought about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian's conduct. Id. at 432. Additionally, the court held that attorney's fees may be awarded when the requestor is successful (or partially successful) via a judicial decree, a quasi-judicial determination, or a settlement of the parties that indicates access was improperly denied and the requested records are disclosed. Id.

Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled on the issue of "prevailing party" attorney's fees. In Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 71 (2008), the Court discussed the catalyst theory, "which posits that a plaintiff is a 'prevailing

party' if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct" (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 131 S. Ct. 1835, 149 L. Ed. 2d 855 (2001)). In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court held that the phrase "prevailing party" is a legal term of art that refers to a "party in whose favor a judgment is rendered." Id. at 603 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1145 (7<sup>th</sup> ed. 1999)). The Supreme Court rejected the catalyst theory as a basis for prevailing party attorney fees, in part because "[i]t allows an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties . . ." Id. at 605, 121 S. Ct. at 1840, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 863. Further, the Supreme Court expressed concern that the catalyst theory would spawn extra litigation over attorney's fees. Id. at 609, 121 S. Ct. at 1843, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 866.

However, the Court noted in Mason that Buckhannon is binding only when counsel fee provisions under federal statutes are at issue. 196 N.J. at 72, citing Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. at 429; see, e.g., Baer v. Klagholz, 346 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 2001) (applying Buckhannon to the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), cert. denied, 174 N.J. 193 (2002). "But in interpreting New Jersey law, we look to state law precedent and the specific state statute before us. When appropriate, we depart from the reasoning of federal cases that interpret comparable federal statutes." 196 N.J. at 73 (citations omitted).

The Mason Court accepted the application of the catalyst theory within the context of OPRA, stating that:

OPRA itself contains broader language on attorney's fees than the former RTKL did. OPRA provides that "[a] requestor who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. Under the prior RTKL, "[a] plaintiff in whose favor such an order [requiring access to public records] issues . . . may be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee not to exceed \$500.00." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-4 (repealed 2002). The Legislature's revisions therefore: (1) mandate, rather than permit, an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party; and (2) eliminate the \$500 cap on fees and permit a reasonable, and quite likely higher, fee award. Those changes expand counsel fee awards under OPRA.

[196 N.J. at 73-76.]

The Court in Mason, further held that:

[R]equestors are entitled to attorney's fees under OPRA, absent a judgment or an enforceable consent decree, when they can demonstrate (1) "a factual causal nexus between plaintiff's litigation and the relief ultimately achieved"; and (2) "that the relief ultimately secured by plaintiffs had a basis in law." Singer v. State, 95 N.J. 487, 495, cert. denied, New Jersey v. Singer, 469 U.S. 832 (1984).

[Id. at 76.]

Here, the Complainant sought the "[n]ames, date of hire, date of separation and reason for separation, salary at the time of separation who either resigned or retired or terminated or otherwise

separated from 2008 to the present,” as well as any “agreement” providing the “reason for separation.” The Custodian provided a list which stated the “reason for separation” as “special retirement”, “ordinary disability”, or “suicide/ survivor benefits” for all identified officers. The Complainant then filed the instant complaint, asserting that the Custodian failed to provide the “real reason” for the officers’ separations. However, the Custodian certified in the SOI that the Borough did not possess any additional records, including any “agreement” described within the Complainant’s request. Thus, the Complainant has not achieved the desired result and is not a prevailing party in this complaint.

Therefore, the Complainant has not achieved the desired result because the complaint did not bring about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian’s conduct. Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. at 432. Additionally, no factual causal nexus exists between the Complainants’ filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief ultimately achieved. Mason, 196 N.J. at 71. Specifically, the Custodian certified that no additional records exist which contained the requested information. Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. at 432, and Mason, 196 N.J. at 71.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

The Executive Director respectfully recommends the Council find that:

1. The Custodian did not unlawfully deny access to the Complainant’s September 22, 2021 OPRA request. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. Specifically, the Custodian certified, and the record reflects, that the Borough of Audubon provided all responsive records containing the requested information. See Danis v. Garfield Bd. of Educ. (Bergen), GRC Complaint No. 2009-156, *et seq.* (Interim Order dated April 28, 2010).
2. The Complainant has not achieved the desired result because the complaint did not bring about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian’s conduct. Teeters v. DYFS, 387 N.J. Super. 423, 432 (App. Div. 2006). Additionally, no factual causal nexus exists between the Complainant’s filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief ultimately achieved. Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 76 (2008). Specifically, the Custodian certified that no additional records exist which contained the requested information. Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. at 432, and Mason, 196 N.J. at 76.

Prepared By: Samuel A. Rosado  
Staff Attorney

June 20, 2023