

### NEW JERSEY STATE SAFETY OVERSIGHT AGENCY



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# ANNUAL PUBLIC RAIL TRANSIT SAFETY REPORT

FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2022

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
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#### Rail Transit Authorities

**Delaware River Port Authority:** Port Authority Transit Corporation John Rink, *Accountable Executive* David Fullerton, *SMS Executive* 

**NJ Transit:** River LINE, Newark Light Rail & Hudson-Bergen Light Rail Kevin Corbett, *Accountable Executive*Brian Lapp, *Chief Safety Officer*Clarice Blackman, *Acting Chief Safety Officer (beginning June 2022)* 



#### Introduction

The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of New Jersey's State Safety Oversight Agency's (NJ SSOA) program.

Pursuant to 49 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 674.11, "Every State that has a Rail Fixed Guideway Public Transportation System [RFGPTS or Rail Transit System (RTS)] must have a State Safety Oversight (SSO) program that has been approved by the Administrator [of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)]. The FTA will audit each State's compliance at least triennially, consistent with the regulation, 49 [United States Code] U.S.C. 5329(e)(9). At minimum, an SSO program must:

- Explicitly acknowledge the State's responsibility for overseeing the safety of the rail transit systems within the State;
- Demonstrate the State's ability to adopt and enforce Federal and relevant State law for safety in rail transit systems;
- Establish a State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA), by State law, in accordance with the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329(e) and this part;
- Demonstrate that the State has determined an appropriate staffing level for the SSOA commensurate with the number, size, and complexity of the rail transit systems in the State, and that the State has consulted with the Administrator for that purpose;
- Demonstrate that the employees and other personnel of the SSOA who are responsible for the oversight of RTSs are qualified to perform their functions, based on appropriate training, including substantial progress toward or completion of the Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program (PTSCTP); and
- Demonstrate that by law, the State prohibits any public transportation agency in the State from providing funds to the SSOA."

Under 49 CFR Part 674.13(a)(7), the State must report, at least once a year, the status of the safety of each RTS to the Governor(s), the FTA, and the board of directors of each RFGPTS.

Executive Order 65 (1997) designates the New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) as the SSOA. New Jersey Administrative Code (N.J.A.C.) 16:53E establishes rules concerning the State's oversight of the safety of RFGPTSs through the NJDOT.

NJDOT (or the NJ SSOA as designated by E.O. 65 (1997)) provides rail transit system safety oversight, reviews projects in engineering and construction, performs accident investigations, approves corrective action plans, and conducts compliance audits for four RTSs in the State of New Jersey. These rail systems are the River LINE, Newark Light Rail (NLR) and Hudson Bergen Light Rail (HBLR) which are all owned by NJ Transit, and the Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO)'s Speedline.

#### What is the State Safety Oversight Program?

The purpose of a State Safety Oversight (SSO) program is to oversee the safety of a Rail Transit System (RTS). An SSO program is administered by eligible states with RTSs under their jurisdiction. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) provides federal funds through the SSO Formula Grant Program for eligible states to develop and carry out their SSO program. Under 49 U.S.C. Section 5329(e), as amended by the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), the FTA is required to certify each state's program to ensure compliance with MAP-21.

The NJ SSOA oversees the safety of four RTSs to ensure they are upholding industry-wide safety standards for riders, employees, equipment, facilities, and the right-of-way (land on which railroad track is located). The program verifies and enforces federal safety regulations throughout each RTS by use of the federally mandated Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP), and further ensures that each system incorporates a Safety Management System (SMS) throughout its operation, utilizing a top-down system of safety promotion and accountability.

## The Role and Responsibility of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)

The FTA monitors each State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) via quarterly check-ins and audits completed every three years. The monitoring is accomplished by utilizing standard evaluation criteria tied directly to FTA regulations. The FTA confirms that SSOA programs are both compliant with federal regulations and effective in safety oversight. The FTA evaluates previous audit findings, risks, and newly identified issues at an SSOA and/or Rail Fixed Guideway Public Transportation System (RFGPTS).

FTA safety-related regulations provide several ways for the FTA to provide safety oversight for the SSO programs and the RFGPTS:

- The FTA may join/participate or lead an investigation or audit. (49 CFR Part 674)
- The FTA may issue a General Directive (49 CFR Part 670) The Administrator may issue a general directive that is applicable to all recipients or a subset of recipients due to an unsafe condition or practice, or a combination of unsafe conditions and practices exists such that there is a risk of death or personal injury, or damage to property or equipment or any situation where the public interest requires the avoidance or mitigation of a hazard or risk.
- The FTA may issue a Special Directive (49 CFR Part 670) The Deputy Administrator may issue a special directive to one or more named recipients due to a recipient engaging in conduct, or there is evidence of a pattern or practice of a recipient's conduct, in violation of the Public Transportation Safety Program (PTASP) or any regulation or directive issued under those laws or an unsafe condition or practice, or a combination of unsafe conditions and practices exists such that there is a substantial risk of death or personal injury, or damage to property or equipment.

The Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act grants the FTA the authority to temporarily assume direct administration of a SSO program in the event of a nonconforming, inadequate, or incapable SSO program. Specifically, the statute outlines three situations where the FTA may assume the safety oversight of an SSO program:

- SSO program "is not being carried out in accordance" with 49 U.S.C. § 5329;
- SSO program "has become inadequate to ensure enforcement of Federal safety regulation";
- SSO program "is incapable of providing adequate safety oversight consistent with the prevention of substantial risk of death or personal injury".

While monitoring SSO programs, should the FTA uncover risks/issues that reach a level of concern, in which regular check-ins do not remedy the situation, the FTA can escalate identified risks/issues to the FTA Administrator, who will determine if temporary direct administration of an SSO program is required. If required, the FTA performs an assessment to inform the forthcoming assumption of decision. The assessment begins the FTA's process, which consists of the following five distinct phases:

- Assessment: Gather and validate information on the SSO program identified as potentially at risk of nonconformance or ineffectiveness;
- **Decision**: Determine if it is necessary to temporarily administer the SSO program;
- *Planning*: Develop a tailored plan for the FTA to temporarily assume direct administration of safety oversight of an SSO program;
- *Execution*: Conduct direct safety oversight for the SSO program and assist the SSO to resolve deficiencies;
- *Relinquishment*: Recertification of an improved SSO program per 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(8)(B)(ii).

#### The State Safety Oversight (SSO) Program Funding

Congress establishes the funding for the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) grant programs. This funding is used by the FTA to issue grants for up to 80% of the reasonable costs of an SSO program. Every state is expected to use these funds to strengthen their program and comply with federal regulations. The New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) applies toll credits for the remaining 20% of the grant. These grants are made available annually to the NJDOT. The NJDOT Office of Fixed Guideway applies for and manages the grant funding. **Table 1-1** presents the apportionment made available for the New Jersey State Safety Oversight Agency (NJ SSOA) program for calendar year 2022.

Table 1-1: 2022 NJ SSOA Program Funding

Federal Grant Year(s)	Federal Allocation	State Allocation (toll credits)	Total
2022	\$919,412	\$183,882	\$1,103,294

The FTA reviews activities to ensure that grant recipients use the funds in a manner consistent with their intended purpose and in compliance with regulatory and statutory requirements. The FTA assesses state management practices and program implementation of several formula grants. The reviews are conducted every three years and encompass seventeen areas of compliance. In the 2022 triennial audit of the NJ SSOA, no grant related issues were identified.

#### The State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA)

Under 49 CFR Part 674.7, an SSOA is an agency established by a state that meets the requirements and performs the functions specified by 49 U.S.C. Section 5329(e) and the regulations set forth in this part.

# The Role and Responsibility of the New Jersey State Safety Oversight Agency (NJ SSOA)

The Program Standard developed by the NJ SSOA, follows all requirements stipulated in 49 CFR 672, 49 CFR 673, and 49 CFR 674. This includes minimum standards for the safety of all Rail Transit Agencies and Systems (RTA/RTSs) within its oversight. These standards are consistent with the National Public Transportation Safety Plan (NPTSP), the Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program (PTSCTP), the rules for Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans (PTASP) and all applicable federal and state laws.

#### Responsibilities of the NJ SSOA program include:

- Requiring Rail Transit Agencies and Systems (RTA/RTSs) to maintain a PTASP that complies with the NJ SSOA Program Standard and federal regulations;
- Requiring the RTAs to develop and follow safety standards based on an all-hazards approach for operations, command and control, and maintenance of the RTSs;
- Requiring the RTA/RTSs to develop, document, and administer a process for performing
  internal safety program compliance reviews/audits and submitting audit plans and
  procedures to the NJ SSOA program for review and potential participation in the actual
  safety program and Safety Management System (SMS) compliance audits;
- Conducting on-site safety program and SMS compliance audits of the RTA/RTSs safety program under the NJ SSOA program jurisdiction once every three years to assess the RTA/RTSs implementation of its safety program and SMS based on the PTASP;
- Requiring RTA/RTSs to notify the NJ SSOA and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) within a required timeframe of any reportable safety event or significant hazard, as defined in the Program Standard and federal regulations;
- Investigating (or causing to be investigated) any reportable event or significant hazard as defined in the Program Standard and federal regulations;
- Requiring RTA/RTSs to develop Corrective Action Plans (CAPs). Tracking progress and evidence of CAP resolution. Monitoring identified safety risks at the RTA/RTSs through reports, meetings, as well as visits to the RTA/RTSs;
- Providing required and requested information, data, and reports to the FTA;

 Participating in capital projects related to rail transit and safety program aspects of the project, including design through safety certification and successful transition from the project to revenue operations and maintenance.

Safety oversight is accomplished through transparent interactions and partnership with each RTA/RTS and the monitoring of all requirements. These requirements are based on the federal and state regulations, the Program Standard, the PTASP and related minimum standards for safety. Any significant issues with meeting these requirements are communicated to the RTA in an appropriate timeframe and tracked. Priorities are established to achieve the following:

- Monitor each RTS's current safety performance compared to the RTA's board approved safety performance targets;
- Monitor each RTS's staff competencies, specifically those who are designated as responsible for audits, examinations, and investigations;
- Work to assure that the SSOA program development and processes are adequate to be aware of each RTS's safety performance and safety risks in operations, maintenance, and projects or modifications to the rail systems and infrastructure.

During certification, the FTA recommended that the New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) maintain a minimum staffing of seven Full Time Employees (FTEs). To comply with this requirement, an average of four FTEs is staffed by NJDOT employees, and an average of three FTEs is staffed by consultant support. This demonstrates NJDOT's level of commitment to the delivery of the program.

The FTA expects the states to staff and otherwise resource their SSO programs (appropriate to the size, number, and complexity of RTAs) with personnel skilled in investigation, analysis, auditing, inspections, administration, and, as appropriate, engineering and capital projects management. The SSO program is responsible for ensuring that designated safety staff (individuals responsible for conducting audits and examinations of transit systems) are qualified through appropriate training, which includes completion of the PTSCTP. The staffing and training of employees must be approved by the FTA and the NJDOT is required to notify the FTA of any changes in staffing.

During this reporting period, the NJDOT met the FTA's recommendation for staffing, and designated safety staff completed and/or continued progress towards completing the FTA training requirements. As of 2022, 50% of the designated safety staff completed their PTSCTP, and the others are in progress.

For 2022, a total of 16,152 hours were expended, the combined efforts of both NJDOT and contracted staff.

#### State Safety Oversight Program Standard (SSOPS)

A State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) must develop and distribute a written State Safety Oversight Program Standard (SSOPS), consistent with the National Public Transportation Safety Plan (NPTSP) and the rules for the Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans (PTASPs). This SSOPS must identify the processes and procedures that govern the activities of the SSOA. Also, the Program Standard must identify the processes and procedures an RTA/RTS must have in place to comply. The New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) SSOPS is available on the State of New Jersey website for transparency with the RTAs/RTSs.

A review of the NJDOT SSOPS that meets the federal requirements set forth in 49 CFR Part 672,

49 CFR Part 673, and 49 CFR Part 674, was conducted in 2022 and a log of future updates is being maintained until the next version is ready for release.

# Rail Fixed Guideway Public Transportation Systems (RFGPTS)

The New Jersey State Safety Oversight Agency (NJ SSOA) is responsible for overseeing the safety of four rail systems, within two rail agencies, that operate under the jurisdiction of the State of New Jersey. One system, Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO), also operates in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. **Table 1-2** presents the RTAs/RFGPTS.

Table 1-2: Rail System Information

RTA	RFGPTS	FTA Mode	Operated & Maintained by	System Length
Delaware River Port Authority	Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO)	Heavy Rail	PATCO	14.5 miles
NJ Transit	River LINE	Light Rail	Southern New Jersey Rail Group, LLC, under contract	34 miles
NJ Transit	Newark Light Rail (NLR)	Light Rail NJ Transit		6.9 miles
NJ Transit	Hudson-Bergen Light Rail (HBLR)	Light Rail	21st Century Rail Corporation, under contract	17 miles

#### **Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO)**

#### Overview

PATCO is owned and operated by the Delaware River Port Authority (DRPA), a heavy rail line that travels between New Jersey and Pennsylvania. PATCO is unique as it is the only bi-state RTS regulated by the NJ SSOA. Oversight has been determined through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between New Jersey and Pennsylvania. PATCO extends approximately 14.5 miles of double track grade separated system from Lindenwold, New Jersey to the City of Philadelphia. There are 13 active rail stations that service an estimated 34,000 daily passengers. Passengers are transported on 60 married pairs of recently refurbished railcars (120 cars in total). PATCO uses the Benjamin Franklin Bridge to provide train service between New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The transit line includes 2.3 miles of downtown subway and 12.2 miles above ground track. The system has seven stations below ground (one of which, Franklin Square, is permanently closed), as well as seven stations above ground. PATCO operates 24-hours-a-day service throughout the year. System safety is provided by Pulse Code Cab Signal System and Wayside Signals at interlockings. Train cars operate under an Automatic Train Control, from a Central Train Control Tower located in Camden. Train movement is powered by a 750 VDC third rail electric power system.





#### **River LINE**



#### Overview

The River LINE is owned by New Jersey Transit and operated and maintained by Southern New Jersey Rail Group, LLC. The River LINE operates 20 married pairs of articulated vehicles. The light rail transit system operates for approximately 34 miles between the cities of Trenton and Camden, New Jersey. The River LINE provides service to major New Jersey locations including the Waterfront Entertainment Center, Rutgers University, Walter Rand Transportation Center in Camden, the Trenton Transportation Center, and towns throughout Burlington County. The River LINE operates as a Light Rail Transit in the city of Camden, in street running mode. The alignment has 73 grade crossings, 21 station stops, and 23 rail bridges. It travels through small towns and sensitive wetland areas. Outside the City of Camden, the River LINE operates on comingled track with Conrail operating over the track at night. Train safety is provided by Wayside Signals with Positive Inductive Train Stop for absolute stop signals. Train movements function according to the Northeast Operating Rules Advisory Committee (NORAC) using the Central Traffic Controls (CTC) from a command office in Camden. The River LINE provides service to approximately 5,500 passengers daily.




#### **Newark Light Rail**



#### **Overview**

The Newark Light Rail (NLR) System is owned and operated by New Jersey Transit. It is a 6.9-mile light rail line that operates as a rapid transit link between terminal stations at Penn Station in Newark, NJ and Grove Street Station in Bloomfield, NJ, with an extension connection from Penn Station to Broad Street Station. The doubletracked light rail line is in an underground tunnel for 1.7 miles and either at grade or a grade separated depressed cut for 3.8 miles and approximately 1 mile of street running territory. The light rail transit vehicles are virtually identical to those used on Hudson – Bergen Light Rail (HBLR), without the running gear. The NLR system is powered by a direct current (DC) variable tension electrical system. catenary The system approximately 16,000 passengers daily and operates 21 hours a day, 7 days a week.



#### **Hudson-Bergen Light Rail**



#### Overview

The Hudson Bergen Light Rail Transit System (HBLR) is owned by New Jersey Transit and operated and maintained by Twenty First Century Rail Corporation. The system operates for approximately 17 route miles of double track between Bayonne, New Jersey and North Bergen, New Jersey. HBLR operates 52 recently refurbished and extended, electrically powered train cars, operating in married pairs. The trains are powered by a direct current (DC) catenary system. The HBLR line provides service to approximately 52,000 passengers daily while running 20 hours a day, 7 days a week. The high-speed rail service provides 24 station stops and 2 employee flag stops. The line starts above ground at the southern terminus in Bayonne, NJ and operates primarily on grade separated right-of-way with approximately two miles of street running in mixed traffic. The at-grade crossings are equipped with transit signal priority to automatically change the traffic signal to favor the light rail transit system. Train movements are governed by a multi- aspect color signal system. The rail line progresses north through a double track 4,096-foot-long tunnel to the northern terminus at North Bergen, NJ.



#### Implementation of New Federal Regulations

#### **Bipartisan Infrastructure Law**

On November 15, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden Jr. signed the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, enacted as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which continues the public transportation safety program for fiscal years 2022-2026. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law amended 49 U.S.C §5329 to require State Safety Oversight Agencies (SSOAs) to conduct risk-based inspections of the rail fixed guideway public transportation systems that the SSOA oversees. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law also added a provision directing FTA to issue a Special Directive to each SSOA on the development and implementation of risk-based inspection programs (see 49 U.S.C. §5329(k)(5)).

Federal Transit Administration (FTA) issued a Special Directive 22-38 on October 21, 2022 that required the New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) to develop and implement a risk-based inspection program as required by 49 U.S.C. § 5329(k). In accordance with 49 U.S.C. §5329 and 49 CFR Part 670, FTA directed NJDOT to: (1) submit documentation that demonstrates the SSOA has developed a risk-based inspection program in accordance with this Special Directive and the criteria set forth in U.S.C. §5329(k) within two years of the issuance of this Directive; and (2) within one year of FTA's approval of the SSOA's risk-based inspection program, submit documentation that demonstrates the SSOA has implemented that approved program for at least six months.

As of issuance of this report, and in consultation with the FTA, the SSOA is on track to make documentation submission in April 2024. Once the submission is reviewed and approved by the FTA, the SSOA must demonstrate six months of implementation.

#### State Safety Oversight Reporting and Data Collection

#### **Electronic Reporting**

The collection and evaluation of data is essential to improving safety. The New Jersey State Safety Oversight Agency (NJ SSOA) focuses on collecting and analyzing meaningful and actionable data. The data in this report is compiled from the annual submission to the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) for calendar year 2022, as submitted via the FTA's State Safety Oversight Reporting (SSOR) database. SSOR fulfills the following requirements:

- 49 CFR Part 674.39 states data "must be submitted electronically through a reporting system specified by FTA."
- 49 CFR Part 674.33(a) includes "the criteria and thresholds for accident notification and reporting are defined in a reporting manual developed for the electronic reporting system specified by the FTA as required in 49 CFR Part 674.39(b), and in appendix A."

In addition to data collection and submission of transit safety data to the FTA, the web based SSOR system provides: Data Analytics, Communications (between FTA and NJ SSOA), and an Event Discrepancy Tracker. The NJ SSOA met the FTA SSOR annual reporting deadlines for calendar year 2022.

#### New Jersey State Safety Oversight Agency (NJ SSOA) Databases

The NJ SSOA maintains databases created to collect and store data, the Electronic Accident Reporting (EAR) database and Accident / Incident Database (ACID). The Rail Transit Agencies and Rail Transit Systems (RTA/RTSs) enter data into the EAR database, which is then imported into ACID by the NJ SSOA. This data is evaluated for accuracy and monitored as part of the oversight process. Portions of numerous reports are shared with the FTA and utilizing a systematic verification process increases the data's credibility. These two databases have continued to ensure the accuracy and efficiency of reportable events as well as the flow of communication between the NJ SSOA and the RTAs. **Figure 1-1** shows the interface of the NJ SSOA's ACID database.



Figure 1-1: ACID Database - Data Entry Selection

#### 2022 Annual Safety Statistics

The following sections represent data submitted as part of the New Jersey State Safety Oversight Agency (NJ SSOA) Annual Submission to the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) using the State Safety Oversight Reporting (SSOR) database for the calendar year 2022. For uniformity, data is represented by Rail Transit Agency (RTA). Port Authority Transit Corporation's (PATCO) data is singular and NJ Transit's data is an aggregate of three Rail Transit Systems (RTSs): River LINE, Newark Light Rail (NLR), and Hudson-Bergen Light Rail (HBLR).

#### **Field Visits**

Recognizing that each Rail Transit System (RTS) has unique characteristics, the New Jersey State Safety Oversight Agency (NJ SSOA) routinely visits each system to perform observations and build our knowledge. During the visits, the NJ SSOA examines the system's implementation of their safety program and performs inspections of vehicles, stations, and facilities. The intent of these activities is to identify and prevent potential safety concerns from developing into safety events. **Table 2-1** presents NJ SSOA field visits completed for the calendar year 2022.

Table 2-1: 2022 NJ SSOA Field Visits

RTA/RFGPTS	2022
DRPA - PATCO	20
NJ Transit (River LINE, NLR, and HBLR)	102

#### **Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans (PTASPs)**

A PTASP describes a rail agency's safety policies, procedures, objectives, and responsibilities. Additional PTASP updates were required for compliance with the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. One of the most notable requirements was that a Joint Labor/Management committee be instituted by July 31, 2022. The committee must review and approve the PTASP no later than December 31, 2022. All RTAs met these FTA deadlines. Once board-approved, these PTASPs will be reviewed and adopted by the SSOA. Table 2-2 presents PTASP implementation dates for calendar year 2022.

Table 2-2: RFGPTS PTASP Implementation Dates

RTA/RFGPTS	Implementation Date	Committee Approval
DRPA - PATCO	June 2, 2020	September 14, 2022
NJ Transit River LINE	August 3, 2020	August 31, 2022
NJ Transit NLR	August 3, 2020	September 2, 2022
NJ Transit HBLR	August 3, 2020	September 29, 2022

#### **Accidents – Notification and Reporting**

In accordance with 49 CFR Part 674.33, Appendix to 49 CFR Part 674 (shown below), and the New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) Program Standard, events that meet the thresholds in **Table 2-3** are required to be reported to and investigated by the NJ SSOA and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA).

Table 2-3: Notification and Reporting of Accidents

Human Factors	Property Damage	Types of Events (Examples)
- Fatality (occurring at the scene or within 30 days following the accident) - One or more persons suffering serious injury	- Property damage resulting from a collision involving a rail transit vehicle or any derailment of a rail transit vehicle	<ul> <li>A collision between a rail transit vehicle and another rail transit vehicle</li> <li>A collision at a grade crossing resulting in a serious injury or fatality</li> <li>A collision with a person resulting in a serious injury or fatality</li> <li>A runaway train</li> <li>Evacuation due to life safety reasons</li> <li>A derailment (mainline or yard)</li> <li>Fires resulting in a serious injury or fatality</li> </ul>

As part of the Rail Transit Agency (RTA)'s responsibility, they must also report these events electronically to the FTA's National Transit Database (NTD) within 30 days of an event. Submissions for events that meet the FTA's threshold for a Reportable Accident are pre-populated into the FTA State Safety Oversight Reporting (SSOR) system, and categorized by the FTA into one of the following Event Types:

- Derailment
- Rail Grade Crossing (RGX) Collision
- Collision (Non-RGX)
- Fire (Causing Serious Injury or Fatality)
- Runaway Train
- Evacuation due to life safety reasons
- Fatalities (one or more within 30 calendar days of safety event)\*
- Serious Injury\*

#### Accident Reporting in 2022

**Table 2-4** presents the total number of accidents reported by the Rail Transit Agencies (RTAs) to the New Jersey State Safety Oversight Agency (NJ SSOA) and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) for calendar year 2022:

Table 2-4: 2022 Accidents

RTA/RFGPTS	2022
DRPA - PATCO	10
NJ Transit (River LINE, NLR, and HBLR)	21
Total	31

<sup>\*</sup>These events account for serious injuries or fatalities not otherwise attributed to a collision, derailment, fire, runaway train, or evacuation for life safety reasons. Accident Reporting in 2022

#### 2022: PATCO Accidents and Probable Causes

There were ten (10) FTA-reportable accidents in 2022. **Table 2-5** presents the 2022 PATCO Count of Probable Cause by FTA Event Type. The probable cause is identified by PATCO unless the investigation was on-going.

Table 2-5: 2022 PATCO Count of Probable Cause by FTA Event Type

FTA Event Type	Total by Event Type	Probable Cause	Count by Probable Cause	Serious Injuries	Fatalities
Collision between 2 or more rail transit vehicles	1	Operating Rule – Human Factor	1	0	0
Collision (non-RGX)	3	Other - Shadows prevented operator from seeing the object on the Ben Franklin Bridge.	1	0	0
		On-going investigation	2	0	3
Derailment	1	On-going investigation	1	0	0
Evacuation for Life		Other - The smoke did not originate from the train or transit facilities.	1	0	0
Safety Reasons	2	On-going investigation	1	0	0
		Operating Rule – Human Factor	1	1	0
All Other Categories	3	Trespasser - A person climbed or jumped from the pedestrian walkway above PATCO's track 1 on the Ben Franklin Bridge. The person fell onto the track and suffered serious injuries.	1	1	0
		Other - Customer was intoxicated and fell into track area and was electrocuted by 3 <sup>rd</sup> rail.	1	0	1

#### National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Investigation of Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) Contractor Fatalities

On October 14, 2022, about 9:21 pm local time, Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) train struck and killed two contractor employees on track 2 on the Benjamin Franklin Bridge in Camden, New Jersey. The train was traveling west at 33 mph and had 68 passengers aboard.

Parties to this investigation include the Port Authority Transit Corporation, the New Jersey Department of Transportation, the Federal Transit Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Delaware River Port Authority. **Figure 2-1** Aerial photograph of the approximate accident location.

Figure 2-1: Aerial photograph of the approximate accident location



This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors will be corrected when the final report has been completed. This information may be obtained from <a href="https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/RRD23FR001.aspx">www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/RRD23FR001.aspx</a>.

#### 2022: NJ Transit (River LINE, NLR, HBLR) Accidents and Probable Causes

There were 21 FTA-reportable accidents in 2022. **Table 2-6** presents the NJ Transit Count of Probable Cause by FTA Event Type. The probable cause is identified by NJ Transit unless the investigation was on-going.

Table 2-6: 2022 NJ Transit Count of Probable Cause by Accidents Category

FTA Event Type	Total by Event Type	Probable Cause	Count by Probable Cause	Serious Injuries	Fatalities
RGX Collision	9	Action of Motorist	8	4	0
KGA Comsion	9	Trespasser	1	0	1
		Operating Rule – Human Factor	2	0	0
Derailment	7	Other - Uniqueness of the track structure in the yard, where it interacts with the asphalt pavement, makes it a difficult area for non- revenue vehicles to traverse.	1	0	0
		On-going Investigation	4	0	0
		Action of Motorist	1	0	0
Collision (non-RGX)		Equipment Failure	1	0	0
	4	Operating Rule – Human Factor	1	1	0
		Trespasser	1	1	0
Runaway Train	1	On-going Investigation	1	0	0

#### **Corrective Action Plans (CAPs)**

As part of its responsibilities under the New Jersey State Safety Oversight Agency (NJ SSOA) program, the NJ SSOA oversees the Rail Transit Agency (RTA)'s development and implementation of CAPs. The purpose of a CAP is to establish the basis of a plan, developed by the RTA, which describes the discovery of a risk or hazard and the actions the RTA will take to minimize, control, correct or eliminate that risk or hazard; including the schedule for the planned actions and the responsible individual who will actualize and execute the plan (49 CFR Part 674.37). In addition, the RTA must provide periodic CAP updates to the NJ SSOA until the risk or hazard has been resolved, or until the risk has been lowered to an acceptable level; thereby, keeping the safety issue in the forefront of the RTA's efforts and preventing neglect.

CAPs are developed by the RTAs for the following activities: investigation reports, internal or external safety compliance audits, and three-year safety compliance reviews and audits (from the NJ SSOA program or Federal Transit Administration (FTA) triennial compliance audit of the NJ SSOA program). CAPs may also be developed from other sources such as a hazard identification and analysis, risk assessments, and risk monitoring by the RTA or the NJ SSOA.

#### CAP Reporting in 2022

**Table 2-7** presents the total number of CAPs reported by the RTAs to the NJ SSOA for calendar year 2022:

Table 2-7: Reported CAPs in 2022

RTA/RFGPTS	2022
DRPA - PATCO	0
NJ Transit (River LINE, NLR, and HBLR)	9
Total	9

The difference in CAPs reported in 2022 is attributed to the implementation of a Safety Management System (SMS) which promotes the development of CAPs. Notably the NJ SSOA completed triennial audits of two systems at the end of 2022, which resulted in the development of CAPs by the RTAs in 2022.

The FTA categorizes CAPs into the following **Source Types**:

- Event
- Inspection (Announced)
- Inspection (Unannounced)
- Internal Audit

- SMS Assessment
- SSO Triennial Audit of RTA
- Other


#### PATCO CAPs

There were no CAPs reported by PATCO for calendar year 2022.

#### NJ Transit CAPs

**Figure 2-2** presents nine CAPs reported by NJ Transit for calendar year 2022, categorized by FTA Source Type.

Figure 2-2: 2022 NJ Transit CAPs (9)



#### Hazards

Hazards are real or potential conditions that can cause injury, illness, or death; damage to or loss of the facilities, equipment, rolling stock, or infrastructure of a Rail Fixed Guideway Public Transportation System (RFGPTS); or damage to the environment; and that meet the Rail Transit Agency's (RTA) thresholds in their safety plans for reporting to the New Jersey State Safety Oversight Agency (NJ SSOA) program. Table 2-8: Hazards presents a generalized sample of hazard categories.

Table 2-8: 2022 Hazards

Hazard Category	Question
Unwanted Energy	Is there an environment capable of producing an unwanted release of energy?
Configuration	Is the workplace configured so that workers can be caught in, on, between equipment and that employees can strike an object?
Mechanical	Can an employee be struck by an object or be struck by a moving mechanical object?
Gravity	Is there potential for slipping, tripping, or falling due to gravity?
Chemicals/ Substances	Does the presence of chemicals or substances pose a threat to the safety and health of the workers and customers?
Overexertion	Could the employee overexert from pushing, pulling, bending, twisting, repetitive motion, vibration or lifting?
Environmental	Is the working or operating environment hazardous to safety and/or health?
Human Factors	Is the task designed to be either too complicated, too simple, or contribute to human error?

#### Hazards Reporting in 2022

Hazard reporting is no longer available in the SSOR system.

#### Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

From January 2021 to April 2022, the federal government required masks on public transportation conveyances and at transportation hubs. As a result of a court order, effective April 18, 2022, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) cancelled their 2021 Order requiring masks on public transportation conveyances and at transportation hubs.

From March 2020 to September 2022, FTA collected information from FTA recipients and subrecipients on the impacts of COVID-19, including transit workforce counts, service impacts, and transit worker positives, fatalities, and recoveries. All agencies that provided transit service and submit reports to the National Transit Database (NTD) as urban reporters or tribal transit agencies reported this information directly. State recipients of Section 5311 grants reported on behalf of their applicable subrecipients. FTA used this data to inform FTA actions in support of the transit industry's COVID-19 response and recovery efforts and implementation of the federal mask requirement for public transportation.

Bipartisan Infrastructure Law changes require that all PTASPs include strategies to minimize the exposure of the public, personnel, and property to hazards and unsafe conditions, and consistent with guidelines of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or a State health authority, minimize exposure to infectious diseases.

## Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Safety Advisory 22-1: Rail Car Passenger Door Inspection and Function Testing

The purpose of Safety Advisory 22-1, issued on October 13, 2022, is to recommend safety practices for Periodic Maintenance Inspections (PMI) for Rail Car Passenger Door Inspection and Function Testing. FTA recommends that State Safety Oversight Agencies (SSOAs) direct rail transit agencies (RTAs) to review current RTA policies, procedures, and checklists for Rail Car Passenger Door PMIs to determine if they meet the recommended practices outlined in this FTA Safety Advisory and should revise and improve them as necessary. As of issuance of this report, all RTAs have complied with the Safety Advisory. Additionally, SSOA key staff observed periodic maintenance and performed document review at each RFGPTS. Upon verification, a report was issued to each RTA.

## Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Safety Advisory 22-2: Signal System Safety and Train Control

The purpose of Safety Advisory 22-2, issued on October 13, 2022, is to recommend that State Safety Oversight Agencies (SSOAs) direct Rail Transit Agencies (RTAs) who operate Rail Fixed Guideway Public Transportation Systems in their jurisdictions to consider signal system safety and train control as part of the RTA's Safety Risk Management (SRM) process. In addition, the FTA advises SSOAs to incorporate SA 22-2 into their oversight activities. As of issuance of this report, the SSOA performed in-person observations and reviews of inspection and maintenance programs across all four RFGPTS. These evaluations revealed that all four RTAs were following most of the FTA's recommended practices, with the SSOA recommending several opportunities for improvement. The implementation of these recommendations is currently being monitored.

#### Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Safety Advisory 22-4: Suicide Prevention

The purpose of Safety Advisory 22-4, issued on December 5, 2022, is to encourage transit agencies to implement suicide prevention signage and messaging to reduce suicide attempts, as well as to assess suicide event data to monitor the effect of updated signage efforts. As of issuance of this report, PATCO has installed additional station signage which includes the 988 Lifeline. NJ Transit has not indicated which Safety Advisory recommendations they intend to implement. **Figure 2-3** presents a graphic from the National Suicide & Crisis Lifeline: 988.

Figure 2-3: National Suicide & Crisis Lifeline



## Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Safety Bulletin 20-1: End-of-Railcar Door Messaging

As a follow-up to an incident involving a Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) subway train, in which a seven-year-old boy was struck and killed about ten feet south of the Alleghany Station Platform, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the child fell between the railcars as he was walking through the end-of-railcar doors while the train departed the station. NTSB reviewed the end-of-railcar door safety messaging in the railcars of several agencies and found that, while many agencies have signage that instructs passengers not to pass through the doors, the signage is not standardized or uniform in design across transit properties. **Figures 2-4 & 2-5** demonstrate the SEPTA door warning at the time of the accident and following the accident.

Figure 2-4: SEPTA door warning at time of accident, "NO PASSING THROUGH"



Figure 2-5: Enhanced SEPTA door warning following this accident



In 2022, the FTA issued a Request for Information and the New Jersey State Safety Oversight Program coordinated the collection of data of all existing end-of-railcar door messaging and signage on rail transit vehicles and submitted this information to the FTA. The NJSSOA added this item to the risk-based monitoring program to be regularly assessed.

## Internal Audits by Rail Transit Agencies (RTAs)/Rail Fixed Guideway Public Transportation Systems (RFGPTSs)

Each Rail Transit System (RTS) is required to develop a three-year cycle of internal compliance audits of all aspects of the Public Transit Agency Safety Plan (PTASP), covering approximately one-third of the PTASP's components and subcomponents each year. The purpose of the internal safety audit is to compare the content of the safety program documentation to the activities that the RTS implements. Findings and changes may require the program documentation or minimum standards for safety to be updated to reflect current activities, or activities may need to be changed or added so the documents and activities match.

Each RTA/RFGPTS is required to provide the New Jersey State Safety Oversight Agency (NJ SSOA) program with an Annual Report by February 12th which includes: a listing of the internal safety audits/reviews conducted for that year, a discussion of where the RTA/RFGPTS is regarding its three-year audit/review schedule, and the status of all findings, recommendations and corrective actions taken/plans resulting from the audit/reviews conducted that year.

**Table 2-9** presents the status of internal audits for calendar year 2022:

Table	2-0.	2022	Interna	1 Audit	Status
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RTA	RFGPTS	2022	
DRPA	PATCO	Completed	
NJ Transit	River LINE	Completed	
NJ Transit	NLR	Completed	
NJ Transit	HBLR	Completed	

## Triennial Audits by the New Jersey State Safety Oversight Agency (NJ SSOA)

49 CFR 674.31 requires SSOAs to complete comprehensive safety audits of each Rail Transit System (RTS) under its oversight, once every three years. The audits at each system examine implementation of the safety program as documented in their Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP), including the minimum standards for safety and related documentation, NJ SSOA Standard and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) regulations. In 2022, the NJ SSOA completed scheduled audits of two NJ Transit RTSs, Hudson-Bergen Light Rail (HBLR) and the River LINE. Newark Light Rail (NLR) and PATCO were up to date as they were last audited 2020. The focus of these audits was a detailed examination of system processes and procedures as well as implementation.

## FTA Triennial Review of the New Jersey State Safety Oversight Agency (NJ SSOA)

The New Jersey State Safety Oversight Agency (NJ SSOA) program worked to close nine finding and implement changes to address the noncompliance identified during the recent FTA triennial audit. A finding of noncompliance is determined when FTA finds that a required element of an SSOA's program does not meet the SSO Rule (49 CFR Part 674) requirements. Three findings relate to the NJDOT Program Standard, which does not include the Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) rule requirements. One finding relates to NJDOT Staffing and Qualifications. The remaining five findings relate to deficiencies of NJDOT oversight of rail transit agencies

(RTAs) in the areas of: Internal safety review notifications; Accident notifications; Corrective action plan (CAP) review and approval processes; and CAP schedules for implementation. **Table 2-10** presents the nine findings of noncompliance in the NJDOT SSO program.

Table 2-10: 2022 NJDOT Audit Review Findings by FTA

Finding	Required Actions	Compliance Status	Implementation Date
1) Section 2.8. 674.25(a)–NJDOT must submit an updated Program Standard incorporating FTA rules requirements.	NJDOT must update its Program Standard and implement minimum standards consistent with FTA rules.	Open	Proposed 3/31/23
2) Section 4.1.674.27(a)(2)–NJDOT did not annually review, revise, and distribute the Program Standard.	NJDOT must develop and implement a process for the annual review, revision, and distribution of the Program Standard.	Closed	8/17/22
3) Section 4.2. 674.27(a) –NJDOT's Program Standard did not meet the minimum requirements established under 49 CFR Part 674.27.	NJDOT must submit an updated Program Standard incorporating the FTA rules requirements.	Closed	1/27/22
4) Section 5.2. 674.25(f) and 672.21 – NJDOT did not ensure that all designated personnel were identified in the Technical Training Plan (TTP) and did not ensure that all designated personnel were enrolled in the Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program (PTSCTP).	NJDOT must submit documentation showing all designated SSO personnel are included in the TTP and enrolled in the PTSCTP.	Closed	1/27/22
5) Section 6.1. 673.13(a), 674.13(a)(4), 674.25(b), 674.29(c), and 674.37(a) – NJDOT did not have a documented process for review and approval of the RTA's Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans.	NJDOT must develop, submit, and implement a process for reviewing and approving Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans.	Open	Proposed 3/31/23
6) Section 7.1. 674.27(a)(4) –NJDOT did not ensure that the RTAs' internal safety audit notifications were properly provided.	NJDOT must update, submit, and implement its process for RTAs' internal safety audit safety reviews.	Closed	8/17/22
7) Section 8.1. 674.33(a) –NJDOT did not ensure that the RTAs met the FTA two-hour notification requirement. NJDOT must update, submit, and implement its process to ensure RTAs notify FTA of all reportable accidents.	NJDOT must update, submit, and implement its process to ensure RTAs notify FTA of all reportable accidents within two hours.	Closed	8/17/22
8) Section 10.1. 674.27(a)(8) and 674.37(a)  –NJDOT did not ensure that the RTAs developed CAPS as required.	NJDOT must develop, submit, and implement a CAP process, to include, identifying thresholds for developing CAPs and ensure RTA CAPs are submitted, reviewed, approved, and tracked.	Open	Proposed 3/31/23
9) Section 10.2. 674.37(a) –NJDOT did not ensure that the RTAs included an accurate schedule for CAPs.	NJDOT must develop, submit, and implement a CAP monitoring process to ensure CAP tracking logs are updated and contain all required information, including current schedules.	Open	Proposed 3/31/23

#### Annual Major System Improvements

**Table 3-1** presents major improvement projects that were either started, continued, or completed for calendar year 2022 at the Rail Transit Systems (RTSs).


Table 3-1: Major System Improvement Projects

#	RFGPTS	Project	Value (\$Million)	2022 Status
1	PATCO	Station Enhancements	6	On-going
2	PATCO	Franklin Square Station Reopening	30	On-going
3	PATCO	Elevator Installations	31	On-going
4	PATCO	Solar Energy Generation	-	Completed
5	PATCO	In-Ground Hoist	5.9	On-going
6	PATCO	Way Interlocking Rehabilitation	14.3	Completed
7	PATCO/ River LINE	Glassboro-Camden	Approx. 2000	On-going
8	River LINE	Onboard Security Cameras	0.7	Completed
9	River LINE	Right-of-Way Flooding Mitigation Study	1	Completed
10	River LINE	Fleet Repower	85	On-going
11		Engine Fire Suppression		On-going
12	River LINE	Mid-Life Overhaul		On-going
13	NLR	Capacity Enhancement Program	33	On-going
14	NLR	Station Modernization and Access Program	130	On-going
15	NLR	Newark Penn Station (Backup Operations Control) Rehabilitation		Completed
16	HBLR	Hoboken Wye Bypass	89	On-going
17	HBLR	Paterson Ave Grade Crossing Elimination	136	On-going
18	HBLR	Route 440 Extension	248	On-going
19	HBLR	Northern Branch Corridor	1180	On-going

#### Franklin Square Station Reopening

As a result of development surrounding Philadelphia's Franklin Square area, the historical Franklin Square Station is returning. Since its grand opening in 1936, the station, located near Seventh and Race Streets, has sporadically closed and reopened with the last period of passenger service between 1976 and 1979. **Figure 3-6** presents a rendering of the finished station.

Figure 2-6: Rendering of the finished Franklin Square Station



#### Glassboro-Camden Light Rail

The proposed Glassboro-Camden Line (GCL) is an 18-mile light rail transit (LRT) line intended to extend mobility into the Philadelphia-Camden metro area and reduce vehicular traffic. The GCL calls for fourteen new stations from Glassboro to Camden and would allow for passengers to transfer to the PATCO Speedline for expedited access to Philadelphia and other parts of Camden County. The line would run two sets of trains, each of which would carry 300 passengers, with departures every 15 minutes during peak/midday periods; a one-way trip would only take between 35-40 minutes, serving as an invaluable option for local commuters.

The project is jointly managed by the Delaware River Port Authority (DRPA), NJ TRANSIT, and PATCO. South Jersey Transit Partners was contracted in October of 2022 to conduct preliminary engineering services. The current phase is expected to take three years, and the entire project has a tentative completion date set for 2028.

#### Annual Rail Transit System (RTS) Emergency Drills

Annually, each RTS conducts emergency drills in coordination with local emergency responders. Emergency drills are recommended by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and American Public Transportation Association (APTA). NJ Transit drills are coordinated by the NJ Transit Police Department (NJTPD), and PATCO drills are coordinated by the Delaware River Port Authority Police Department (DRPA PD). The New Jersey State Safety Oversight Agency (NJ SSOA) attends drills as an observer and reviews the after-action report. A summary of the drills completed for calendar year 2022 are detailed below.

#### **PATCO Emergency Drills**

PATCO completed a Tabletop Exercise on October 17, 2022. The exercise included review of Cyber Security. The agency completed an after-action report which indicated that the exercise was a success.



#### **NJ Transit Emergency Drills**

#### **River LINE**

On June 4, 2022, River LINE conducted a drill simulating a flood situation. This drill was conducted at Bordentown passenger station. The agency completed after action reports which indicated the drill was successful. Figure 3-1 shows River LINE's 2022 emergency drill, which simulated a train stuck on a bridge above Blacks Creek due to high flood waters. While the train was incapacitated one or more passengers experienced medical emergency. a Emergency personnel deployed boats into Blacks Creek, which then docked beneath the stranded LRV. Emergency personnel then scaled the steep embankment, to reach the individual(s) experiencing the medical emergency. Our observers witnessed three (3) "victims" being removed from the LRV and brought to the safety of the Bordentown dock, where emergency medical personnel were on site. In another instance, they simulated an individual aboard the stranded train who wished to avoid emergency personnel and jumped off the bridge into the creek. The emergency personnel successfully deployed a drone to drop a life-saving buoyancy object near the 'drowning' victim. It was reported this is a new tactic, that had not been previously tested. Figure 2-7 shows River LINE's 2022 emergency drill.




Figure 2-7: 2022 River LINE Drill

#### Newark Light Rail (NLR)

Figure 2-8: 2022 NLR Drill




On October 1, 2022, NLR conducted a drill focusing on responding to a fire on a light rail vehicle. This drill was conducted at an underground subway station. The agency completed after action reports which indicated the drill was a success. **Figure 2-8** shows NLR's 2022 emergency drill.

#### Hudson-Bergen Light Rail (HBLR)

On December 4, 2022, HBLR conducted a drill focusing on responding to a fire/smoke on a light rail vehicle. The agency completed after action reports which indicated the drill was a success.

Figure 2-9: 2022 HBLR Drill



#### Key Activities 2023 and Beyond

The NJDOT SSOA upcoming activities include the following:

SSOA Approval of (4) PTASPs – 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2023

FTA Grant Application cycle – 2023

Conduct PATCO and NLR Triennial Audits – 2023

Bipartisan Infrastructure Law Requirements & FTA Special Directive – 2023-2025

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