

Developing & Implementing a Patient Safety Reporting System

New Jersey PSIC May 2005

Goals for Legislation

Strengthen patient safety
Promote a systematic analysis
Emphasize confidentiality
Sets up reporting system

How Will Information be Used?

Hospital review of events & RCA
DHSS review of events & RCA
Summary of reports
Medical Alerts
Work with hospitals

Process for Reviewing Event Reports/RCAs

Started February 1 using forms and fax Review each form submitted May ask for additional information Confirm receipt of event form □ RCA due in 45 days Also confirm receipt of RCA Confirm that RCA is accepted



□ STEP 1: Facts of Event

□ STEP 2: Causality

□ STEP 3: Action Plan/Measures


Teaching Method

Explain the process
Model an example
Lead an example
Utilize repetition
Build knowledge base

Model Repetition Engagement



Case Example




Initial Event Report

42-year-old male admitted for right knee arthroscopy on 12/23/04

Surgery performed on left knee

Patient informed





Step 2: Causality

Determine pertinent areas

Focus on pertinent areas

Formulate causal statements





5 Rules of Causation

Must show "cause and effect"
No negative descriptions
Human error must have preceding cause
Systems, not people
Violations of procedure must have preceding cause
Duty to act-only if pre-existing



Report of event Description of Event

- □ Triage questions → Areas
- □ Info. from causality
- Action plans

- Areas of causality
 - Causal statements
- Outcome measures

Teaching Method

Explain the process
Model an example
Lead an example
Utilize repetition
Build knowledge base

Model Repeat

Engage



Apply Triage Questions to Event


Surgeon Enters & Cuts (Triage Questions)

Was environment/equip. involved in any way? ➡ Env/Eqp

Were rules/policies/procedures R/P/P
 or lack thereof - a factor?




Focus on Areas of Causality




Areas of Causality

R/P/P	BARRIER	ENV/EQP	HF
Surg.site mark-not consistent	Surg.site mark why failed?	Change in OR	Resident unfamiliar (HFT)
Time-Out why not done?	Time-Out why failed?	Equipment positioning	Tech silent (HFC)





□ Time-Out not done → No monitoring



Causal Statement

[*Something*] increased the likelihood of [*something*] happening......

Causal Statement #1

Lack of monitoring of the Time-Out Policy increased the probability that it would not be part of the preoperative routine, thereby increasing the probability of wrong site surgery.




#5 Was communication among team adequate? No

#13 Did culture support/welcome observations?No. Staff afraid to speak

Incision on Wrong Knee □ Time-Out not done No monitoring Resident preps **Different protocols** "no X" knee □ Staff silent Culture does not

support input



Causal Statement # 3

Incision on Wrong Knee

Time-Out not done
 Resident preps
 "no X" knee
 Staff silent

□ Change of OR

No monitoring Different protocols

 Culture does not support input
 Mirror images invites confusion

STEP 3: Action Plan

Addresses the cause
Specific and concrete
Doable
Consult process owners
Designate point person
Monitor and measure outcomes

Examine Causal Statements

Create action plans for each cause

Actions prevent or minimize future adverse events


Examine each cause; pick strong rather than weak action



Develop Action Plan for Causal Statement #1

Causal Statement #1

Lack of monitoring of the Time-Out Policy increased the probability that it would not be part of the preoperative routine, thereby increasing the probability of wrong site surgery.




Action Plan #1

Designated staff use check-list to ensure a time-out for each surgery; two signatures

Check lists reviewed weekly to ensure that time-outs occurred; records kept


Number of wrong site surgeries monitored



Develop an Action Plan for Each Causal Statement

Be specific
Choose strong rather than weak actions
Choose permanent over temporary
Monitor effectiveness

Goal : minimize event recurrence



Culture of Safety

Confidentiality

□ Blame-free

Empowerment

Recognition

Leadership



□ FRANCES TO DEVELOP



Questions